Simplicity and Divine Freedom?

SUMMARY

1,718 words, 9 minutes read time.

In this piece we’re going to ask and answer two questions:

How can a God who is pure act and simple choose among genuine alternatives and enter real relationships with a changing world without gaining parts, powers, or new intrinsic states?

If on God’s side these “relations” are only Cambridge properties and exist “in idea,” in what sense are they genuinely real relations rather than mere conceptual or linguistic designations, and does this entail a participatory metaphysics as well?

Classical Christian thought insists that God is pure act and therefore simple: nothing in Him can develop, divide, or be added (God is perfect after all). Yet, in our common vernacular, our worship, and in scripture, all speak as if God freely chooses, creates, and answers prayer. This tension, in my relational view of things here, is resolved by combining two ideas. A relational horizon view, which says God’s one act already contains every creature directed relation He could freely realize. And, two, Cambridge change type language says that when such a relation is realized the “change” is wholly extrinsic, occurring in creatures, while God’s inner life remains identical with His essence. Horizon language explains where real options live in a simple God; Cambridge language explains how the Trinity’s own self-realization (which is always already realized) leaves this incomparable life unchanged.

QUESTION 1

How can a God who is pure act and simple choose among genuine alternatives and enter real relationships with a changing world without gaining parts, powers, or new intrinsic states?

DEFINITION — RELATIONAL HORIZON

Thomas Aquinas teaches that Father, Son, and Spirit differ only by real relations that are the divine essence [1] (bracketed numbers are sources with notes listed in the bibliography below). Because in God essence is identical with actus purus, no unrealized potency remains [2]. A relational horizon is the total field of possible creaturely relations already implicit in that single act. Omniscience surveys every possible order and omnipotence could freely instantiate any of them [3]. The idea here is that God’s single, simple act of being inherently includes an open “horizon” [20] of all possible relations, which He can freely instantiate (or not) toward creatures without any intrinsic change in Himself.

PROBLEM — SIMPLICITY VS FREEDOM

  • Simplicity: pure act leaves no room for unused capacities [1].
  • Freedom: real choice seems to require live alternatives.

Critics say combining the two forces either modal fatalism, or a covert stock of unrealized powers [5]. Peter Geach’s notion of Cambridge change, helps here as it communicates a shift that affects only relational predicates, not intrinsic states, and clarifies part of the puzzle [4], but by itself can sound like mere linguistic book-keeping. So let’s lay out the full solution in 2 parts.

2 PART SOLUTION

  1. Horizon Gives Positive Depth — Key Terms
  • Saturated phenomenon (Jean-Luc Marion). A phenomenon is saturated when its givenness overwhelms every concept; intuition “overflows intention” [6]. The idea shows how one act can be inexhaustibly fecund without having parts.
  • Explanatory primitive (Jiri Benovsky). A primitive is a posit taken as metaphysically basic and not further analysed [7]. Treating relation as primitive means the fact that x is related to y needs no deeper substrate [8].
  • Logical atomism (Bertrand Russell). Reality bottoms out in atomic facts–either a particular has a quality or several particulars stand in a relation [9]. No deeper layer underlies x R y [10].

Putting these strands together: Marion shows an act can overflow every conceptual frame; Benovsky’s work can show relations can be basic; Russell shows relational facts need no further reduction. Hence, God’s one saturated act already includes, as primitive atomic facts, every relation He may freely realize toward creatures.

  1. Cambridge Change Guards the Perimeter

When God wills to create world W, the relation “Creator of W” crosses the horizon into actuality; the universe changes while God acquires only an extrinsic denomination [4]. Aquinas already noted that creatures are really related to God, whereas in God the relation exists only “in idea” [1]. Recent analytic work shows that differing Cambridge predicates across possible worlds do not entail modal collapse [11][12].

The Geachean definition of Cambridge change makes it crystal‐clear that the predicate flips because something outside God changes, not because God acquires a new real state (https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095544270; https://www.jstor.org/stable/42968647).

  1. How the Two Fit

God’s act is like white light. The relational horizon is the full color spectrum latent in that light. When the prism of creation appears, distinct hues show on the wall; the source light itself does not change [14]. Horizon language explains the spectrum; Cambridge language explains why the source is undisturbed.

APPLICATION

Trinity

Within God the horizon is necessarily actual for the relations of origin, Father begets Son, Son proceeds Spirit, so no composition arises [14].

Creation

God freely instantiates “Creator of W.” Different worlds vary only in creaturely states and in which horizon-relations come true; God’s essence is unchanged [15]. Hence modal-collapse objections fail: necessity attaches only to God’s being, not to which relations He realises [11].

Prayer

Augustine’s counsel “Pray as though everything depended on God” captures the model: our petition triggers the branch of the decree in which God grants the request; the resulting change is purely relational [13].

Spiritual Perspective

Immutability is inexhaustible readiness, not marble stillness. Each new grace-event adds nothing to God but everything to us, making history the theatre where horizon possibilities become relationally real [18].

Final Question:

If on God’s side these “relations” are only Cambridge properties and exist “in idea,” in what sense are they genuinely real relations rather than mere conceptual or linguistic designations, and does this entail a participatory metaphysics as well?

Answer:

Because these predicates track real ontological bonds–creatures depend on God’s act of existence as their cause–they’re not mere words but genuine relational facts. Aquinas holds that while “relation…enters into the notion of the person,” it is really instantiated in the creature’s dependence on God (ST I, q. 28, a. 2). Modern relational metaphysics (Benovsky) shows that such relations are explanatory primitives, requiring no deeper substrate beyond the relata themselves. Russell’s logical atomism affirms that an external fact “God R X” is an atomic fact of reality, not reducible to convention, and Geach’s Cambridge-change framework confirms that when “Creator of W” flips to true it marks a genuine shift in the world’s relation to God, not a new intrinsic state in God himself.

Moreover, yes, this view, or any good and strong Christian view you should, presuppose(s) a participatory metaphysics: finite creatures do not bear being as an accident but exist per participation in God’s ipsum esse, so that every God, creature relation is an authentic participatory bond in His undivided act of being. Hence the “relational horizon” is not merely a list of potential predicates but a horizon of participations, God eternally “offers” His actus essendi, and creatures become real precisely by actualizing those relations, all without adding parts to the divine simplicity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY w/NOTES

  1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I q. 28 “The Divine Relations.” https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm

— Aquinas is the classical source for saying the divine relations are really identical with God’s essence, the cornerstone for any “relational horizon.”

  1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I q. 28 (parallel text and notes). https://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/Summa_Theologiae/Part_I/Q28

— The line-by-line Latin-English notes clarify how Aquinas denies that added accidents arise in God, reinforcing the simplicity side of the dilemma.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Harmonizing Simplicity and Trinity by Analogy.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/harmonizing-simplicity-and-trinity-by-analogy/

— Dryer supplies a contemporary analogue (a musical chord) showing how one act can “sound” as three relations without splitting the essence, illustrating horizon plenitude.

  1. Peter T. Geach, “Cambridge Change,” in Logic Matters (1972). https://www.jstor.org/stable/42968647

— Geach coins the term “Cambridge change,” the analytic tool used here to show that God’s relational shifts leave His intrinsic state untouched.

  1. W. Wallace, “Modal Collapse and Modal Fallacies.” https://philarchive.org/archive/WALMCA-8

— Wallace surveys recent modal-collapse arguments, framing the very objection the horizon-plus-Cambridge model is built to defuse.

  1. Jean-Luc Marion, “Saturated Phenomena, the Icon, and Revelation.” https://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/mason-saturated_phenomena.pdf

— Marion’s concept of a “saturated phenomenon” provides the template for how one simple act can overflow with inexhaustible content.

  1. Jiri Benovsky, “Meta-Metaphysics.” https://philpapers.org/rec/BENM-7

— Benovsky argues that some entities must be taken as explanatory primitives; we adopt “relation” as just such a primitive in the horizon account.

  1. Jiri Benovsky, “Primitiveness, Metaontology, and Explanatory Power.” https://philarchive.org/archive/BENPMA

— This follow-up piece shows why theories that spend fewer primitives for equal explanatory reach are preferable, supporting the elegance of treating relations as basic.

  1. Bertrand Russell, “Logical Atomism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2023). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-atomism/

— Russell’s atomism insists that facts of the form x R y need no deeper substratum, grounding the claim that horizon relations don’t add parts to God.

  1. Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” Lecture 7, The Monist 29 (1919). https://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/br-logical-atomism7.html

— Lecture 7 specifically defends external relations against Bradley, a historical precedent for our external (Cambridge) approach.

  1. Thomas Hünefeldt, “Extrinsic Willing and Knowing Against the Modal Collapse Argument.” https://philarchive.org/archive/HUNDSA-4

— Hünefeldt shows how God can will contingently by extrinsic denominations alone, bolstering the Cambridge-change half of the solution.

  1. Edward Feser, “A Further Reply to Mullins on Divine Simplicity.” https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-further-reply-to-mullins-on-divine.html

— Feser’s post demonstrates how Thomists deploy Cambridge properties to rebut critics who equate simplicity with fatalism.

  1. Saint Augustine (attributed), prayer quotation. https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/saint_augustine_165165

— The maxim “pray as though everything depended on God…” encapsulates the lived expression of horizon freedom and Cambridge responsiveness.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Responding to Dale Tuggy (Relation = Essence). https://robertdryer.com/responding-to-dale-tuggy/

— Dryer’s essay supplies the compact formula “relation = essence,” the lynch-pin for identifying horizon relations with divine simplicity.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Defending Divine Simplicity: Jiri Benovsky.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/jiri-benovsky/

— This article applies Benovsky’s primitive-relation strategy directly to divine freedom, giving a real-time theological use-case.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Defending Divine Simplicity: Jean-Luc Marion.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/jean-luc-marion/

— Dryer integrates Marion’s saturation motif with Thomistic metaphysics, showing why overflow and simplicity need not conflict.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Defending Divine Simplicity: Erich Przywara.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/erich-przywara/

— The piece links the analogia entis with relational ontology, filling out the horizon’s metaphysical backdrop.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Defending Divine Simplicity: Eriugena.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/eriugena/

— By invoking Eriugena’s negative-theology strands, Dryer shows that affirming relational plenitude still respects divine incomprehensibility.

  1. Robert Dryer, “Four Questions on Divine Freedom.” https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/4-questions-around-if-god-always-is-what-he-does-and-can-never-be-different-how-could-creating-the-world-have-been-a-real-choice-rather-than-something-that-had-to-happen/

— This Q&A directly tackles how God’s freedom can coexist with simplicity, making it the practical capstone for the essay’s thesis.

  1. “Horizon” here meaning how God’s one simple act of being carries an inherent, open domain (of possible relations that He can freely instantiate extrinsically without any change in His essence).