Rethinking Divine Simplicity: A Meta‑Metaphysical Reconfiguration

Introduction

My own Trinitarian theology, and the broader Catholic/Orthodox tradition in general, strives to affirm the oneness of God while preserving the real distinction of the three divine Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Traditional metaphysical frameworks have approached this great mystery from two angles. On one hand there’s the constituent ontology approach, which sees a universal as a part of each particular-so that the divine nature is internal to and constitutive of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And in contrast, there’s a relational ontology approach which-traditionally-holds that a thing’s identity is defined by its primitive relation to a universal, with each instantiation numerically distinct. Critics of a purely relational approach argue that this leads to multiple instantiations of the divine nature, risking a tritheistic outcome.

My systematic theology, the Self‑Standing Givenness Ontology (SSGO going forward), proposes a radical meta‑metaphysical shift. Instead of starting with either a constituent or a relational framework, SSGO takes the act of divine self‑givenness itself as the foundational principle. In SSGO, the act of self‑givenness is the very relational disclosure of God: each divine Person is defined by an irreducible, self‑standing relational mode that fully expresses the one divine essence without any underlying substance. This approach, influenced by the apophatic insights of Jean‑Luc Marion and the problem‑solving logic of Jiri Benovsky’s metaphysical primitives, reconfigures our understanding of Trinitarian expression from the ground up. Giving us a relational ontology that is successful because it creatively gives us true unity in distinction without 3 instantiations of an abstract thing.

A. Divine Self‑Givenness as Relational Disclosure in SSGO

SSGO asserts that each divine Person does not merely possess the divine essence-they actively and fully express it through what can be called a self‑standing relational mode, or a dynamic primitive disclosure if you will. This mode, traditionally termed the “relation of origin,” is the primitive by which the divine essence is entirely disclosed in each Person. In other words, the act of self‑givenness is not secondary or accidental; it is the complete and irreducible way that the one undivided divine essence is made manifest in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Here, the language of Jean‑Luc Marion becomes crucial. (Or at least how I take his language seriously and positively does.) Marion’s insight is that givenness is not an external property or an addition to being-it is the very mode by which being reveals itself. As Marion writes in Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, “every phenomenon shows itself only to the extent that it first gives itself” (Marion 2002, p. 9; see plain text link:

http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=2481).

SSGO takes this further by affirming that divine self‑givenness is the ontological ground of all relational distinction. Each relational mode is not an instantiation of an abstract universal nor a constituent part of a composite substance; it is the full, active disclosure of divine identity. The mode of reality because it is relational through and though discloses and confers everything including identity. Thus, the Father, Son, and Spirit each is the divine essence, a gift, in a distinct, irreducible mode of relational self-offering: God is fully given, received, and shared. Or as the Bible puts it, God is one, true, and love.

B. Aquinas’s Approach: Preserving Simplicity Through Negation

Thomas Aquinas works within a substance‑accident framework and is genius. He maintains that each divine Person is not merely a bearer of the divine essence but is the complete, self‑actualized manifestation of that essence. His challenge is to affirm the distinctiveness of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Spiration without compromising the absolute simplicity of God.

In Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 7, Thomas Aquinas states, “Therefore, it is clear that God is in no wise composite, but is altogether simple” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 7, accessible at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm). He similarly argues that divine relations (such as paternity and filiation) do not inhere in a divine substance as accidents, but are instead intrinsic to the divine essence itself (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28–29, available at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm and http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm).

Aquinas describes this relation as being predicated by mode of identity, stating: “the divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 4).

His method remains a reductio ad absurdum like argument: by demonstrating that any notion of composition or accidental relation in God leads to contradiction, he preserves divine simplicity by negation. His focus is on denying that external or additional relations can be superimposed on the one divine nature, thereby ensuring that no extraneous parts are introduced. This approach primarily negative—it shows what God is not, rather than positively describing the dynamic, active self-givenness of the divine. I’m sure later Thomistic tradition corrected this but that would diverge us too far away from here and the task at hand.

C. Comparing Constituent and Relational Ontologies

C.1. Constituent Ontology — One Shared Divine Substance

Traditional and scholarly sources affirm that in a constituent ontology of the Trinity, the divine nature is an internal, shared constituent of each Person. In other words, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess numerically one and the same divine substance as part of their very being. This aligns with classical conciliar language about one substance (ousia) shared by three Persons. For example:

• Brian Leftow explains the Latin Trinitarian view, emphasizing that in his model, “the Father just is God” (Anti Social Trinitarianism, in The Trinity, OUP, 1999). However, while Leftow states that the Father is God, he does not explicitly write in the same sentence that “so also for the Son and the Spirit”. This second clause is an interpretive extension derived from the broader Latin Trinitarian framework and has been articulated in summary form by scholars such as William Hasker (Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 2013). Leftow’s original formulation clarifies that the Father and Son instance the divine nature together, stating: “while Father and Son instance the divine nature (deity), they have but one trope of deity between them… If the Father’s deity is God’s, this is because the Father just is God.” (Leftow, The Trinity, p. 203–204). This means the Father and Son (and, by extension, the Spirit) do not instantiate “deity” as three separate examples of a kind; rather, they literally share one concrete divine nature as an ontological constituent of each, avoiding any multiplication of the divine substance.

• Tertullian (2nd–3rd c.) — “These Three are one essence, not one Person… in respect of unity of substance not singularity of number.” Here the early Church father uses the formula “three Persons, one substance” (Latin: tres Personae, una Substantia), emphasizing that the Father, Son, and Spirit are consubstantial — three distinct Persons who nevertheless share one identical divine substance. This patristic formulation undergirds later conciliar statements (Nicene Creed, etc.) insisting that all three Persons are of one being (homoousios). It reflects precisely the idea that the Godhead’s substance is one internal reality present in each Person.

C.2. Relational Ontology — Universal Instantiation and Tritheism Risk

By contrast, a relational (or “non-constituent”) ontology of universals holds that a nature is related to individuals by instantiation rather than being a literal part of them. Applied to the Trinity, this approach would say the Father, Son, and Spirit each instantiate the universal “divine nature” by a primitive exemplification relation. In this view, the divine nature functions like a kind or universal (deity or Godhead) that each Person possesses separately. Scholarly analyses point out that this can imply three numerically distinct instances of the divine nature — one in the Father, one in the Son, one in the Spirit — which threatens trinitarian monotheism by verging on tritheism (three gods). For example:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on Latin vs. Social Trinity) – Latin Trinitarians “deny that the Three are ‘the same substance’ merely in the sense in which three humans are, i.e., each equally instantiates the same universal nature.” In an ordinary universal-instance ontology, three human persons (say, Peter, James, and John) each instantiate the universal “humanity,” which makes them three distinct instances of one nature. The quote underscores that if one were to interpret the Trinity this way (three Persons each instantiating the divine nature separately), one ends up with “three numerically distinct things, each of which is divine,” which is essentially the definition of tritheism. The traditional Latin insistence on one numerically identical divine substance is meant to avoid this outcome.

And from the same source, Dale Tuggy says (via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) – “It would seem that by definition a thing with the divine essence is a god, and so three such things would be three gods.” In other words, if the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each had their “own” instance of the divine essence (like three instances of a universal), then each instance would qualify as a “god” in its own right, resulting in three gods. This articulates the classic charge of tritheism that arises when the one divine nature is conceptualized as a multiply-instantiated universal rather than as one concrete reality. The pro-Nicene Cappadocian fathers recognized this danger: one ousia, three hypostases was not to be understood as one genus with three species (which would be three gods), but as one indivisible substance shared fully by three persons .

Each of these sources reinforces the distinction between the two approaches: a constituent ontology secures the unity of God by positing one shared, internal divine nature (thereby upholding one God in three Persons), whereas a relational instantiation ontology risks turning the Trinity into a collection of three independent exemplifications of divinity (which slides toward three gods). The former coheres with historic Christian orthodoxy’s insistence on una substantia, while the latter must carefully hedge against interpreting Trinity as a mere set of divine individuals of the same kind. Each Person of the Trinity is fully divine with the same divine essence, not divine by having a merely similar instance of a nature. This is why the traditional formula is three Persons in one substance, safeguarding both the unity of God and the distinction of Persons .

D. The SSGO Move: A New Meta‑Metaphysics

SSGO transcends these two traditional frameworks by proposing a meta‑metaphysical reconfiguration. Rather than taking substance or instantiation as a given, SSGO starts from the insight that divine self‑givenness itself is primitive. Influenced by Marion’s notion of givenness and by Jiri Benovsky’s work on metaphysical primitives (see Benovsky’s chapter, “Primitives,” in The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, 2020; for more info in plain text:

https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Metametaphysics/Efird/p/book/9781138831976), SSGO holds that the act of self‑disclosure is the very mode in which the divine essence is given.

Benovsky notes that in metaphysics, “the choice of primitives is crucial in shaping the explanatory power of a theory” and that “these primitives themselves are ungrounded explainers” (Benovsky, “Primitives,” in The Cambridge or Routledge Handbook of Meta-Metaphysics, p. XX [exact page depends on edition]; if not in that volume, see Benovsky, “Primitives: The Controversy, The State of the Art, and a New Solution,” Dialogue 52, no. 2 [2013]: 251–262, link in plain text:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie/article/abs/primitives-the-controversy-the-state-of-the-art-and-a-new-solution/99398DC8E6A6FA83BE9A40252A23D074).

SSGO uses this idea to claim that each divine Person expresses the divine essence through a self‑standing relational mode-an irreducible act that does not rely on a substrate of substance or on multiple instantiations of a universal.

In my SSGO approach, the divine Persons are not seen as separate instances of a universal nature; they are the complete, active, and dynamic self‑givenness of the one, undivided divine essence. This is a transformative move: it shifts the focus from a negative account that merely denies composition (as in Aquinas) to a positive, dynamic account that explains how divine simplicity is actively maintained through relational disclosure. SSGO redefines divine relationality so that the relation of origin (Father → Son, Father & Son → Spirit) becomes the very basis of each Person’s identity-a mode that fully expresses the divine essence without partition or repetition.

E. Addressing Criticism: Instantiation Versus Self‑Givenness

Critics of relational ontology argue that if each Person instantiates the divine nature, we end up with three distinct instantiations-implying three gods rather than one. Scott Williams says exactly that in this interview here: (https://redcircle.com/shows/bfb67000-a8bc-447f-b7f3-2a941c791a68/ep/29f1e96f-ec20-4cd6-8da1-3dcb0de85e87) Through my SSGO I think it needs to be clarified that it-my approach-does not adopt a simple instantiation model. Instead, I posit that the one divine essence is fully given in each self‑standing relational mode, without being multiplied. There is no separate “instance” of the divine nature; rather, the self‑givenness itself is the primitive, and it is identical with the full, dynamic expression of the divine essence.

The Father’s unbegotten mode, the Son’s begotten mode, and the Spirit’s proceeding mode are not three separate instantiations but three relational perspectives on one complete and undivided reality. And this can be emphasized with the persons in isolation too. For example, the Monarchy of the Father can be expressed as the foundational relational stance that undergirds triune self‑givenness. God’s self‑ordering principle is expressed in the Holy Trinity; without this personal distinction, we lose the full glory of the Persons’ fully actualized relational mode. This preserves both divine simplicity and real distinction. Echoing Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 2, where he writes:

“In God, relation is not an accident but is the divine essence itself,”

(see: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm)

SSGO similarly integrates relation and essence, but emphasizes positive givenness at the heart of that relation.

F. The Meta‑Metaphysical Shift: Beyond Traditional Categories

Traditional relational and constituent ontologies start with predetermined metaphysical categories–whether substance, instantiation, or part‑wholeness–and then analyze how relations function within those constraints. SSGO, however, reconfigures the very starting point of metaphysical inquiry. Instead of assuming an underlying substance or a primitive instantiation relation, SSGO takes divine self‑givenness as the fundamental principle.

This meta‑metaphysical shift allows SSGO to build a new ontology–a kind of “meta‑phenomenological metaphysics”–where the act of being given (self‑givenness) is the primary mode by which the divine discloses itself. This framework not only preserves the oneness of God but also explains the real, irreducible distinctions among the divine Persons in a way that is both positive and dynamically expressive. It resonates with Marion’s caution in God Without Being that “to think God according to Being is already to idolize Him” (Marion 1991, p. 35; plain text link:

http://www.vanderbiltuniversitypress.com/books/49/god-without-being), urging us to think of God primarily through the lens of love and gift rather than simply Being.

Conclusion

In summary, both Aquinas and SSGO aim to affirm that the one divine essence is fully expressed in the distinct Persons of the Trinity. Aquinas does so by denying any accidental composition within a substance‑accident framework–arguing by reductio ad absurdum that any notion of composition in God is contradictory. SSGO, on the other hand, offers a positive account by asserting that divine self‑givenness itself is the fundamental, primitive mode of relational disclosure.

Drawing on Jean‑Luc Marion’s insights on givenness (for instance, Being Given, 2002, see above link) and Jiri Benovsky’s conception of metaphysical primitives (see references above), SSGO reconfigures the very basis of metaphysical inquiry. It shows that the one divine essence is not instantiated or divided but is actively and fully disclosed in each Person through an irreducible relational mode (the relation of origin). This meta‑metaphysical approach preserves both divine simplicity and the real distinctions among the Persons, providing a robust framework that aligns with conciliar Trinitarianism while overcoming the pitfalls of both traditional relational and constituent ontologies.

Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas.

• Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3 (on divine simplicity) and I, q. 28–29 (on divine relations).

• Online (q.3): <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm>](http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm)

• Online (q.28): <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm>](http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm)

• Online (q.29): <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm>](http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm)

Aristotle.

• Metaphysics, Book XII (Lambda).

• General text: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Met.>](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Met.)

Benovsky, Jiri.

1. “Primitives.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, edited by Ricki Bliss and J.T.M. Miller, 2020.

• Publisher link: <https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Metametaphysics/Efird/p/book/9781138831976>](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Metametaphysics/Efird/p/book/9781138831976)

2. “Primitives: The Controversy, The State of the Art, and a New Solution.” Dialogue 52, no. 2 (2013): 251–262.

• Cambridge Core link: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie/article/abs/primitives-the-controversy-the-state-of-the-art-and-a-new-solution/99398DC8E6A6FA83BE9A40252A23D074>](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie/article/abs/primitives-the-controversy-the-state-of-the-art-and-a-new-solution/99398DC8E6A6FA83BE9A40252A23D074)

Leftow, Brian.

• Cited in discussions of Thomas Aquinas’s account of divine essence in the Trinity. For instance, see Brian Leftow’s work on the Trinity in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by Thomas Flint and Michael Rea, 2009. No direct link provided in-text; consult standard academic databases.

Marion, Jean-Luc.

1. Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford University Press, 2002.

• Stanford UP link: <http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=2481>](http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=2481)

2. God Without Being. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. University of Chicago Press, 1991.

• Vanderbilt link: <http://www.vanderbiltuniversitypress.com/books/49/god-without-being>](http://www.vanderbiltuniversitypress.com/books/49/god-without-being)

Plato.

• Republic, Book VI, 508e–509b.

• Perseus Digital Library: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168>](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• General site: <https://plato.stanford.edu/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/)

• Consult relevant entries on “Trinity,” “Latin Trinitarianism,” “Social Trinitarianism,” etc. For example, see “Trinity” by Dale Tuggy (First published 1997; substantive revision 2020) at <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/).

Tertullian.

• Adversus Praxean (Against Praxeas). Traditional Latin citation for “These Three are one essence…” For general reference: <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0317.htm>](https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0317.htm). Various translations available.

Tuggy, Dale.

• “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing.” In Philosophy Compass 4/5 (2009): 835–845. Also see Tuggy’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the Trinity: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/).