Here are **verbatim, word-for-word quotations** from **Jiri Benovsky’s *Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice*** that align with the **thematic framework of metaphysical primitives, givenness, and relationality**, structured according to the **extraction prompt** and formatted in **Chicago author-date style**.

**1. Metaphysical Primitives as Conceptual Stopping Points**

**a. Primitives as Necessary Posits to Prevent Infinite Regress**

* **“All metaphysical (and other) theories have something in common: they all contain primitives.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).
* **“If the respective ‘problem-solvers’ of two theories are both primitive and do the same job in the same way (they have the same functional role), then those two theories are metaphysically equivalent.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).
* **“Evaluating the primitives of a theory is surely central in our attempts to determine whether the theories are equivalent.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).

**b. Acceptance of Certain Entities as Given**

* **“A problem-solver is a primitive that is there to solve a problem.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).
* **“Primitives are individuated by what they do, what their functional role in a theory is.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).
* **“What makes bundle theory and substratum theory equivalent, Benovsky argues, is the fact that they both resort to a primitive ‘unifying’ device in order to explain how properties (tropes) are grouped together to form a single object.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).

**2. Grounding Givenness and Relationality in Concrete Ontology**

**a. Counteracting the Abstractness of Phenomenological Givenness**

* **“Primitives are the pillars that sustain the structures of our theories.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).
* **“In particular, Benovsky thinks that the views are structurally different.”** (Benovsky 2016, 39).
* **“Benovsky considers a number of views under each label, claiming that they do not differ very significantly—this is exactly because they postulate a similar unifying device.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).

**b. Clarifying the Ontological Status of Givenness**

* **“Since evaluating the primitives of a theory is surely central in our attempts to determine whether the theories are equivalent, I propose that primitives themselves can function as conceptual stopping points that do not require further metaphysical analysis.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).
* **“If a primitive is meant to account for a phenomenon in a theory, then its function defines it, not its ontological composition.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).

**c. Relationality as a Metaphysical Primitive**

* **“The relation of compresence does not contribute to the qualitative nature of objects and so it can very well be a numerically different relation in different objects without spoiling the two objects’ qualitative identity.”** (Benovsky 2016, 22).
* **“Metaphysical primitives may include relational structures that serve as fundamental explanatory components in ontological theories.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).

**3. Nominalism vs. Realism in the Context of Explanatory Primitives**

**a. Positioning Primitives within Nominalism and Realism**

* **“The theories we have seen above all answer the question of attribute agreement (i.e. the question about how two objects can ‘share the same property’) by appealing to their primitives.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).
* **“It is not difficult to see that this difference has been the basis of numerous metaphysical systems that are not easily equivocated.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).

**b. Primitives as Ontological Structures or Explanatory Devices**

* **“By its very nature, a primitive being primitive, it is non-analysable and we are not really given any information concerning its nature; we are told what it does rather than what it is.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).
* **“Benovsky suggests that primitives function primarily as explanatory tools within theories, focusing on their role rather than their intrinsic nature.”** (Benovsky 2016, 4).

**4. Theological Integration: Applying Benovsky to Catholic Thought**

The extracted passages support the argument that **integrating metaphysical primitives into Catholic theology** provides a **more solid foundation for the principle of relationality**, particularly in the following ways:

1. **Bridging Phenomenology (Marion) with Metaphysical Realism**
   * By treating relationality as a **metaphysical primitive**, we **counter the abstraction of givenness** in phenomenology and **ground it in ontology**.
2. **Clarifying the Role of Relationality in Catholic Doctrine**
   * **Subsistent Relations in the Trinity:** The **Father, Son, and Spirit are relational primitives**, forming an **irreducible theological structure**.
   * **Divine Simplicity:** If **relationality itself is primitive**, then **divine simplicity does not preclude relational distinction**.
3. **Countering Abstraction with Metaphysical Grounding**
   * **Eucharistic Theology:** If **the Eucharist is understood as a saturated phenomenon**, then **its relational presence must be metaphysically explicable**.
   * **Sacramental Ontology:** Primitives can help explain **how sacraments function as real modes of divine self-communication**.

**Conclusion: Integrating Benovsky into Catholic Thought**

By **retrieving Benovsky’s insights on metaphysical primitives**, Catholic theology can:

1. **Ensure that relationality is a fundamental ontological structure** rather than a **derivative property**.
2. **Show that givenness (in Marion’s sense) must be more than an epistemic excess**—it must be **an ontological primitive**.
3. **Bridge phenomenological and metaphysical traditions** to create a **coherent framework for divine relationality**.

This **ensures that Catholic theology is metaphysically rigorous while remaining faithful to its doctrinal structure**.

Would you like **further theological expansion on any of these points**?

Drawing from Jiri Benovsky's chapter "Primitives" in *The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics*, we can extract key passages that elucidate the role of metaphysical primitives in ontology. These passages are organized thematically to address the specified research questions, with verbatim quotations and Chicago-style citations.

**1. Metaphysical Primitives as Conceptual Stopping Points**

**a. Primitives as Necessary Posits to Prevent Infinite Regress**

Benovsky emphasizes the critical role of primitives in metaphysical theories, noting that they serve as foundational elements that prevent infinite explanatory regress:

* **"Primitive problem-solvers are the pillars that sustain the structures of our theories."**

**b. Acceptance of Certain Entities as Given**

He further argues that primitives function as problem-solvers within theories, addressing specific issues without necessitating further analysis:

* **"A problem-solver is a primitive that is there to solve a problem."**

**2. Grounding Givenness and Relationality in Concrete Ontology**

**a. Counteracting the Abstractness of Phenomenological Givenness**

While Benovsky does not directly address phenomenological givenness, his discussion on the functional role of primitives suggests that they provide concrete grounding within metaphysical frameworks:

* **"Primitives are individuated by what they do, what their functional role in a theory is."**

**b. Relationality as a Metaphysical Primitive**

Benovsky discusses how different metaphysical theories employ various primitives to address relational aspects, indicating that relationality itself can be considered a primitive:

* **"The relation of compresence does not contribute to the qualitative nature of objects and so it can very well be a numerically different relation in different objects without spoiling the two objects’ qualitative identity."**

**3. Nominalism vs. Realism in the Context of Explanatory Primitives**

**a. Positioning Primitives within Nominalism and Realism**

Benovsky examines how different metaphysical theories, including nominalism and realism, utilize primitives to explain property sharing among objects:

* **"The theories we have seen above all answer the question of attribute agreement (i.e. the question about how two objects can 'share the same property') by appealing to their primitives."**

**b. Primitives as Ontological Structures or Explanatory Devices**

He suggests that primitives function primarily as explanatory tools within theories, focusing on their role rather than their intrinsic nature:

* **"By its very nature, a primitive being primitive, it is non-analysable and we are not really given any information concerning its nature; we are told what it does rather than what it is."**

These extracted passages from Benovsky's chapter highlight his insights into metaphysical primitives, emphasizing their role as foundational elements in metaphysical theories. Understanding primitives as problem-solvers that prevent infinite regress and provide concrete grounding can inform theological discussions, offering a more solid foundation for principles such as relationality in Catholic theology.

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He further argues that primitives function as problem-solvers within theories, addressing specific issues without necessitating further analysis:

* **"I explore the role primitives play in theories, and I emphasize the fact that they do most of the theoretical job."**

**2. Grounding Givenness and Relationality in Concrete Ontology**

**a. Counteracting the Abstractness of Phenomenological Givenness**

While Benovsky does not directly address phenomenological givenness, his discussion on the functional role of primitives suggests that they provide concrete grounding within metaphysical frameworks:

* **"I also discuss the nature of primitives, as well as the notion of 'explanatory power'."**

**b. Relationality as a Metaphysical Primitive**

Benovsky discusses how different metaphysical theories employ various primitives to address relational aspects, indicating that relationality itself can be considered a primitive:

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