Defining the Divine Substance Correctly: the divine nature series prt. 4
It has come to my attention that there are some non-orthodox respecting Christian philosophers who are redefining the divine substance in such a way as to bar out divine simplicity and make it a properly philosophical issue. Luckily, we’ve been covering the divine nature here, and can fully push back on this basic definitional error. It was brought to my attention specifically from Ryan Dozier who gives this definition of divine substance here:
“The divine substance is taken as the fundamental asymmetrical ground (i.e. explanatory relation) for the numerically distinct, necessary, uncreated, divine attributes. See the work of Paul M Gould, Gregory Fowler, Matthew Baddorf, Joshua Sijuwade, Ross Inman, Tim O Connor.”
Now this is obviously incorrect because it’s defined in such a way as to leave room to leave out divine simplicity, not to mention the orthodox sense of divine substance, which I’ll give below. The precision of doctrinal definitions is not merely academic; it shapes the faith and practice of believers. I appreciate Dozier’s definition for its precision, it illustrates its unorthodox focus well. Since, some philosophers are trying to take this term and domain of inquiry out of theology proper, by defining it incorrectly, and without acknowledging orthodox and ecumenical commitments in the definition is fine; but, it should be clear they’re doing just that.
Dozier is representing a definition of substance that comes from, according to him, a contemporary philosophical inquiry, where some philosophers propose redefining divine substance in ways that exclude divine simplicity, which is a key component of orthodox Christian doctrine. For example, the conceptualization of God as the “Asymmetrical Ground” and “Numerically Distinct Attributes” in theology is problematic because it allows for a challenges the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, which is dogma and not merely a phi’s logical concept to begin with. Simplicity (as we’ve covered in depth over the last 3 entries here in earlier posts), asserts that God is not composed of parts, and therefore, God’s attributes are NOT actually distinct from His essence. By suggesting that the divine substance serves primarily as an underlying basis that explains attributes without being reciprocally dependent on them, this view introduces a form of foundationalism that is at odds with the traditional understanding of God as a simple, non-composite being. If attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence are treated as numerically distinct and separate from the essence of God, it leads to a form of ontological pluralism that contradicts the unity and indivisibility of God’s nature. There’s also something like an explanatory relation (the grounding relation talk in the definition of divine substance), that is, in this definition as Dozier represents it, it infers or posits a causal or dependency relationship where attributes derive their existence from the substance, which could imply that God’s attributes are not inherent to His nature but are instead contingent or derivative. This flirts with undermining the notion of the Trinity as the necessary and self-sufficient ultimate transmundane reality, whose attributes are eternally and immutably perfect and unified (God is one). Such views can lead to theological inconsistencies and a fragmented understanding of the divine nature, potentially distancing these interpretations from orthodox Christian teachings. Luckily for us we’ve covered the divine nature in detail, so we can point to those posts from previous discussions (the last 3). But, more importantly we can offer a definition that keeps it Catholic and theologically proper.
At this point it might seem like I’m setting up to argue against this non-orthodox definition and views behind it. I’m not. There’s no reason to argue when the definition of divine substance is in fact in error if you’re a Catholic, or respect orthodoxy, which is my focus. This piece is about being proper to the definition as it’s understood in an orthodox and theological context. Clarity is half the battle, especially on this subject. More importantly this is a great excuse to add to our series we’ve been working on. That is, we’ve been covering “the divine nature,” and trying to locate the phenomenon conceptually and definitionally consistently through the doctrines of simplicity, Actus Purus, and Perichoresis. Defining the divine substance is a great addition to that study so LFG!
Let’s first define substance as it’s come to be understood from the last 3 entries on the divine nature we’ve covered previously at robertdryer.com … After that I’ll give you the full history and development of the term through Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and so on. We’ll skip the councils and official church documents as they just mimic and assume the greats; and, we’ve already covered them in other posts sufficiently. Hopefully, defining the term as such helps, enjoy.
Divine Substance defined properly and towards a Theological Context
The definition of the Divine substance is typically in context of essence God-talk, and for our purposes here, will be expressed more theologically than philosophically, but authentically Catholic, so the balance between faith and reason will be done as well as I can.
The Divine substance can he defined as the ontologically unique and non-composite (indivisible) essence or nature of God, that is identical to and fully expressive of His perfections such as omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness. The divine substance in terms of essence as such, is not solely foundational, but is actively (and Trihypostaticly) realized in each divine Person echoing a Perichoretic (or consubstantial) unity that transcends numerical distinctions and causal hierarchies. Traditionally, divine simplicity is affirmed dogmatically, and as such the essence of God under discussion here is understood also actively as Actus Purus, signifying that God’s nature as pure actuality involves no potentiality, so that together the lack of division and composition is as metaphysically broad as the Trinity is unique. Furthermore, this divine substance (and/or essence) can be characterized intrinsic relational through Perichoresis (or consubstantiality), because the divine persons engage in eternal and mutual indwelling in virtue of the revelation of God in Christ, which showcases a sense of dynamic communion (“Persons”) that maintains both the unity and the distinct relational identities within the Godhead. This meticulous definition, both philosophically sensitive but unabashedly theological, upholds the traditional Catholic (universal and ecumenical) affirmation of God’s transcendence, immanence, and (Trihypostatic in one substance) relational, where the divine substance is another way of saying the Trinity is ultimate reality; and, such a view would oppose any non-orthodox interpretation that suggests a divisible or causally dependent kind or like definition of the divine nature. Whatever the divine Substance is, philosophically, and in line with Catholicism it is the only and one consubstantial, coeternal, and perichoretic unity of the three divine Persons.
Let’s reflect on substance definitionally in depth, and a bit theologically. Now that we have a proper definition in place, hopefully this deeper dive into the definition proper will help it stands out even more so, and hopefully it will help clarify some more too.
“Substance defined toward a Theological subject”
The concept of substance is fundamentally crucial but can often be indirectly described within theological discourse, but is in fact traditionally distinguished clearly from “accidents.” Substance, in its primary sense, according to ChatGPT: “refers to an entity that neither inheres in another as a determination nor serves as a metaphysical component of something else. Instead, it positively stands on its own, possessing the reality it signifies, and may, but not necessarily, have accidents inhering in it.”
Engaging with “substance” talk requires a nod to Aristotle, as theological discussions often stem from or react to his philosophical groundwork. His substantial and causal ontology often create a false focus when we translate such a complex in application to God. But before we go there…
In Aristotelian terms, substance indicates that which is neither predicated of any subject nor exists in any subject, such as an individual man or horse. It is something that, while capable of undergoing changes, retains its fundamental essence, which may include forms, matter, and the composition arising from these elements. The uniqueness of substance is such that it doesn’t admit of more or less in terms of its identity; for example, if the substance is a man, he remains consistently ‘man’ across different contexts and comparisons. As we can see the sense of substance is primarily about an ontology for the world of creatures and would be problematic to apply to God with no restrictions, and is why (in part) our definition proper interchanged it with essence talk too.
Here’s some great excerpts on substance from “Aristotle Dictionary” by Thomas P. Kiernan, covering pages 474-478 on Substance:
“Substance, in its strictest, primary, and principal sense, refers to that which is neither predicated of any subject nor exists in any subject, such as an individual man or horse.
Reference: CAT-5. 2all
Substance, remaining identical in number, can receive contraries. It undergoes change, allowing for the modification of substance.
References: CAT-5. 4al0; 5. 4b17-19
It is characteristic of substance that it has no contrary. However, this is not unique to substance but applies to many other categories, such as quantity.
Reference: CAT-5. 3b24
Substance does not seem to admit of more or less. That is, a substance is not more or less the entity it is; for example, if the substance is a man, he will not be more or less a man, neither at different times nor compared to other men.
Reference: CAT-5. 3b33-35
Substance is described in four ways: the essence or formal cause, the universal, the genus, and the subject. Here, the subject is that of which other things are predicated, while it itself is not predicated of anything else. Thus, the subject is often seen as the primary form of substance.
Reference: ME-6. 3. 1028b33-1029a2
As previously mentioned, substance encompasses three aspects: form, matter, and the composition resulting from these two elements.
Reference: DE A-2, 2, 414al4-16
There are three types of substances: matter, nature, and the singular entity that subsists from these and is distinct.
References: ME-11. 3. 1070a9-12; ME-11. 1. 1069a30-33
Substance is a particular genus of beings where we distinguish firstly matter, then form and species, followed by the composition of these elements.
Reference: DE A-2. 1. 412a6-9
In the simplest terms, entities like earth, fire, water, and bodies composed of these, including animals and parts of natural bodies (stars, moon, sun), are recognized as substances because they exist independently and are not predicated of a subject.
References: ME-4. 8. 1017b10-14; ME-6. 2. 1028b8-13
Every natural body endowed with life qualifies as a substance.
Reference: DE A-2. 1. 412al5
In defining substance, there are two interpretations: as the ultimate subject not predicated of anything else, and as that which constitutes the form and species of each entity.
References: ME-4, 8. 1017b23-26; ME-4. 8. 1017b14-16
Substance and its differences are predicated univocally, either of individuals or species, with no substance referring to any subject.
Reference: CAT-5. 3a33-37
There exists an Eternal Substance, immovable and separable from sensibles.
Reference: ME-11. 7. 1073a3-5
According to Plato, the realms of forms, mathematical entities, and the substance of sensible bodies constitute substances.
Reference: ME-6. 2. 1028b19-21
Substance as a subject of change indicates that, unlike other categories, it does not predicate any other subject, affirming its unique standing.
Reference: PHY-1. 7. 190a33-190b1
Primary Substance
Primary substances are considered such because they underlie all others, with all others predicated upon them or existing within them.
Reference: CAT-5. 2b15-17
Among primary substances, no one entity is more of a substance than another.
Reference: CAT-5. 3b10
Secondary Substance
Secondary substances include species and genera in which primary substances are inherent.
References: CAT-5. 2a12; CAT-5. 2a14; CAT-5. 2b30
Sensible Substances
Sensible substances, those that are singular and prone to decay, are defined by their material nature which admits the possibility of existence or non-existence.
Reference: ME-6. 15. 1039b27-31
Substantial Nature
The substantial nature is analogous to the relationship between raw material and its formed product, illustrating the essence of individual substance and being.
Reference: PHY-1. 7. 191a7-12””
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Aristotle sets the stage, for substance talk. But this language is looking for natural things that change and have characteristics that are parts of who they are. It’s a great start but what about the supernatural one and only God under reflection here? That’s where the greats come in: enter Augustine and Aquinas….
The divine substance according to authorities
The divine substance is covered as part of a complex, typically around divine simplicity. For example, in the Prima Pars Thomas Aquinas writes on the Simplicity of God:
Thomas Aquinas in the Prima Pars present this objection: “Objection 1. It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
He then goes onto reply to that objection: “The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.”
– Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Question 3, Article 5, Thomas Aquinas.
Further on in the Prima Pars Aquinas presents another objection and responds,
and that also provides some relatives insight into the divine substance. On Whether God Has Accidents he writes: “Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat…” and then he continues with another reply: “Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.”
– St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Question 3, Article 6.
Augustine also has clarifying insights into the divine substance in context of talking about the Coeternity of the Trinity: “But I would boldly say, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, God the Creator, the Omnipotent Trinity, work indivisibly; but that this cannot be indivisibly manifested by the creature, which is far inferior, and least of all by the bodily creature: just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be named by our words, which certainly are bodily sounds, except in their own proper intervals of time, divided by a distinct separation, which intervals the proper syllables of each word occupy. Since in their proper substance wherein they are, the three are one, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the very same, by no temporal motion, above the whole creature, without any interval of time and place, and at once one and the same from eternity to eternity, as it were eternity itself, which is not without truth and charity.”
– St. Augustine., On the Trinity, Book IV, Chapter 21.
The divine substance is consistently characterized by Aquinas and Augustine (arguably the whole classical tradition) as fundamental, simple, and indivisible, existing in and of itself, and without being categorized within any genus or having accidents. Aquinas emphasizes that God is His own existence and essence, thus lacking any accidental properties, while Augustine highlights that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of one and the same indivisible substance, transcending temporal and spatial divisions.
——
the greats get us the divine substance in a context, and help make it a subject that’s intelligible, and it’s clearly theological. From there the tradition is able to normalize the usage of the idea and allow for theologians to define it.
Divine Substance defined in Theological Terms
The transition from Aristotle’s view to theological reflection shifts the focus to the one Divine reality. Here, we finally get to a definition in a theological context, and thousands of years removed from Aristotle… and really where it matters. This is the entry for “Substance” from “Dictionary of Theology,” by Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, second edition, page 489:
“SUBSTANCE
Substance is a fundamental concept that can only be indirectly described. It is distinguished from *accident*. *Substance* refers to an entity which, from a negative perspective, is not a determination inherent in another nor a metaphysical component of something else. Positively, it possesses the reality it signifies, stands independently, and thus may, but does not necessarily, have accidents inhering in it.
The concept of *substance* is realized analogically across varying levels of being, diminishing in clarity as one moves to lower levels. In the realm of purely physical entities, it is challenging to distinctly determine when and how a “particle” separates from the overall field of matter in such a way that it fulfills the definition of substance.
In the highest form, God, who absolutely subsists by himself, is considered the most eminent example of substance (D 1782). Similarly, the individual, free, spiritual person invariably qualifies as a substance, though only analogously relative to God’s substantiality. This is because a person’s existence is contingent upon God, contrasting with *Pantheism*.
For an exploration of the difference between *substance* and *subsistence*, crucial to Christology, see the entry on Subsistence.”
—
As mentioned in the beginning, the divine substance also involves a relational aspect through Perichoresis (consubstantiality), where the Divine Persons engage in eternal and mutual indwelling, signifying a dynamic communion that respects both unity and distinct relational identities within the Godhead. This Perichoretic unity exemplifies how Divine substance transcends numerical distinctions and causal hierarchies, emphasizing a Trihypostatic realization actively present in each Divine Person.
Part of the issue is God doesn’t have a contrasting world like that inherent to created things which have “substance and accidents.” So, to keep the causal context and language, as it relates to God, one is usually forced to compromise and have a sense of essence too, because traditionally you need an interplay of substance and accidents to have a decent description of something in a causal context. But, as you can imagine talking about who and what God is leads to issues for obvious reasons which is why the original definition interchanged the terms at times because the causal context is not necessarily helpful for God talk in our discussion here, and there’s also an inherent relational aspect in order to get at using such terms for God too.
Metaphysical essence, as discussed by Joseph M. Dalmau, brings another layer to our understanding of substance and May help. He defines it as such: “The metaphysical essence is defined as the objective notion or sum of notions that constitute the thing substantially and distinguish it from other orders of being. These are the foundation of all other things predicated of it, that is, its properties. Thus, the metaphysical essence of man is ‘rational animal.’ The metaphysical essence of the human soul is something spiritual as the form of the body and its properties, such as immortality and spirituality. Since these are transferred to the divine reality, granting the complete simplicity of His nature, we can speak about the metaphysical essence of God, but not about attributes or properties that are really distinct from it. However, because of the logical distinction between the different predicates attributed to God, we can properly distinguish the metaphysical essence of God from His attributes.”
Metaphysical essence helps us distinguish one order of being from another; or, in more humanly, it’s the ‘rational animal’ to descriptor for humans, and in divine terms, it speaks to the complete simplicity of God’s nature, acknowledging that while we can distinguish God’s attributes logically, they are not really distinct from His essence.
Ultimately, discussing substance in theological terms leads to affirming the Trinity as the epitome of ultimate reality, a consubstantial, coeternal, and perichoretic unity of the three Divine Persons. This keeps us sensitive to the primary domain, which is a theological exploration, and in theology we can maintain the traditional Catholic affirmation and metaphysical commitment to his subj stance, which is the negative refusal to collapse transcendence and immanence, and yet in virtue of revelation acknowledge the relational dynamics in a balance of faith and reason; this, providing a richer understanding that can help shape one to conform to Christian doctrine and belief of they so choose, even if some philosophers disagree.
The Definition Proper
I took our discussion above and had AI synthesize it succinctly. Here’s the definition as we’ve covered and generated as such:
“In orthodox Catholic theology, ‘divine substance’ is defined as the undivided and non-composite essence of God, which is fully expressive of His perfections such as omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness. This essence is inseparable from His existence, embodying the doctrine of divine simplicity. According to this doctrine, God’s attributes are not additions to His essence but are synonymous with His very being. Divine simplicity affirms that God is entirely simple and not composed of parts, ensuring that His nature is completely unified and His actions are consistent with His immutable essence. This definition upholds the traditional Catholic affirmation of God’s transcendent and immanent nature, which is foundational to understanding the relational dynamics within the Trinity and the uniformity of His divine acts.”
(And you can refer to the beginning for my own definition in detail.)
Conclusion and Reflection
Now, there’s no argument to be had, don’t get me wrong. The definition by Dozier as representative of these philosophers he has in mind is in error for a theological reason, it allows one to go against the standard definition and it’s entailments as we find it in authorities, dogma, and general Catholic teaching. The attempt here is to relocate and remind the reader what substance talk looks like in definition for theological use proper. Aristotle may have defined the context but in application to God it’s a theological world much different than that of one of substance and accidents, or form and matter. So, philosophers are going to do what philosophers do. No biggie. It’s in a sense like denying the hypostatic inion, or the Trinity, it’s just an error in definition from the Catholic view. No argument really can be had tbh. Hopefully, these definitions help you orient and appropriate the substance of substance for your Catholicism better, if not no worries you prob have a different metaphysics. Not much we can do about that. Some one may see an assertion here that non-orthodox views are incorrect, and that it does not engage deeply with the reasons these views have emerged or why they might hold appeal to some philosophers, and they’d be right, as this price is just to cover the definition of substance and locate it in Catholic terms, and that’s it. Hopefully, that helps. If it does, I’ve covered divine simplicity in depth other places, although I don’t interact with people who are going to deny the ecumenical and dogmatic reality of the doctrine, and a basic definition of substance that differs with the tradition, that’s too fundamental and wouldn’t be productive. Imho. God bless!
update 05/05/2024:
Mr. Dozier tweeted me on Twitter and said he didn’t intend “a complete real definition.” It is not clear if he meant a definition in the colloquial sense (extensional or intensional and so on)… What is clear from our convo is this statement was intended to be part of a personal project of his that’s intending to give a compete real coherent account of God. So please take my characterization of his statement with a major grain of salt. Hopefully, defining the divine substance proper and in a proper context still helps.
I’ll leave ya’ll with this:
“Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature.”
-Fourth Lateran Council : 1215
