Sources Shaping SSGO Notes

Influential Thinkers and Sources Shaping SSGO’s Trinity and Simplicity

Self-Standing Givenness Ontology (SSGO) is Robert Dryer’s framework for reconciling divine simplicity (God’s oneness with no parts) and Trinitarian relationality (genuine distinctions of Father, Son, Spirit). Dryer’s SSGO draws on a broad range of sources – from contemporary metaphysics to medieval councils and theologians – to articulate a relational ontology that sees each divine Person as a full “self-givenness” of the one divine essence (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer). Below, we analyze each primary influence on SSGO, highlighting their contributions to understanding divine simplicity and the Trinity, how SSGO builds on their insights, where their perspectives may not fully align with SSGO, and key nuances in their thought relevant to SSGO’s approach.

Jiri Benovsky

• Core Contributions: Jiri Benovsky (a contemporary metaphysician) introduces the idea of metaphysical “primitives” as fundamental explanatory factors in a theory. In his metametaphysics, a “primitive” often serves as a “problem-solver” – an irreducible element posited to account for some phenomenon (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer). For example, different theories of properties employ primitives (like tropes, universals, or compresence) to explain how two objects share an attribute (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer). Benovsky’s key contribution is recognizing that sometimes theoretical problems can only be resolved by admitting an irreducible factor which is not further analyzable – a concept highly pertinent to the irreducible personhoods in the simple Godhead.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO explicitly draws on Benovsky’s insight by treating the Trinity’s personal distinctions as metaphysical primitives within the divine being (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Dryer adapts Benovsky’s idea to call the Father, Son, and Spirit “relational modes” of the one essence – fundamental, non-derivable distinctions that solve the “problem” of the one-and-three. In SSGO, these relational modes are not added parts or properties in God but the basic ways the one divine essence exists and self-expresses (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). This move allows SSGO to affirm real differences (the three Persons) without compromising simplicity, much as Benovsky’s primitives allow differences without further reduction. SSGO thus uses Benovsky’s concept as a philosophical bulwark to say the Trinity’s plurality is primitive and underived, preserving God’s unity (since the unity isn’t “broken” by the modes, which are the very form of God’s being). As Dryer summarizes, “relational modes” inspired by Benovsky let us have Father, Son, Spirit as irreducible differences while leaving the divine essence wholly intact (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer).
• Tensions with SSGO: Benovsky himself was not addressing theology, so there is an implicit tension in repurposing his metaphysical tool for Trinitarian doctrine. His “problem-solver” primitives are a methodological posit, and one might question whether treating divine persons as such **blurs the line between a theological mystery and a mere metaphysical problem to be solved. Additionally, Benovsky’s approach is value-neutral – primitives are admitted for functionality, not because they reflect an ultimate reality – whereas SSGO claims the real nature of God involves such primitives. There could be reticence from a thinker like Benovsky in declaring that metaphysical primitives correspond to actual divine hypostases (this leaps from metaphysics into dogma). Moreover, Benovsky discusses primitives as theoretical devices, potentially even interchangeable in different systems (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer) (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer), while SSGO treats relational modes as objective features of God. This difference means SSGO goes beyond Benovsky’s intent, pinning a lot of theological weight on the concept. Nonetheless, there is no direct contradiction – it’s more a matter of Benovsky’s framework being stretched into a new domain.
• Notable Nuances: Benovsky emphasizes that primitives are defined by their function in explanation, not by a positive content of their own (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer). SSGO resonates with this by insisting the Persons have no added content besides the one essence – their personhood is in the role or function of relation (e.g. Father as source, Son as begotten) rather than a chunk of deity. This functional primacy echoes Benovsky’s view that “primitives…are individuated in terms of their functions” (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer). Another nuance is Benovsky’s tolerance for multiple theories with different primitives that are functionally equivalent (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer). SSGO similarly posits its model as one way to conceptualize the Trinity within orthodoxy – a “primitive” based model meant to foster understanding, even if other theological models (Thomist, Augustinian, etc.) use different conceptual primitives (like processions, relations of origin) to solve the same mystery. Dryer’s use of Benovsky is thus a creative meta-metaphysical appropriation: it doesn’t claim Benovsky as a theologian, but leverages his insight that sometimes irreducible distinctions must be acknowledged to uphold a coherent system (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). In SSGO, this yields a bold claim: the divine relations are as basic as it gets – the very “pillars that sustain the structure” of Trinitarian theology (Jiri Benovsky – RobertDryer), analogous to how Benovsky’s primitives underpin any metaphysical theory.

Jean-Luc Marion

• Core Contributions: Jean-Luc Marion, a French Catholic phenomenologist, contributes chiefly through his notion of “givenness” (donation) and the idea of the saturated phenomenon. Marion’s philosophy emphasizes that something truly manifests itself only by giving itself – phenomena appear as gifts rather than as objects seized by our cognition (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In theology, Marion applied this to God by arguing that God surpasses the concept of “Being” and reveals Himself in love and gift (e.g. God as “love without being”). Although Marion does not systematically write a Trinitarian theology in dogmatic terms, his framework implies that God’s essence is an act of self-giving love, and that we understand God (especially in revelation) in terms of how He gives Himself to us rather than through abstract definitions. This has implications for both simplicity and Trinity: it underscores God’s unity (the one act of giving) while also resonating with the Trinity as the dynamic of giver, gift, and reception within God. Marion’s insistence that showing-itself equals giving-itself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) grounds a view of God where relational self-donation is more fundamental than static being. In short, his core contribution is a vocabulary and logic of self-gift (or “self-donation”) that relocates the understanding of God’s perfection from mere immutable simplicity to overflowing generosity.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO takes Marion’s concept of givenness and places it at the heart of God’s inner life. Dryer gives a “loose but inspiring nod” to Marion by making self-givenness the mode in which the simple divine essence exists (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). In SSGO each divine Person is understood as a complete self-gift of the one divine being (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). This means the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three independent entities, but three ways the one Godhead gives itself and shares itself infinitely. Marion’s thought supports SSGO’s claim that God’s unity is not static or self-contained; rather, God’s oneness is an act of giving – the Father giving the divine essence to the Son, and both giving it in the Spirit, in an eternal agape. This dovetails perfectly with a relational ontology: if to be God is to give God, then the tri-personal communion is how the one divine act is lived. Marion’s influence is clear when SSGO states that each Person is the complete self-expression of God’s essence, fully self-given without remainder (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Divine simplicity is thus preserved (one essence, one being-given) but understood dynamically: the simplicity is “self-subsisting love” rather than a barren monad. Marion’s phenomenological perspective also encourages SSGO’s method of starting from how God appears to us (in revelation and love) and working back to ontology – akin to Marion’s approach of starting from the givenness of phenomena. In sum, Marion provides SSGO a conceptual bridge between classical doctrine and experiential description: God’s simplicity = God’s self-gift, and the Trinity are the relations of giving within that one gift.
• Tensions with SSGO: Marion is famously apophatic and wary of “ontotheology” (overly defining God in being-categories). SSGO, while inspired by him, nonetheless builds a metaphysical framework that could appear more cataphatic (it makes firm ontological statements about God’s inner relations). Marion might be reticent about any attempt to harmonize the Trinity and simplicity in a neat theory, since he often emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God’s revelation (the Trinity as a “saturated phenomenon” that exceeds our conceptual grasp). There’s a subtle tension: Marion prefers to let the phenomenon of God’s love overflow conceptuality, whereas SSGO systematizes it into an ontology. However, SSGO tries to remain humble in its claims – framing itself as a “re-articulation” of timeless truths (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) – which is in the spirit of Marion’s project to rethink how we articulate God. Another possible tension is Marion’s concept of God “without Being”, where he distances God from metaphysical categories, versus SSGO’s willingness to use metaphysical language (essence, relation, act) to describe God. SSGO must take care not to violate Marion’s caution by turning the gift into a fixed object; it addresses this by continuously emphasizing the “dynamic interplay” and mystery of divine self-givenness (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). In effect, SSGO navigates Marion’s concerns by adopting his language of love and gift but also grounding it in orthodoxy’s defined terms – a balance Marion might find challenging but not impossible.
• Notable Nuances: Marion differentiates between idol and icon – concepts about God can become idols unless they continually point beyond themselves to God’s transcendence. SSGO can be seen to incorporate this nuance by insisting that while each Person is a fully given mode of God’s essence, the divine mystery remains infinite. The very term “givenness” in SSGO signals that God’s inner reality is phenomenologically inexhaustible, not a static object. Additionally, Marion’s focus on love aligns SSGO with a more affective and interpersonal understanding of simplicity: instead of viewing simplicity purely as metaphysical unity, it’s viewed as “the unity of the gift of love.” Marion’s notion that the phenomenon gives itself as a gift (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) also colors SSGO’s epistemology – Dryer’s presentation often appeals to scriptural and experiential aspects (for example, seeing the Trinity in the economy of salvation) consistent with Marion’s approach that we only know the immanent Trinity through its self-giving in history. In sum, Marion injects into SSGO a phenomenological sensitivity: God is not an object of dissection but the eternal act of love presenting Himself, which SSGO then integrally identifies with the Trinity of Persons. This helps SSGO remain, at its best, not a dry schema but a portrait of the living God whose very simplicity is “the fullness of His self-giving.”

Karl Rahner

• Core Contributions: Karl Rahner, one of the 20th century’s leading Catholic theologians, is famous for asserting that “the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity.” In essence, Rahner taught that we only know the Trinity from God’s self-revelation in history (the economy of salvation), and that this revealed Trinity truly is God in Himself – there is no hidden God behind the Trinity. This “Rahner’s Rule” closed the gap between the abstract doctrine of God and the lived Christian experience of Father, Son, and Spirit. It stressed that any legitimate knowledge of the inner (immanent) life of God must come from what God does for us and with us (sending the Son, pouring out the Spirit). By doing so, Rahner safeguarded Trinitarian relationality from becoming an irrelevant speculation: the relations in God are directly linked to the relations God establishes with humanity. Regarding divine simplicity, Rahner did not reject it (as a Catholic he affirmed God’s unity), but he reframed emphasis: God’s unity is the unity of one mystery of love communicating itself. He also contributed the idea that the divine persons might best be thought of in terms of distinct “modes of subsisting” or manners of being of the one God, rather than “persons” in the modern sense of independent centers of consciousness. All these contributions – the identity of immanent and economic Trinity, the self-communication of God as key to His being, and a careful redefinition of personhood – deeply influence how one might integrate Trinity with simplicity. Rahner essentially made Trinitarian theology existential and pastoral without discarding the metaphysics.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO aligns strongly with Rahner’s approach by insisting that relation is at the heart of who God is. Dryer’s framework does not treat the Trinity as an add-on to an otherwise unitary God, but rather as the very way God’s simple essence exists and is known. This echoes Rahner’s point that we have no access to God’s simplicity except through the Trinity. For instance, Rahner notes that we know the “immanent” Trinity only insofar as we experience the Trinity in salvation history, and in fact the two are identical (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer). SSGO takes this seriously by rooting its ontology in the fact that God has revealed Himself as Father, Son, Spirit. The idea that each Person is a full “self-givenness” of God’s being (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) resonates with Rahner’s idea of God’s self-communication (God gives his very self to us in grace, ultimately in the incarnation of the Son and indwelling of the Spirit). Thus, SSGO’s relational ontology can be seen as a metaphysical unpacking of Rahner’s theological axiom: if God communicates Himself as Trinity, then God is Trinity through and through, and any talk of simplicity must incorporate that. Additionally, Rahner’s cautious language of “distinct manner of subsisting” rather than stressing the word “person” fits SSGO’s notion of distinct relational modes. SSGO preserves the consubstantial equality of the Persons while emphasizing their relational roles – a balance Rahner also sought (he famously worried that average Christians were “mere monotheists” in practice, ignoring the Trinity). By making the Trinity the key to God’s very being, SSGO walks the Rahnerian path of ensuring that divine simplicity is not an abstract absolute but the unity of three co-equal relationships. This makes the doctrine more intelligible and spiritually relevant, much as Rahner intended.
• Tensions with SSGO: Rahner might be cautious about some of SSGO’s more speculative or philosophical extensions. For example, Rahner, working in a transcendental Thomist style, focused on the mystery and incomprehensibility of God, often stopping short of detailed ontological models. SSGO, however, proposes a specific ontology (with influences from Benovsky, Marion, etc.) – something Rahner might worry could over-systematize the mystery. There’s also the issue that Rahner’s approach, while collapsing the immanent/economic distinction, sometimes led critics to accuse him of being too “oneness”-oriented (some felt he did not sufficiently distinguish the persons in themselves because of his emphasis on the unity of God’s self-communication). SSGO, by contrast, is very keen to underscore real distinctions (using the language of relational primitives). Rahner might ask: does SSGO truly preserve the coequal threeness or does its language of “modes” risk sounding like modalism (mere roles)? Dryer anticipates this kind of concern and explicitly frames SSGO to avoid modalism or partialism (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Nonetheless, Rahner’s reticence toward overly neat analogies or logical “proofs” of the Trinity could be a gentle tension – SSGO is bold in marrying Thomistic simplicity with relational metaphysics, whereas Rahner tended to simply affirm both and live with some paradox. Another nuance: Rahner was deeply influenced by Augustine and Thomas but re-read them through a modern lens. SSGO also re-reads the tradition but pulls in very modern philosophical ideas (metametaphysics, phenomenology). Rahner might caution that any such synthesis must remain thoroughly grounded in biblical faith and Church teaching – something SSGO indeed claims to do. Overall, any tension is more in tone than substance: Rahner’s theology sets the stage that SSGO plays on, even if SSGO’s performance is a bit more experimental in philosophical style.
• Notable Nuances: A key nuance in Rahner is his idea of the “anonymous Christian” and the presence of God’s grace everywhere – while not directly about Trinity, it flows from the notion of a God whose very being is self-communication. This highlights that for Rahner God’s simplicity = God’s universal self-giving love (an idea SSGO mirrors by tying simplicity to God’s relational act). Also, Rahner’s transcendental anthropology (seeing human openness to God as a quasi-“element” of the doctrine of God) means he links Trinity to human experience; SSGO similarly often relates its ontological claims to how we experience relationships, love, knowledge (as seen when Dryer compares human relationality analogies from figures like Staniloae or uses scriptural relational terms (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer)). Another nuance: Rahner was a Jesuit steeped in Ignatian spirituality, and he viewed the Trinity in terms of God’s self-bestowal in love and our call to respond. SSGO doesn’t explicitly delve into spirituality, but its stress on relationality implicitly invites a more prayerful, interpersonal understanding of God than a purely scholastic account would – again very much in Rahner’s spirit. Finally, Rahner carefully kept Christology and Trinity connected (e.g., the Son who becomes man is the same Son in the Trinity, and this reveals something of how God is Father, Son, Spirit eternally). SSGO likewise upholds that the distinctions we see in salvation (Father sending Son, Spirit proceeding) reflect eternal truths of God – indeed SSGO uses those distinctions as primitives. In essence, SSGO operationalizes Rahner’s axiom: it provides a conceptual schema wherein the unity of God’s essence and the triplicity of His self-communication are one reality, just described in different terms – precisely what Rahner insisted upon (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer).

Lateran Council IV (1215)

• Core Contributions: The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is a defining moment for the doctrine of God in the Catholic tradition. In its Canon 1, Lateran IV articulated with clarity the belief in one absolutely simple divine essence in three persons. It taught: “We firmly believe and openly confess that there is only one true God… Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three Persons indeed but one essence, substance or nature, absolutely simple” (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer). This conciliar statement is a core dogmatic affirmation of divine simplicity: God is incomposite, not made of parts like creatures are. Simultaneously, it affirms real Trinitarian distinctions by describing the persons: the Father unbegotten, the Son begotten of the Father alone, the Holy Spirit proceeding from Father and Son (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer). Lateran IV thus contributes the authoritative balance: God’s essence is one and indivisible, yet within the unity of that simple essence the personal relations of origin (begetting and proceeding) constitute the three persons. Another important phrase from this council is that in God there is “common essence undivided and personal properties divided” (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer) – meaning the Godhead is undivided in what is common, but the persons are distinct in their relational properties. This council’s formulation set the stage for all later attempts (including SSGO) to “harmonize Trinity and simplicity”, by insisting on both truths without explaining away either. Historically, Lateran IV was combating errors like Cathar dualism (which denied one principle of all things) and various Trinitarian heresies; it established once for all that Christianity worships one God in Trinity, not three gods, and not a solitary God with merely three names. Its insistence that God is “omnipotent, unchangeable, incomprehensible” and yet Father, Son, Spirit, provides the non-negotiable doctrinal bedrock.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO identifies itself as “a framework for a catholic systematic theology” (relational ontology – RobertDryer), so it explicitly builds on teachings like Lateran IV. The Council’s declaration of absolute simplicity coupled with real Trinitarian relations is essentially the problem SSGO is designed to explore and illuminate. Dryer’s work frequently cites Church declarations (Lateran IV and others) that God as the “uncaused principle” must be simple (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). SSGO’s relational ontology is an attempt to explicate how Lateran’s seemingly paradoxical phrasing can be understood coherently: how the one “simple” essence exists undivided in three distinct ways. For example, Lateran IV said the Trinity’s persons are not to be multiplied as separate beings, nor the unity reduced – in SSGO’s terms, this translates to each Person being the fullness of the divine being (no division of substance), differentiated only by relational identity (which fulfills the Council’s mention of personal properties). When SSGO posits “each Person is a self-standing, eternally actualized self-gift… preserving both absolute unity and genuine relational distinction” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer), it is essentially rephrasing Lateran IV in a new conceptual idiom. The Council provided the what (one simple nature in three distinct persons); SSGO is providing a possible how (the one nature is the relational act of self-givenness that subsists as Father, Son, Spirit). Moreover, Lateran IV’s condemnation of both tritheism and modalism is mirrored in SSGO’s careful boundaries – Dryer explicitly frames SSGO as avoiding “mere modes” on one hand and partition of the Godhead on the other (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). By rooting itself in Lateran IV, SSGO aligns with the deepest tradition: any new theory must at least affirm the Lateran formula. Dryer does so, even quoting that God is “one principle of the universe” and highlighting Lateran’s teaching that were God composite, He would be dependent (unacceptable) (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Hence, SSGO is in strong continuity with Lateran IV, seeking to support and illuminate its teaching with philosophical insight.
• Tensions with SSGO: Since Lateran IV is a dogmatic statement, it doesn’t theorize – it simply states truths. Any creative system like SSGO must be careful not to stray from those truths. A potential tension could arise if someone thought SSGO’s language of “relational modes” sounded like introducing parts or accidents in God (which would contradict “absolutely simple” and undivided essence). However, SSGO explicitly denies that its modes are parts; it intends them as the very Godhead in relational expression, which should be compatible with Lateran IV. Another area of caution is that Lateran IV’s understanding of persons was rooted in classical terminology of relations of origin (Fatherhood, Sonship, Procession). SSGO’s terminology (drawn from modern sources) must ultimately map back to those classical concepts. For instance, if SSGO said something like “the persons are perspectives of the essence,” that could be misconstrued as modalism or Sabellianism which Lateran IV rejects. Dryer seems aware of this, constantly emphasizing the full reality of each hypostasis and the permanence of the distinctions (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). In truth, any “tension” is just the challenge inherent in expounding a mystery defined so succinctly by the Council. SSGO must hold together what Lateran IV holds together: unity and Trinity. As long as it does, it’s not so much in tension with Lateran as in creative continuity. One might also note that Lateran IV used the Filioque (“Holy Ghost equally from both [Father and Son]” (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer)), whereas some relational ontologies might de-emphasize that to appeal to East-West unity. SSGO, being Catholic, upholds the Filioque (the Father and Son jointly as one principle spirating the Spirit (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer)), but also draws on Eastern thinkers like Lossky and Staniloae. There is a possible tension in blending Eastern insights with a Western dogma – for example, Lossky criticized the Filioque for seeming to make the unity a property of nature rather than person (Father). SSGO has to navigate that by articulating the Filioque in a relational way that doesn’t undermine the Father’s primacy. This is a subtle point, but one that Lateran IV followers would watch. So far, SSGO handles it by maintaining one identical essence in Father and Son that spirates the Spirit, consistent with the Council’s intent while still describing the relations in symmetric, reciprocal terms (this likely draws on Ratzinger or Augustine’s idea of the Spirit as the bond of love of Father and Son).
• Notable Nuances: Lateran IV’s context is important: it was combating both dualism (the idea of two ultimate principles, good and evil) and clarifying Christian monotheism against misunderstandings. Thus it stresses one principle of all things (the Trinity as Creator, not three cooperatively) (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer). SSGO echoes this by insisting there’s a single divine will and act behind creation – even though it’s a tri-personal act, it’s one “self-standing” act. This corresponds to Lateran’s unica principium (one principle). Another nuance: the Council’s phrase “absolutely simple” (simplicem omnino) (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer) is one of the strongest assertions of simplicity in any magisterial text. SSGO must honor that by showing that relational distinctions do not introduce composition or accidents in God. Dryer emphasizes God has no “parts” or metaphysical composition like essence/existence, form/matter, etc., citing Aquinas and the Catechism (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). This underscores SSGO’s commitment to what Lateran taught: all that is in God is God (no distinct sections of divinity). Additionally, the Council’s wording “three persons indeed, but one essence” (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer) has an apologetic ring: it’s pushing back on those who might either blur the persons or multiply the Godhead. SSGO’s own writing often mirrors this kind of apologetic structure, e.g., Dryer’s blog addresses questions like “One God, Relational Trinity, No Modalism” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) and “Three Persons, One Essence, & Simplicity” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) – essentially unpacking Lateran IV for a modern audience. Finally, Lateran IV goes on to talk about the Incarnation (one person two natures) in the same Canon, highlighting how Trinity and Incarnation are the twin pillars of Christian doctrine. SSGO, while focused on Trinity and simplicity, does not ignore the Incarnation – Dryer’s questions include how simplicity relates to God’s act of becoming man (relational ontology – RobertDryer). This holistic approach is very much in line with Lateran IV’s comprehensive vision of God’s unity and God’s interaction with the world (creation and salvation). In summary, Lateran IV provides SSGO with its doctrinal scaffolding – the non-negotiable truths – within which SSGO’s more detailed relational ontology is constructed. The ontology’s success is measured by how faithfully it preserves what Lateran IV succinctly expressed: God is one simple essence in a Trinity of true persons (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer).

Hans Urs von Balthasar

• Core Contributions: Hans Urs von Balthasar, a Swiss theologian, contributed a vibrant and imaginative approach to the Trinity, especially in his works like “Theo-Drama” and “Mysterium Paschale.” He is known for emphasizing the dramatic and relational nature of the Triune God. Balthasar proposed that the intra-divine life can be thought of as a kind of eternal drama of love: the Father who eternally generates and “hands over” the Son, the Son who eternally receives and reciprocates this self-surrender, and the Holy Spirit as the bond of this love. One of his striking contributions is the idea of a kind of “kenosis” within the Trinity – not that God changes or suffers deficiency, but that within God’s self-giving love there is something analogous to self-emptying: the Father withholding nothing of the divine being from the Son, etc. He interprets the Crucifixion as revealing something of the inner life of God (e.g., the cry of dereliction “Why have you forsaken me?” indicates a profound distance between Father and Son that is still within the unity of the Spirit). Balthasar frames Trinitarian distinctions in terms of relational opposition of love (sender–sent, lover–beloved) and insists this duality is overcome in a higher unity of will and being (Hans Urs von Balthasar – RobertDryer) (Hans Urs von Balthasar – RobertDryer). For example, he writes that the distinction between “the One who surrenders and the One who is surrendered… cannot be ultimate; it expresses a unity of the Spirit, a unity of disposition” (Hans Urs von Balthasar – RobertDryer). Thus, Balthasar’s core contribution is a richly relational vision: the Trinity is a communion of persons in absolute mutual love, a dynamic event of gift-exchange and even a sort of dialogue. In terms of divine simplicity, Balthasar doesn’t focus on the term, but implicitly he suggests that God’s unity is the unity of this triune love – an “ineffable order” where 3 = 1 in a way that transcends our categories (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (he often draws on the idea of the Trinity as an absolute fullness (plenitude) of being and love with no loneliness or partition). He also incorporated aesthetic and dramatic categories into theology, so the revelation of the Trinity is the climax of the divine “drama” of salvation. In short, Balthasar injects pathos, reciprocity, and beauty into Trinitarian theology, refusing to let it be merely abstract – God is active, eventful Love.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO seeks to keep both God’s unity and tri-personal life in view, which is very much what Balthasar’s theology does. Dryer’s ontology, which states each Person is the full divine essence from a unique relational vantage, finds an illustrative counterpart in Balthasar’s thought that each Person possesses the fullness of the Godhead but in a distinct relational manner (Father as source, Son as recipient-and-returner, Spirit as the fruit of their love). Balthasar’s vivid descriptions (Father as speaker, Son as word; Father as lover, Son as beloved, Spirit as love itself, etc.) help flesh out how the relations are real and yet do not break unity – exactly SSGO’s aim. For example, Balthasar emphasizes that even when we distinguish “the one who sends” vs “the one who is sent,” we must hold they are perfectly one in Spirit and disposition (Hans Urs von Balthasar – RobertDryer). SSGO echoes this by emphasizing perichoresis – each Person envelops and is in the others, sharing one will and action. In SSGO terms, all three relational modes interpenetrate such that the one simple act of God is fully in each (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer). Balthasar’s influence can also be seen in SSGO’s stress on love as foundational. Dryer describes God’s being as “intrinsically self-giving” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) – a very Balthasarian sentiment (since for Balthasar God is self-giving love, shown supremely in the cross and resurrection, which in turn reflect the eternal Trinity (Hans Urs von Balthasar – RobertDryer)). Additionally, SSGO’s incorporation of Eastern theological insights (like those of Lossky or Staniloae) is something Balthasar himself did – he was very patristic and conversant with Eastern fathers, which enriched his Trinitarian vision of communal love. This broad, mystical yet orthodox approach aligns with SSGO’s attempt to be “truly Catholic” and integrative. Thus, Balthasar provides SSGO with a vocabulary of love and relationality that keeps the ontology from becoming too dry. Terms like “relatio subsistens” (God as relationship subsisting) which Dryer uses (relational ontology – RobertDryer), resonate with Balthasar’s idea that the persons are relations in the most real sense (similar to Ratzinger’s point). In sum, Balthasar’s depiction of the Trinity as the “absolute plenitude of love, where self-giving and receiving coincide” is the kind of image that SSGO attempts to capture in systematic form. Each Person in SSGO is a self-gift; Balthasar would say each person is a stance in the divine love-drama. Those are two ways of describing the same reality of a triune God whose unity is not static solitude but living communion.
• Tensions with SSGO: Balthasar’s style is more poetic and less strictly metaphysical than SSGO. He might be wary of over-philosophizing the Trinity, as he often criticized what he saw as arid neo-scholasticism. SSGO, being a metaphysical framework, could seem to systematize what Balthasar preferred to approach through analogy, narrative, and paradox. One specific area of tension is Balthasar’s notion of the Son’s abandonment on the cross reflecting a kind of “distance” between Father and Son in the Trinity (some interpret this as suggesting a sort of suffering or change in Godhead). SSGO, committed to divine simplicity and immutability, might hesitate to incorporate any idea of “pain” or “rift” within God, even a temporary or economic one, since that can conflict with the idea of God’s impassibility and perfection. Dryer would need to treat Balthasar’s “drama” as an analogy or economic manifestation rather than a literal change in the immanent Trinity. Balthasar stretched language to capture the costliness of divine love (even speaking of a ‘super-kenosis’ in God’s eternal life); some Thomist-inclined thinkers have found this problematic. SSGO has to strike a balance: embracing the rich relational insight without implying any instability in God. Another potential tension: Balthasar’s heavy focus on the Trinity revealed in the paschal mystery might downplay how to rationally reconcile Trinity with simplicity – he’s content to stand in awe, whereas SSGO ventures a rational synthesis. Yet, these are complementary approaches more than contradictions. If anything, SSGO might need Balthasar’s imaginative vision to avoid becoming overly technical. Conversely, Balthasar’s approach needs frameworks like SSGO to show it doesn’t violate classical doctrine. Provided SSGO continues to affirm things like the total unity of divine action and will (which it does), there’s no direct conflict. Balthasar’s portrayal of the Persons as having distinct “missions” and even a sort of dialogical life does come close to saying there are distinct consciousnesses or wills in God – an area of careful theology (the Church teaches there is one divine will). SSGO likely navigates this by saying each Person fully and freely lives the one divine will from their unique personal angle, which would be in line with Balthasar’s intent if not his exact language.
• Notable Nuances: Balthasar, along with his mentor Henri de Lubac and others, was part of the Ressourcement movement, returning to Scripture and the Church Fathers. This means he often presents ideas (like Trinitarian perichoresis, the mutual indwelling of persons, or the idea of person as relation) that have patristic roots (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine) but with a modern twist. SSGO benefits from these retrieved patristic insights – for example, the Cappadocian idea that we do not count in God as 1+1+1, the three are one (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) is evident in Balthasar and explicitly cited by Dryer. Balthasar’s concept of “theodrama” also implies that creation and salvation are drawn into the Trinitarian life (without pantheism). SSGO’s worldview is similarly expansive: it hints that reality as a whole (creation) is structured relationally because it comes from a relational God. Another nuance is Balthasar’s use of aesthetic values (beauty, harmony) in theology. SSGO, while not aesthetic in language, similarly tries to show a synthesis (harmony) of truths that is intellectually beautiful – the simplicity and Trinity shining together. Balthasar also dialogued with Eastern Orthodox theology; for instance, he admired figures like Maximus the Confessor and incorporated notions of ecstatic love. SSGO’s inclusion of Orthodox voices (Lossky, Staniloae) can be seen as furthering that East-West convergence that Balthasar valued. Furthermore, Balthasar’s close collaboration with Adrienne von Speyr introduced mystical insights about the Trinity; while SSGO doesn’t mention those, its idea of each divine person as a “self-gift” might unconsciously echo mystical themes of divine love as an eternal flow outward. Lastly, Balthasar underlined that God is personal through and through – “not a person confined in his own self”, but an expansive tri-personality open to include us in love (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer). SSGO’s relational ontology underscores that same personalist idea: God is not a remote simple substance; he is Father, Son, Spirit in eternal relationship, and the very simplicity of God is found in the perfect integration of this relational life. In essence, Balthasar enriches SSGO with a vision of the Trinity as Love’s ultimate mystery, ensuring that any ontological analysis stays moored to the profound reality of divine love that surpasses our complete understanding (yet invites our contemplation and awe).

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)

• Core Contributions: Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) made significant contributions to Trinitarian theology in the 20th century, particularly by re-emphasizing an insight from Augustine and the Eastern Fathers: personhood in God is relational. In a famous formulation, Ratzinger stated, “In God, person means relation. Relation, being related, is not something superadded to the person, but is the person itself.” ([PDF] Anthropology in the Thought of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger). This succinctly captures that the Father is nothing other than the act of begetting the Son, the Son is the act of being begotten and returning to the Father, and the Spirit is the proceeding love – each just is a relation subsisting. This idea was momentous for modern Catholic theology because it bridges the gap between Greek patristic terminology (hypostasis as individual reality) and Latin emphasis on unity: it shows the “persons” are not things or minds alongside the divine nature, but are relations of origin within the one being of God. Ratzinger also delved into how to convey the Trinity to contemporary minds – warning against imagining three separate centers of consciousness (tritheism) and instead understanding the Trinity as unity in communion. Additionally, he contributed an exploration of the Augustinian psychological analogies (memory, intellect, will) but noted their limitations; instead, he highlighted biblical personal language (Father/Son) as irreducibly relational. On divine simplicity, Ratzinger as a theologian accepted it as Church teaching, but he mostly approached it through the lens of God’s unity of being and act – e.g., in Introduction to Christianity, he explains that the Christian God is one and relational, contrasting it with both polytheism and strict monotheistic unitarianism. He also pointed out (in line with the Council teachings) that the Trinity doesn’t undermine God’s oneness: God is one, but not solitary – meaning God’s unity is fecund and tri-personal, not a barren singularity. Ratzinger’s writings, including Credo for Today and academic articles, consistently stress that the Christian understanding of person (which originated in Trinitarian theology) is Being-in-Communion. In summary, his core contribution to our topic: a clear doctrinal affirmation that relationship constitutes the Persons, helping theologians articulate how the Trinity fits with God’s simplicity (since relations do not add extra “parts” to God, they are just God under a relational aspect).
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO stands directly on Ratzinger’s shoulders with regard to defining the Trinity. Dryer’s notion that each divine Person is a distinct “relational mode” of the one essence is essentially a restatement of person as relation. When SSGO says “the one divine essence is fully and irreducibly expressed in the distinct relational modes of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer), it is translating Ratzinger’s teaching into metaphysical jargon. The idea that relation is “not something added” to God but is identical with God’s very being in three ways ([PDF] Anthropology in the Thought of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger), is a guarantee that SSGO’s relational distinctions do not violate simplicity. Indeed, Ratzinger’s statement ([PDF] Anthropology in the Thought of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger) could serve as a motto for SSGO. Moreover, Ratzinger often highlighted the unity of will and intellect in God despite the personal distinctions – SSGO maintains that by insisting each Person is the same one God (hence one will, one mind), differing only as who (a “who” defined by relation). Another alignment: Ratzinger (like Balthasar) loved the concept “God is love” (1 John 4:8) applied to the Trinity – he wrote that this implies lover, beloved, and love (echoing Richard of St. Victor’s triad). SSGO’s emphasis on self-givenness dovetails with that: the Father loves (gives), the Son is beloved (receives and returns), the Spirit is that love given. Thus, SSGO’s dynamic of “each Person fully giving and fully receiving the divine essence in love” is just an expanded riff on Ratzinger’s personal-relational theology. Furthermore, Ratzinger’s concern as a churchman was to communicate these mysteries without philosophical jargon when possible – SSGO tries to stay accessible too, using relational language more than technical terms like processions or innascibility. In its more pastoral moments, Dryer’s work mirrors Ratzinger’s approach of starting from Scripture’s revelation of Father, Son, Spirit as one God and explaining it in terms of relationship. Finally, Ratzinger, who as Pope wrote “Introduction to Christianity”, was keen on showing how the Trinity is not opposed to rationality but exceeds it in a beautiful way. SSGO’s entire project – to systematically “explain” Trinity and simplicity – can be seen as taking up that mantle, demonstrating rational coherence while preserving mystery. In essence, SSGO aligns with Ratzinger by asserting: God’s unity = God’s relationality; there is no tension because what it means for God to be one is for God to be Father, Son, Spirit united in love.
• Tensions with SSGO: Since Ratzinger’s contributions are more in conceptual clarity than elaborate system-building, there’s little direct conflict. If anything, Ratzinger might gently question some of SSGO’s newer philosophical terminology. For instance, calling the persons “modes” might risk confusion, since historically modalism is a heresy (though SSGO clarifies they mean modes in an ontologically real sense, not mere appearances). Ratzinger typically stuck to saying “persons” or “relations” – a minor semantic point but important catechetically. Another nuance: Ratzinger was deeply influenced by Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of Father and Son. SSGO doesn’t explicitly highlight that particular relation (at least in what we’ve seen), though it’s presumably implicit. If SSGO underplayed any one of the relationships (like the Spirit’s procession), Ratzinger’s theology would nudge it to keep symmetry: the Spirit is a full person, not just a bond. But Dryer’s work does treat the Spirit equally as a relational mode of self-givenness, so that’s likely fine. Ratzinger’s work also engages the issue of the “monarchy of the Father” carefully – acknowledging the Father as source but without subordination. SSGO might find balancing Eastern emphases on Father’s monarchy with Western Filioque equality a delicate matter (as mentioned under Lateran IV, and relevant here too). Ratzinger, being very aware of ecumenical dialogues, might advise SSGO to articulate those points with precision so as not to lean too far East or West exclusively. Additionally, Ratzinger would be cautious that any novel theory stays recognizably within the Church’s language. SSGO’s use of terms like “horizon” or “vantage” for persons might be seen as exploratory. Provided SSGO continually ties these back to relation and person in the traditional sense, there’s no real opposition. Essentially, any tension is more about pedagogy and emphasis: Ratzinger might focus on explaining Trinity through biblical terms and historical creeds, whereas SSGO extends into metaphysical explanations (which Ratzinger did less of, though not because he disagreed, but because his aim was different). So long as SSGO does not inadvertently introduce concepts like multiple consciousness or wills (which it explicitly avoids), it remains in line with Ratzinger’s theology.
• Notable Nuances: Ratzinger’s theological style is marked by a synthesis of Scripture, Patristics, and contemporary thought (especially personalist philosophy). One nuance he often mentioned: the term prosopon (person) initially meant face or role, but in Christian usage it was transformed to mean a relation that is itself a subsisting reality. SSGO’s idea of “relational modes” could be seen as a continuation of that semantic transformation – emphasizing that the reality of each Person is their relational orientation (just as Ratzinger explicated). Another nuance: Ratzinger took care to say that while God is relational unity, God is still one subject. He rejected any idea of the Trinity as a committee of three consciousnesses; instead, there is one divine “I” in three ways. SSGO would concur, since it posits one underlying essence – yet SSGO might risk misunderstanding if “relational self-givenness” is taken by readers to imply each person is a separate subject giving to the others. The nuance SSGO must maintain (in line with Ratzinger) is that the giving and receiving are eternal movements within the single divine life, not exchanges between independent beings. Ratzinger also engaged modern philosophy’s notion of personhood (he knew that calling the Father and Son “persons” could mislead people to think of human personality). By defining person as relation, he solved a lot of that. SSGO’s commitment to describing the persons in terms of relational “vantages” or perspectives of the one essence carries that into a metaphysical register – the who is defined by relation, the what is one across them. Additionally, Ratzinger was an Augustinian at heart; he emphasized love and knowledge in God. He wrote about the Son as the Word (Logos) and the Spirit as love, similar to Aquinas. SSGO’s framework can incorporate that by noting the relational modes correspond to how the one divine act operates: the Father generates by intellect (Word), spirates by will (Love), etc., though Dryer might not explicitly go into that scholastic detail. If not, that’s a nuance for further development. Lastly, Ratzinger had a strong ecclesiological bent: he saw the unity-in-diversity of the Trinity as the model for the Church (many members, one Body) and for human community. SSGO’s relational ontology actually reinforces that connection – if ultimate reality is relational, then created reality (and the Church) images it by being relational. Ratzinger’s personalism and SSGO’s relational metaphysics both attest that to be (even for creatures) is to be in relation. In conclusion, Ratzinger’s clarity that relation = person in God provides perhaps the clearest support for SSGO’s claim that it’s possible to have real distinctions in a simple God without composing Him ([PDF] Anthropology in the Thought of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger). It’s a highly congruent relationship: Ratzinger supplies the doctrinal insight and terminology, and SSGO expands it into a full-fledged ontological model.

Erich Przywara

• Core Contributions: Erich Przywara, a Jesuit theologian-philosopher, is best known for his elucidation of the analogia entis (“analogy of being”). His work Analogia Entis deeply contemplates the relationship between God’s being and creaturely being, insisting that there is an ever-greater dissimilarity within every similarity. For divine simplicity, Przywara’s contributions include highlighting the fundamental divide between God and creatures: God is His existence (ipse esse subsistens), whereas in creatures, essence and existence are distinct and in tension. As one commentator on Przywara explains, “unlike God, whose essence is to exist, the essence of the creature is precisely not identical to its existence” (Erich Przywara – RobertDryer). This means all creation has an inherent instability or never fully realized nature, whereas God is ontologically simple and fully actual. This underscores divine simplicity by contrast: God has no potentia or unrealized aspect; creatures are a composition striving toward fullness. Przywara frames this as creatures existing in a dynamic “essence-in-and-beyond-existence” state (Erich Przywara – RobertDryer), whereas God is the perfect unity of essence and existence (pure act). In Trinitarian terms, Przywara didn’t write extensively on the Trinity specifically, but his analogical approach has implications: one must speak of the Trinity analogically, mindful that any concept we apply (like “person” or “relation”) applies to God in a transcendent way. Another key theme from Przywara is the notion of a “dynamic tension” in reality – a rhythm of being that reflects a creature’s continual receiving of being from God and never possessing it fully. This concept can enrich the understanding of the God-world relationship in Trinitarian creation: creation is not separate from God but not identical either – it’s analogically participating in being. For simplicity, that means God can be utterly simple and yet creation (with its multiplicity) can reflect Him without compromising Him. Przywara also addressed nature and grace: he insisted that nature is ordered to grace (and thus to the Trinity) without being able to reach it on its own, preserving both the novelty of divine self-gift and the integrity of nature (Erich Przywara – RobertDryer). This aligns with maintaining that the Trinity (grace) doesn’t automatically emerge from philosophy (nature) – you need revelation, yet revelation isn’t alien to our deepest nature. Summarily, Przywara’s analogia entis contributes a metaphysical safeguard: God is infinitely above creation (preventing any collapse of God into the world or vice versa), which is a crucial backdrop for any discussion of Trinity and simplicity. It ensures that when we say God is three and one, we remember “three” and “one” are being used analogically, not in a crude creaturely way.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO, being a Catholic ontology, operates within the analogy of being, whether explicitly stated or not. Dryer’s approach that God’s being is self-standing and our reality is relationally dependent on God resonates with Przywara’s idea of the ontological difference between Creator and creature. For instance, SSGO asserts God’s “absolute self-sufficiency” in His essential attributes (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) – this is pure Przywara, emphasizing God’s totally other mode of existence (only God’s essence entails existence; ours does not). At the same time, SSGO’s theme of self-giving love means God freely shares being and life with creation, which lines up with the analogy: creation is like God (since it receives being, truth, goodness from Him) yet unlike (since God alone is being by nature). By integrating both transcendence and immanence, SSGO mirrors the analogical balance Przywara championed – God is intimately related to the world (immanence: in Him we live and move and have our being) but also infinitely beyond it (transcendence: the world is contingent, God is necessary). Przywara’s specific point that in creatures essence is never fully one with existence (we’re always “on the way” to our full realization) helps SSGO make sense of divine simplicity in contrast: because Father, Son, Spirit are not three evolving, separate beings but one eternal act, the Trinity stands apart from the world of becoming. This difference is preserved in SSGO, which never makes the persons three independent centers of change – they are one act, timelessly. Moreover, SSGO might implicitly use the analogia entis when dealing with tricky issues like: how can our language of “relation” which in human terms implies separation or accident, be applied to God who is simple? The answer lies in analogy: relation in God is supra-eminent. Przywara’s insight that any positive statement about God carries the silent “and ever more so” (et semper maior) is useful for SSGO. Dryer can say the Father is distinct from the Son, similar to how human persons are distinct – and yet ever more united than any human persons could be. That’s analogical reasoning. Additionally, SSGO emphasizes that God’s eternal act of self-givenness grounds all attributes (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer). Przywara would appreciate the integration here: instead of treating simplicity and love as separate attributes, SSGO merges them (God’s simple essence is love-in-act). This reflects analogia entis at work because it refuses to let an idea like “simplicity” (which might conjure a static unity) be taken in a univocal way that contradicts “love” (which implies relationship). Rather, it holds them together in the One, recognizing our concepts must bend to God’s reality (which analogously encompasses what appears opposites to us: simplicity and multiplicity in perfect form). In essence, Przywara’s legacy in SSGO is the constant awareness that God is God, man is not – SSGO upholds God’s unique mode of being (which allows Trinity of persons without partition) and simultaneously underlines that creation’s relational being is a participated shadow of God’s own relational being.
• Tensions with SSGO: Przywara’s writing is dense and highly philosophical, and one might wonder if SSGO’s more brisk, synthetic approach does justice to all the subtlety of analogy. If SSGO were to lean too far into explaining the Trinity in clear-cut terms, a strict analogist might caution that some mystery must remain – the Trinity will always elude full conceptual capture due to the Creator-creature gap. Dryer’s confidence in proposing a “meta-metaphysical reconfiguration” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) could be seen as too optimistic by someone like Przywara, who might stress the need for negative theology (e.g., saying what God is not). However, SSGO doesn’t abandon apophatic awareness; it tries to integrate it by saying its terms are “hermeneutical” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) – not capturing God’s essence comprehensively, but interpreting known truths in a fresh way. Another possible tension: Przywara’s analogia entis was critiqued by some (notably Karl Barth) as potentially blurring God and creation. SSGO’s talk of relationality everywhere (even in God and in creation) might superficially sound like a kind of pantheistic or monistic lean if misunderstood – “non-dualism” as Dryer’s one post title suggests (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). Przywara would insist on the “infinite qualitative distinction” (to borrow Barth’s phrase) – and indeed SSGO explicitly contrasts its view with Eriugena’s more monistic non-dualism, upholding a clear Creator-creature distinction (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). So SSGO is actually in line with Przywara, but it must always clarify that when it speaks of “relational ontology” it doesn’t mean God = world, but rather relationality in the world analogously reflects relationality in God. Provided SSGO continues to emphasize God’s aseity (from-himself-ness) versus our dependency, it stays true to analogia entis. One more subtle point: Przywara’s analogy of being also implies that human reason can to some extent reach a knowledge of God (analogy is the middle ground between rationalism and total agnosticism). SSGO assumes this too – it’s doing theology with reason – but it also relies on revelation. No real conflict there, but a nuance: analogia entis requires a delicate balance that SSGO must maintain – using reason and analogy confidently but not overstepping what God has unveiled.
• Notable Nuances: Przywara spoke of an “original structure and universal rhythm” in metaphysics – an interplay of opposites (immanence/transcendence, unity/difference) that in creation is never resolved, but in God is transcended in simplicity. SSGO capitalizes on this by showing Trinity (difference) and simplicity (unity) are not opposites in God but two aspects of the same truth – something Przywara’s perspective would allow by saying our categories of unity vs. multiplicity are transcended in the divine modus. Another nuance: Przywara’s formula “essence in-and-beyond existence” for creatures (Erich Przywara – RobertDryer) mirrors the Christian idea of “already and not yet” – we are, but we are not yet fully what we’re meant to be. This has an interesting echo in SSGO’s view of eschatology or deification: because the Trinity is the model of fully actualized relational life, creatures (especially persons made in God’s image) are on a journey toward a fullness of relational existence (ultimately achieved in the beatific vision and communion of saints). While Dryer’s analysis doesn’t explicitly go into this, the framework implies that creaturely relations will find their completion in participation in the triune life – a very analogia entis outcome (creation finding rest in the Creator). Przywara’s concern to uphold mystery (God ever greater) also means that any human explanation, like SSGO, should be held lightly. From what we see, Dryer understands his work as a “rearticulation” of Church teaching, not a final word (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer). This humility aligns with analogical understanding – we speak truly about God, but never exhaustively or on par with God’s self-knowledge. Additionally, Przywara’s thought influenced many later theologians (like Balthasar and Ratzinger). Through them, his nuances (like the refusal to pit God’s unity against God’s threeness, or nature against grace) have likely trickled into SSGO’s DNA. For instance, SSGO’s statement that “the Church Fathers and councils consistently affirm God is at once perfectly transcendent and radically self-giving” (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) is practically a summary of analogia entis applied to theology: God is wholly other (transcendent/simple) and wholly present (self-giving in Trinity and Incarnation). Holding those together without contradiction is analogical thinking at its finest. So, Przywara’s contribution to SSGO is less a direct content piece and more the metaphysical canvas on which SSGO is drawn – ensuring that SSGO’s bold synthesis respects the Creator-creature distinction and the both/and logic required to say God is One and Three, simple and relational, without falling into either/or traps.

Vladimir Lossky

• Core Contributions: Vladimir Lossky, an Eastern Orthodox theologian, offered a staunchly Eastern patristic perspective on the Trinity. His contributions revolve around safeguarding the mystery of the Trinity and the real distinction of persons within the one God, often emphasizing themes like the monarchy of the Father, the rejection of treating the Trinity in terms of impersonal substance, and the essence–energies distinction (though the latter pertains more to how God relates to creation). In his seminal “The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,” Lossky highlights that the Trinity transcends our normal categories such as number. Citing St. Gregory of Nazianzus, he notes that “Two is the number which separates, three the number which transcends all separation: the one and the many find themselves gathered and circumscribed in the Trinity” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer). This means that whereas having two divine persons might imply division into two gods, three persons paradoxically yields unity – a profound assertion that 3 in God is not 3 in the creaturely sense. Lossky addresses the issue of counting in God: he quotes St. Basil to clarify that “we do not count by addition… we do not say: one, two, three” as if adding up separate entities (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer). The divine “threefold number” is not a quantity that spoils unity; rather “the ‘sum’ of which is always unity, 3 = 1” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer), expressing an “ineffable order” within God, not mathematical addition. This is a key contribution: a conceptual pointer to how Trinity doesn’t violate simplicity – because the nature of divine triplicity is unlike any creaturely triad. Lossky also insisted on the consubstantiality (homoousios) of the Three and at the same time the personal properties (being unbegotten, begotten, proceeding) as the only distinctions. He championed the apophatic approach – we cannot comprehend how 3 = 1, we simply hold the truth in tension. On divine simplicity, he upholds it (God’s nature is one, simple and unknowable in itself), but he is critical of any Western tendency that, in his view, might subordinate persons to the essence. For instance, he feared that the Filioque (Spirit proceeding from Father and Son) if misinterpreted, could imply the nature (Father+Son as one principle) generates a person, thus making nature prior to person – something he saw as a Latin error. He emphasized instead the “monarchy of the Father” (the Father alone as source of Son and Spirit) to ensure the persons are defined by relations of origin and nothing “impersonal” has priority. Lossky famously stated that the Eastern Church “allows itself to be guided by the Trinitarian mystery in all its theological vision,” never reducing it to rational scheme, whereas the Western Church starting with one essence tends to face either modalism or tritheism (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (though he did acknowledge both East and West confess the same dogma, he identified differences of theological emphasis). Another contribution is his explication of perichoresis (mutual indwelling) – the Fathers’ teaching that the three persons “cleave to each other without separation… like three suns conjoined into one light” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer), which shows the unity-in-distinctness in an image. Overall, Lossky’s work reinforces that personal distinctions are irreducible and eternal (no collapsing into an abstract One), and yet God is one indivisible being. He also brings in the essence-energies concept: the one essence is shared by the persons (inaccessibly), but they work in the world through energies that are common. While that’s more about economy, it underscores that the unity of action reflects unity of essence – one God acting, not three separate agents.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO finds a great ally in Lossky’s insistence that the Trinity must not be thought of as a sum of parts or a dilution of unity. Dryer’s repeated emphasis that in God the persons are not partitions of the divine being but each is fully God (no division of substance) is exactly what Lossky stresses with 3 = 1. For example, Lossky quoting Basil – “the threefold number is not a quantity… the sum of which is always unity” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) – could be a motto for SSGO’s claim that each person = the whole divine essence (hence you don’t count God as 1+1+1). SSGO’s concept of “relational modes” parallels Lossky’s idea that the only differences in God are the relational properties (fatherhood, sonship, procession). Dryer doesn’t deviate from that: he uses philosophical language, but ultimately the content is that Father = God-as-giver, Son = God-as-given (receiver and returner), Spirit = God-as the unity of giver and given (love) – which is a dynamic restatement of the classic properties. This is consonant with what Lossky calls the “proper and peculiar hypostatic marks” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer): unbegotten, begotten, proceeding. Also, Lossky’s concern to avoid viewing the Trinity through the lens of human categories like number or society is something SSGO heeds by forming its own careful terms. SSGO’s reliance on apophatic affirmation – e.g., acknowledging divine mystery and not collapsing into straightforward logic – is encouraged by Lossky. In Dryer’s site, questions are raised like “What does it mean to count the Persons in a simple God?” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer), directly tackling the issue Lossky discussed. SSGO’s answer would echo Basil/Lossky: you don’t count them in a literal arithmetic way. Instead, you understand distinction without separation – which is precisely Lossky’s point. Moreover, SSGO tries to mediate between East and West, and including Lossky’s perspective is part of that triangulation. By affirming the monarchy of the Father in a way (likely acknowledging the Father as source even within a Filioque context) and emphasizing perichoresis (the mutual indwelling that Lossky described via the image of conjoined suns (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer)), SSGO aligns with Eastern insights. Lossky’s influence ensures SSGO underscores that the persons are not roles or modal appearances but concrete realities, and that unity is not an abstract essence overshadowing persons but the living communion of the three. Dryer’s category of “One God, Relational Trinity, No Modalism” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) could have been penned by Lossky, who always balanced one God (monarchy and unity) with rejection of Sabellian modalism and also rejection of Tritheism. Another alignment: Lossky’s apophatic stance that the divine essence is beyond comprehension whereas we know God in the persons and energies – SSGO similarly acknowledges we only know what God shows us (Father, Son, Spirit in action), and in that revealing, we find unity and Trinity together. SSGO’s methodology of using both Eastern (Lossky, Staniloae) and Western (Thomas, Rahner) sources is itself a nod to Lossky’s hope for integrating the strengths of both traditions (though Lossky was polemical at times, he ultimately believed both East and West held the same faith). By drawing Lossky’s insights into a Catholic systematic framework, SSGO underscores the compatibility of those insights with Catholic doctrine.
• Tensions with SSGO: Lossky was protective of the Orthodox theological language and often critical of Western approaches. If SSGO, for example, uses terms like “metaphysical primitives” or heavily Thomistic concepts like actus purus, Lossky might frown that this is rationalizing what should be left in the realm of mystery. There is a difference of style: Lossky might think SSGO’s attempt to “explain” too much risks taming the mystery. However, since SSGO deeply respects that the distinctions are irreducible and mysterious, it likely stays on Lossky’s good side conceptually. The Filioque issue is a potential friction point. SSGO, being Catholic, affirms the Spirit’s procession from the Father and the Son. Lossky argued that the Filioque, if framed poorly, either subordinates the Spirit or merges the Father and Son into a single principle (thus confusing the personal properties). SSGO would need to articulate the Filioque in a way that might satisfy Lossky’s concerns – e.g., saying the one simple essence is communicated from the Father to the Son, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father through (or and) the Son as one spiration, without making the Spirit a “product” of an impersonal substance or making the Father not the sole arche. If SSGO leans on Augustine’s and Aquinas’ explanations (which in their own way preserve the Father as source), it might survive Lossky’s critique. Still, Lossky might be inherently “reticent” about any framework (like SSGO’s) that originates in a context accepting Filioque. SSGO tries to incorporate the Monarchy of the Father concept (one of Dryer’s Q&A headings (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer) is explicitly “The Monarchy of the Father and Divine Simplicity”), which suggests he is addressing how the Father as source coexists with simplicity. If he can satisfy that (likely by saying the Father as source is a relational property of that hypostasis, not an extra essence piece), the tension can be eased. Another tension: Lossky’s essence-energies distinction implies that while God’s essence is simple and transcendent, God’s energies (operations like grace, presence) are multiple and can be participated. Catholic theology doesn’t typically use that distinction formally. SSGO doesn’t speak of energies, but its notion of self-givenness might play a similar role – the way God’s internal life is shared externally. Lossky might worry if SSGO, by emphasizing God’s internal relationality, would claim we somehow comprehend or partake in the essence (which Orthodox say remains inaccessible, except through energies). SSGO would probably answer that what we partake in is God’s life and love (which could be termed energies), not the inner essence as such. Provided SSGO doesn’t conflate Creator and creature (which it doesn’t), it’s more a differing theological language than a contradiction.
• Notable Nuances: Lossky often contrasted Eastern and Western approaches: Eastern = start from three hypostases, arrive at one essence; Western = start from one essence, explain three persons (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer). SSGO interestingly attempts a synthesis: it starts with absolute unity (like Lateran IV) and immediately interprets that unity as subsisting in relational form. In a way, SSGO is trying to do both at once – a very nuanced stance that Lossky might find intriguing if not entirely orthodox by his standards. Lossky’s commitment to apophaticism meant he cited Dionysius: e.g., even the concept of Trinity transcends our understanding – we use it because God revealed it, but we can’t fathom how three are one (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). SSGO would agree that ultimately our explanations are imperfect. Another nuance is Lossky’s emphasis on experience of God (hence “Mystical Theology”): he claimed dogma isn’t dry speculation but guardrails of true experience of the Triune God in prayer and sacraments. SSGO, though a theoretical framework, consistently ties into Scripture and doctrines aimed at enriching understanding for faith (Dryer often mentions how this helps worship or biblical interpretation). That is congenial to Lossky’s view that true theology is inseparable from doxology. Additionally, Lossky’s elucidation of perichoresis (mutual indwelling) offers SSGO a rich image to express why relational distinctions don’t cause composition or separation. If each person contains the others (as Jesus says “I am in the Father and the Father is in me”), then the divine simplicity is evident – you can’t isolate one from the others at all. SSGO employs this concept by asserting each Person is the whole divine essence from their standpoint. That’s basically an application of perichoresis. Lossky’s recounting of patristic analogies like “three suns with conjoined light” (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) or three torches lighting one merged flame, etc., all bolster SSGO’s case to the imagination. Finally, Lossky (and Eastern theology in general) prioritizes the personal over the philosophical abstract. SSGO resonates by making relationship (personal reality) primary and treating the “substance” not as a fourth thing but as the communion of persons. This is very much in line with Eastern Trinitarian personalism. By including Lossky, SSGO is not only honoring an influential source but also tempering its own Western roots with Eastern mystical sobriety – a balance that can only strengthen its catholicity (small “c” for universality). Thus, Lossky’s legacy within SSGO is a vigilant reminder that the Trinity breaks our categories (like number) and must be approached on its own terms: one undivided divine life, and in that life, three undiluted personal realities (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer) (Vladamir Lossky – RobertDryer), a paradox that SSGO, like Lossky, ultimately invites us to contemplate rather than solve in a human way.

Dumitru Stăniloae

• Core Contributions: Dumitru Stăniloae, a 20th-century Romanian Orthodox theologian, contributed a sophisticated synthesis of patristic theology and personalist philosophy, particularly regarding the Trinity as the “supreme structure of love.” He emphasized that God’s being is an eternal community of perfect love and that this fact is not ancillary but foundational to understanding everything else (creation, salvation, human personhood). Stăniloae underlined the idea that each divine Person, while distinct, contains and fully participates in the one divine essence and in the life of the other persons. He used analogies drawn both from patristic thought and creative imagination. For example, he describes the unity of human nature across many persons as a pale analogy for the divine unity: “the continuity of human nature subsisting concretely in many hypostases can be imagined… as a string on which the hypostases appear like different knots” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). In this analogy, the string (common nature) runs through the knots (persons); between knots the string is “thinner” but still there, holding them together (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). While human persons are divided and only loosely share one nature, the Trinity is the infinite perfection of this unity-in-diversity: “in comparison with the unity of God’s being, the unity of our nature is much reduced” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). In God, there is no fragility or separation between persons – “no distinction in time, nor are they torn away from their connection with each other” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). Stăniloae also stressed perichoresis in vivid terms: the divine hypostases are “totally transparent one to another… like three surpassingly bright and transparent suns which cleave to each other” (he echoes the Fathers here) (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). On divine simplicity, Stăniloae affirms that the unique supra-essence of God subsists in the three persons (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer), meaning the essence is one and the persons are co-inherent in that one essence. He does not treat simplicity as a separate attribute per se, but implicitly he upholds it by denying any division or opposition in God: “all three are perfectly one in the other, together possessing in common the whole of the divine nature with no weakening of continuity between them” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). He was also a proponent of the essence-energies distinction like other Orthodox, teaching that the uncreated energies of God allow us to participate in the divine life (the unity of being) without collapsing us into God’s essence (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). Furthermore, Stăniloae is known for integrating Western insights (he engaged Aquinas and others) into an Eastern framework – thus he speaks of God as actus purus (pure act) but in the context of personal love, and he addresses modern personalist philosophy, presenting the Trinity as the answer to humanity’s relational longing. In summary, his core contributions: articulating the Trinity as perfect relationality and unity (the model and source of love), using analogies to explain how one nature can abide in three persons, and reinforcing that this communion does not violate God’s simplicity but rather expresses God’s fullness. He shows the benefit of Trinity: because God is a communion, we (made in God’s image) are called into communion (with God and each other), which is our salvation and deification.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO’s description of each divine Person as a “self-standing self-gift” that is the full divine essence (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer) strongly echoes Stăniloae’s thought. Stăniloae wrote that “each person of the Holy Trinity… manifests perfect unity vis-à-vis the other two persons both through his own being and through his perfect love for them” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) – this is essentially saying each person fully possesses the one being (unity of essence) and lives it in relation (love toward the others). SSGO says each Person is the complete divine essence expressed from a unique relational angle (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer), which is very much in line with Stăniloae’s view that in the Trinity, “each hypostasis bears the whole of [the one divine] nature” and is interior to one another through love (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). The analogy of the string and knots, while imperfect, gives SSGO a conceptual boost to explain how one nature can be in multiple subjects without there being multiple natures. Dryer can point to that analogy: in humanity the nature is spread thinly and divided among individuals, but in God the nature is fully present without any “thinness” between the persons – there is no gap at all (the string is not attenuated between the divine “knots” — indeed, in God, the “knots” of personhood overlap completely, so to speak). This imagery bolsters SSGO’s argument that the Trinity doesn’t break God’s unity. Stăniloae’s emphatic statement that the Trinity is the “Holy Trinity: Structure of Supreme Love” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) aligns with SSGO’s emphasis on self-giving: for Dryer, God’s being is self-giving love, and Stăniloae would whole-heartedly agree. Additionally, Stăniloae’s integration of Actus Purus (God as pure act with no potential) into an Eastern context helps SSGO link classical divine simplicity (no potential, no composition) with relational life. SSGO frequently insists God has no unrealized potential or parts yet is free to create – Stăniloae likewise would say God’s triune life is eternally actual and perfect, and creation is a free extension of His love (not filling a need). Both SSGO and Stăniloae thus present a God who is fully actual and fully relational – not a static block, but an active communion. Furthermore, Stăniloae, like Lossky, rejects any subordinationism or modalism, matching SSGO’s guardrails. He notes that the divine persons “are not separated by any interval” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) and “no attenuation of the divine nature is conceivable among the persons” (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) – these could be taken as textual confirmation for SSGO’s claims that there’s no diminution of divinity in each person (each is 100% God, not one-third). SSGO could directly use such quotes to support its ontology. On the flip side, Stăniloae also says each person has particularity (unrepeatable identity) but without isolating them – SSGO likewise treats the relational property as giving each person a distinct identity (Father not Son, etc.) without an ontological separation. Also noteworthy: Stăniloae’s idea that the Trinity is the source of our own personhood and unity (we remain distinct persons even as we’ll share in divine life together) resonates with SSGO’s broader relational worldview. SSGO not only explains God’s nature but hints that reality, being created by a triune God, is relationally structured (“non-dual” yet not monistic, as Dryer’s Spider-Man analogy piece suggests (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer) (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer)). This is in line with Stăniloae’s view that the Trinity is the model for church and society – unity in diversity. In sum, Stăniloae supplies SSGO with both robust theological content and imaginative analogies that reinforce the very points SSGO makes: absolute unity of being, real plurality of persons, held together by the primacy of love.
• Tensions with SSGO: Being an Eastern Orthodox, Stăniloae might have similar hesitations as Lossky regarding certain Western formulations. However, Stăniloae was comparatively more open to Western theology (he dialogued with Thomism and Catholic theologians amicably). If SSGO stays true to shared dogmatic ground, tensions are minimal. One area to watch: Stăniloae upholds the essence-energies distinction (though perhaps not as polemically as some). SSGO doesn’t explicitly incorporate that distinction. If SSGO were pressed on how we experience God, it might lean on a more Western notion of grace or the economy, whereas Stăniloae would articulate it in terms of uncreated energies flowing from the Trinity. But this is more a theological explanatory style difference than a fundamental clash. Another subtlety: Stăniloae was very strong on the monarchy of the Father (like most Easterners, he sees the Father as sole arche). SSGO, honoring Catholic doctrine, treats the Son as co-source of the Spirit (Filioque). However, Stăniloae wrote that the Filioque, properly understood in an economic or relational sense, need not be church-dividing if it doesn’t undermine the Father’s monarchy. SSGO could be in line with Stăniloae if it emphasizes the Father initiates the Spirit’s procession, with the Son’s participation. As with Lossky, SSGO just needs to articulate carefully so as not to offend Eastern sensitivities – given Dryer’s interest in Eastern writers, he likely does so or at least is aware of the issue. Stăniloae might also caution that an overly metaphysical presentation could lose the experiential side of theology (he always linked dogma with spiritual life). If SSGO is presented purely as an abstract framework, one might miss the sense of worship and deification that pervades Stăniloae’s writing. However, Dryer’s language of “self-giving love” and references to communion indicate he’s keeping the spirit in mind, not just the letter. Additionally, Stăniloae was thoroughly patristic; any concept SSGO brings (like Benovsky’s primitives or Marion’s phenomenology) would be foreign to patristic terminology. Stăniloae might simply reserve judgment: does this new jargon truly convey the ancient faith or does it smuggle in some new notion? Given SSGO’s intent to be orthodox, it likely passes the test, but the proof is in consistent coherence with patristic principles (which SSGO strives for by constant cross-reference to tradition).
• Notable Nuances: Stăniloae offers a richly integrative theology: he ties Trinity with anthropology, cosmology, and spirituality. One nuance is his view that because the Persons are in perfect harmony, God’s interaction with creation (through energies) is an overflow of that harmony, inviting us into it. SSGO’s talk of God’s self-givenness could extend to that: the Trinity opens itself to let us share (by grace) in the love they have. Dryer’s framework already hints at human relational destiny being fulfilled in God’s image. Also, Stăniloae articulated that the interpersonal love in God guarantees our own personhood is preserved in salvation (we don’t dissolve into God but remain distinct in communion). SSGO might incorporate this nuance when considering the ultimate purpose of creation; if everything is relational, union with God isn’t absorption but perfect relationship – an insight from Trinitarian theology. Another nuance: Stăniloae’s use of Romanian/Byzantine mystical insights, like the importance of prayer, hesychasm (stillness before God), etc., which while not directly affecting an ontology, provide context – the Trinity is approached in prayer and lived in the church, not just thought about. SSGO is an intellectual construct, but one can sense a pastoral intent (Dryer referencing scripture, coherence with Catholic devotion). This resonates with Stăniloae’s conviction that theology must edify the soul. Also, Stăniloae had a keen interest in showing that reason and mystery cooperate – he didn’t shy from using philosophy but always transcended it with mystery. SSGO likewise is using reason to serve mystery (not replace it), as evidenced by Dryer’s constant return to the idea that these are timeless truths of God expressed in new terms (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Lastly, Stăniloae often invoked the title “God is love – the Holy Trinity” to sum up that if God were not triune, He could not be love in Himself eternally. SSGO’s fundamental assertion that God’s being is self-giving love inherently presupposes a Beloved and a Spirit of love – the Trinity. In that, SSGO is in full harmony with Stăniloae’s theological vision. Therefore, Stăniloae’s influence on SSGO ensures that the warmth and relational depth of Eastern Trinitarian theology suffuses the framework, preventing it from becoming a merely logical puzzle. SSGO gains from Stăniloae a confirmation that divine simplicity is not compromised by Trinity, but rather enriched by it, for simplicity means God is just love, nothing else, and in the Trinity we see that love in its fullest interpersonal form (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer) (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer).

John Duns Scotus

• Core Contributions: John Duns Scotus, a medieval Franciscan theologian (c. 1265–1308), made several nuanced contributions that bear on divine simplicity and the Trinity. One of Scotus’s key ideas is the “formal distinction” (distinctio formalis) – a type of distinction that is intermediate between a real distinction and a purely conceptual distinction (John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) – Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). He applied this to the divine attributes: for example, God’s justice and mercy are not really two separate parts of God (He is simple), but neither are they identical in our understanding merely by linguistic convention; they are distinct “formalities” within the one essence. In a one-liner: “the divine attributes are really identical in God but formally distinct.” (Divine Simplicity, the Formal Distinction, and the Real Distinction). This allowed Scotus to uphold simplicity (one essence with no parts) while still saying we can meaningfully speak of different attributes or properties of God without trivializing them. Extending this to the Trinity, many interpret that Scotus saw the persons as formally distinct from the divine essence and from each other, rather than really distinct substances. That means Father, Son, Spirit are each God (no real division of essence), yet the personal properties (paternity, filiation, spiration) are formal distinctions – genuinely distinct aspects, but all within the single reality of God. This is a bit different from Aquinas, who considered the relations as “really distinct” from each other but not from the essence (since each relation is just the essence under a relation of origin). Scotus’s formulation tends to reinforce that the distinctions are real enough (more than merely how we think of God) yet do not multiply the underlying reality. Another contribution of Scotus is his emphasis on the primacy of the will and love in God. He argued that God’s will is supremely free (God could have decided on a different world or no world at all; nothing necessitates Him externally). This intersects simplicity because Scotus (in contrast to some readings of Aquinas) wanted to avoid any suggestion that God’s nature compelled Him to create or to love in a certain way; it’s all freely willed. Yet God’s will and essence are one – a mystery he can accommodate via formal distinction perhaps. Scotus is also famous for the concept of the univocity of being – meaning when we say “God exists” and “creature exists,” the concept of “exists” is used in a single (univocal) sense, though vastly different in degree. This was to ensure logical coherence in metaphysics and proofs for God’s existence. This univocity was controversial because Thomas and others preferred “analogy” (being is said in proportionally similar but not identical senses). How does this affect Trinity and simplicity? Univocity of being makes it easier to talk about God’s attributes in a clear way, but one must be careful – Scotus still acknowledges God’s infinite mode vs. our finite mode. For Trinity, univocity isn’t directly about persons, but it’s part of his systematic consistency in talking about God. Additionally, Scotus offered rational arguments about the Trinity’s fittingness: he proposed that God’s self-knowledge could naturally produce one “Word” (the Son) and God’s self-love could spirate a “Love” (the Spirit), so having three persons is maximally perfect in a philosophical sense – more than one person (because solitary God couldn’t be interpersonal love) but not more than three, which in his view would add nothing beyond three (this is more conjectural in his works, but often attributed to him as a “proof of the Trinity’s triune shape”). Summing up, Scotus’s contributions give us conceptual tools: formal distinction to articulate multiplicity within simplicity, strong unity of essence (univocity) to avoid equivocation, and a view of persons that likely treats them as formal differentiations in one substance – preserving both oneness and threeness robustly.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO’s project is essentially to allow real distinctions (persons) in God without compromising God’s unity. Scotus’s concept of formal distinction is very much in that spirit. Dryer doesn’t explicitly use the term, but when he says the Father, Son, Spirit are distinct modes or primitives of the one essence, it sounds akin to saying they are distinct formal aspects of God’s being (each a “who” that is not the other). Scotus would likely nod at something like that – it’s an approach to ensure the distinctions aren’t collapsed as mere names, yet God remains simple and one in actuality. Also, SSGO’s emphasis that nothing in God is partitioned – that all attributes and actions are one in God – parallels Scotus’s insistence that attributes are identical in reality (so, e.g., God’s simplicity and God’s tri-unity are one reality in God, even if formally we distinguish conceptually). Dryer mentions in SSGO contexts that, for example, “the relations of origin within divine simplicity” are a remarkable insight (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer), which resonates with Scotus’s own medieval explorations of that topic. Furthermore, SSGO’s reassurance that each Person is fully identical with the divine essence echoes the outcome of Scotus’s formal distinction: the Father is the divine essence (with the personal property of paternity formally distinguishing Him). Scotus would agree that the personal property is not a part or accident in God, but a formal character – similar to how SSGO’s “relational mode” is not an added part but the manner in which the essence subsists as Father or Son. Another alignment is in the freedom and will aspect: SSGO tries to emphasize both God’s freedom and lack of potentiality, something that can seem paradoxical. Scotus, with his refined thinking, managed to say God has no passive potency (pure act, aligning with simplicity) yet has contingent free knowledge of things (He could have willed differently). SSGO addresses questions like “How Is God Free to Create When He Has No Unactualized Potential?” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). A Scotistic perspective would help answer that (likely SSGO’s answer is that God’s decision to create is not a new actuality added to Him, but an eternal free act; Scotus similarly would root it in the divine will as eternal). So SSGO’s compatibility with Scotus here is strong: both want to protect God’s freedom while affirming His simplicity/immutability. Additionally, Scotus’s notion that tri-personal being is the most perfect way for the absolute love to exist dovetails with SSGO’s idea of the Trinity as the consummation of relational self-gift (it’s an argument from fittingness that if God is perfect love, a Trinity of lover, beloved, and shared love is the highest expression of that – SSGO essentially assumes that as a given truth from revelation and tradition, which Scotus found philosophically reasonable as well). In short, Scotus provides SSGO a scholastic precedent for navigating the one-and-three puzzle logically. SSGO might not cite him explicitly, but his influence is perhaps felt through the general tradition. When Dryer claims his position meets Thomistic concerns (no modalism or partialism) (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer), he is effectively walking in the path Scotus and other medievals paved: distinguishing persons without dividing God.
• Tensions with SSGO: Scotus’s univocity of being could be at odds with the heavy analogical or phenomenological flavors SSGO also draws from (like Przywara or Marion). If SSGO leaned too Scotist, an analogical thinker might object it’s making God too comprehensible. Conversely, if SSGO leaned too analogical, a Scotist thinker might worry about equivocation. SSGO in practice seems to use analogical language (e.g., relational attributes) but also tries to be quite clear logically, so perhaps it mediates this issue. There’s a historical tension: Scotus’s formal distinction vs. Aquinas’s approach. SSGO doesn’t explicitly pick a side, but by employing something akin to primitives/formalities, it’s arguably more Scotistic here than Thomistic. This isn’t a bad thing for orthodoxy, but a die-hard Thomist might challenge SSGO’s conceptualization (preferring the language of relations of opposition that are really distinct as relations but not in substance). However, since SSGO aims to be inclusive (“truly Catholic” in broad sense), it likely tries to show it’s just rephrasing the common doctrine. A subtle tension: Scotus placed a strong emphasis on the intelligibility of doctrine (hence his attempt to rationalize Trinity’s number). SSGO too aims to make sense of Trinity+simplicity, but there’s always a risk: press too hard on rationalizing and one might stray into speculation not strictly warranted by revelation. Scotus’s rational Trinity arguments have never been accepted as proof; they’re seen as suggestive. SSGO must similarly remain a theological explanation, not a “proof” that forces God into a schema. As long as SSGO remains presented as a model consistent with faith (which it does), not an independent rational derivation, it’s fine. Scotus’s heavy focus on will also led to theological positions that some Thomists criticize (like viewing the persons of the Trinity primarily through will – arguably Scotus saw the Spirit proceeding from will/love). SSGO doesn’t go into that debate, but if it emphasized, say, love too singularly as what defines the Spirit, some nuance might be lost. However, since SSGO draws from multifaceted sources, it probably doesn’t fall into any one school’s potential blind spot. Another potential friction: Scotus’s legacy in Catholic thought sometimes is contrasted with Thomas’s. SSGO compares itself to Thomism in one blog piece. Perhaps one might wonder, does SSGO’s SSGO lean more Thomist or Scotist? It might use Thomist terms (actus purus) but in a somewhat Scotist fashion (speaking of modal distinctions). This could confuse purists of either camp. But such scholastic turf wars are less relevant in a synthetic work like SSGO, which is more interested in the end result (Trinity and simplicity affirmed together). So any tension is likely minor and internal to specialist debate.
• Notable Nuances: Scotus introduced the idea of “haecceitas” (this-ness) to explain what individuates one thing from another when all common nature is the same. In Trinity terms, one could say each Person has a haecceity that makes him Father, Son, or Spirit. SSGO doesn’t use the term, but its concept of a unique relational vantage is akin to a haecceity – an individuating factor that isn’t a chunk of essence but a certain “this-ness” (being Father, e.g., means being God in a paternal way). Also, Scotus’s Mary-centric theology (like the Immaculate Conception) and absolute primacy of Christ (Incarnation intended even without the Fall) reveal how he viewed God’s will and love as very orderly and planful. SSGO isn’t addressing those topics, but its strong integration of Trinity with God’s act of creation and salvation (as seen in Dryer’s emphasis that Trinity is revealed in the economy and not incidental) resonates with the idea that God’s inner life and His plan for creation are unified – a notion Scotus would support (for instance, if Christ is the first thought in God’s plan, that emphasizes the centrality of the Son in God’s creative will, tying immanent and economic Trinity closely). Another nuance: Scotus’s theology was part of a Franciscan tradition (alongside St. Bonaventure) that often stressed divine love and the centrality of the Trinity in a more affective way than some Dominican scholastics. SSGO interestingly pulls from many wells, including that more affective stream via Marion or Balthasar. In doing so, SSGO perhaps unwittingly marries the Franciscan emphasis on love (Bonaventure, Scotus) with Dominican clarity (Aquinas) – a holistic approach. Additionally, Scotus had a nuanced view of necessity vs. contingency in God’s actions (God necessarily loves himself, necessarily Trinity; ad extra acts are free). SSGO deals with “necessary existence vs. free creation” (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer), likely echoing similar distinctions (God’s nature necessarily is triune love, but creating the world is a free choice flowing from that love). We see Scotus’s fingerprints in any careful conditional: e.g., if God creates, He must do so in line with His nature (which is love and wisdom), but He wasn’t compelled to create. SSGO certainly upholds that: creation is not out of necessity (so no potential forced God’s hand), yet creation does reflect who God is (love given freely). Lastly, historically Scotus’s thought influenced later Catholic theology through figures like Suarez and the Jesuit school, which in turn fed into modern Magisterial language. So some ideas that SSGO takes for granted (like “in God all is one except where there is opposition of relation” – a very standard formula from Lateran IV and Aquinas) indirectly benefitted from Scotist clarification. SSGO as a modern construct benefits from centuries of such scholastic fine-tuning. In essence, Scotus provides SSGO with the intellectual tools and distinctions that make a concept like SSGO even possible: that we can speak of modes, relations, formalities in one simple God without contradiction. SSGO, knowingly or not, uses a Scotistic lens at times to ensure the Trinity is not lost in simplicity nor simplicity in Trinity. Scotus’s work shows that the logic of Trinity and simplicity can be coherent, and SSGO builds on that foundation to present a fresh synthesis.

John Scottus Eriugena

• Core Contributions: John Scottus Eriugena was a 9th-century Irish theologian-philosopher known for his work “Periphyseon (On the Division of Nature)”. He is a unique figure who merged Christian Neoplatonism with a sort of speculative cosmology. Eriugena advanced a form of Christian non-dualism or panentheism – the idea that all reality (God and creation) is ultimately one, or at least that creation has no independent existence apart from God. He spoke of nature in four divisions: (1) the nature that creates and is not created (God as source), (2) that which is created and creates (the primordial causes or Logos), (3) that which is created and does not create (the world), and (4) that which neither is created nor creates (God as end of all, when all things return to Him). In doing so, he essentially said all things come from God and return to God, and in the end, God will be “all in all.” This suggests an ultimate unity where the distinction between Creator and creature is somehow overcome (though Eriugena intended this in an orthodox way of deification, his language can sound pantheistic). For divine simplicity, Eriugena was radically affirming: God is beyond all categories, even beyond being itself – a direct influence from Pseudo-Dionysius. He would assert God is a “simple unity” in whom the forms of all things pre-exist and to whom all things will be reconciled. In terms of the Trinity, Eriugena certainly accepted the doctrine, but he saw the persons in highly apophatic terms: since God’s essence is unknowable, the Father, Son, Spirit are also ultimately unknowable in their distinctions except as they accommodate to our mind. He tended to subsume differences in an overriding unity: some interpreters say he considered the Trinity to be like three categories of our understanding of God rather than real distinctions in God (this was one accusation of heterodoxy against him – perhaps unfairly). His emphasis was on the oneness of God to the point of sometimes explaining the Trinity in very abstract terms (like God as self-knowing gives rise to Word and self-loving to Spirit, which is standard, but he put more weight on the Neoplatonic “God beyond God” idea). Another key element: Eriugena’s concept of “theophany” – all creatures are a manifestation (appearance) of God. This implies a super-strong doctrine of participation: creation is essentially God showing Himself under forms. In Eriugena’s view, creatures have no being except in God (which is true, but he really runs with that: effectively creation is within the divine self-manifestation). That underscores simplicity in a way: ultimately, only God truly is – everything else is sort of God’s self-expression (though not identical to God in essence). So Eriugena’s contribution is pushing unity to its extreme, seeing Creator and creation in a kind of grand non-dual relationship (not two separate realms). Historically, some of Eriugena’s positions were later considered too unguarded (he was never condemned explicitly, but later medievals were wary of pantheistic readings of him). However, his bold speculation opened avenues for later mystics and thinkers about the all-encompassing nature of God’s presence. To summarize: Eriugena underscores absolute divine unity (“God is One and the only reality”), interprets all distinctions (including the Trinity and creation) as ultimately flowing from and returning to that unity, and frames the whole of reality as a procession from and return to the simple divine source.
• Alignment with SSGO: SSGO is certainly theocentric and holistic in a way Eriugena would appreciate: it tries to view all reality (divine and created) through the lens of relationship and participation in God. For instance, Dryer speaks of a kind of Christian non-dualism but carefully “with a clear demarcation between God and creation” (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). This shows SSGO is inspired by the idea of a profound God-world unity (like Paul saying “in Him we live and move and have our being” (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer), which Eriugena loved), yet it stops short of erasing the Creator-creature distinction as Eriugena’s system risked. SSGO’s notion of “Divine Existential Unity (DEU) principle” (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer), which presumably says God is the one in whom all exist, parallels Eriugena’s insistence on the unity of all in God. But SSGO explicitly upholds asymmetry – God is the sustainer, creation is contingent (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer) – aligning it with orthodox Christianity more than Eriugena’s extreme monism. Still, the very idea of an ontology where relation is fundamental and “all is interconnected” in God echoes Eriugena’s panentheistic vision. SSGO posits that being is fundamentally relational and grounded in God; Eriugena would agree wholeheartedly that everything is grounded in God (indeed nothing truly “other” than Him). On Trinity, while Eriugena’s view is a bit unorthodox in tone, both he and SSGO share the perspective that God’s unity is never broken. SSGO’s emphasis that the three persons are one context or one “web” of relationality could be seen as resonant with Eriugena’s view that the distinctions are within the one nature of God which ultimately remains simple. However, SSGO insists the distinctions are real and eternal (matching Church teaching), whereas Eriugena sometimes gives the impression that distinctions fade in the final analysis. Alignment is found in how SSGO leverages Neoplatonic thought (through Marion’s Dionysian influences, perhaps) to say God is utterly simple and beyond comprehension – that vibe is very Eriugenian/Dionysian. Also, SSGO’s portrayal of creation as an extension of God’s self-gift (like Spider-Man’s web analogy tying creation to Creator (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer)) has similarity to Eriugena’s idea of theophany – creation as God’s “web” or manifestation. Both views integrate cosmology with theology: reality is a network of relations rooted in the Trinity. SSGO however modulates the language to keep Creator and creation distinct within that network, a correction to Eriugena’s overreach. Thus, SSGO draws inspiration from Eriugena’s grand unity (hence quoting or referencing his non-dualism (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer)) while remaining cautious. We might say SSGO sees Eriugena’s vision as a kind of limit case: extremely beautiful in affirming God’s all-in-all, but requiring qualification to maintain orthodox boundaries. In doing so, SSGO aligns with the spirit of Eriugena (all is from and in God) but not the letter (it won’t say creation is just God or that the Trinity dissolves into oneness).
• Tensions with SSGO: If taken without correction, Eriugena’s theology could undermine precisely what SSGO wants to uphold: real Trinitarian distinctions and real otherness of creation. SSGO explicitly contrasts its relational ontology with Eriugena’s brand of non-dualism: “this view contrasts with Eriugena’s, aligning more with the Principle of Divine Dynamic Actuality (DDA)” (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). The mention that SSGO’s view “upholds a clear demarcation” between God and creation suggests that Eriugena did not uphold such a clear demarcation (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). So, SSGO acknowledges tension: Eriugena might have collapsed creation into God (or at least blurred lines), which SSGO cannot accept (because that would compromise God’s freedom, transcendence, and the gratuity of grace). Another tension: Eriugena’s Trinity might be seen as a step towards modalism or ontological monism by some – he so prioritizes unity that the persons could seem like phases of the one nature appearing. SSGO, conversely, insists on permanent relational distinction (no hint that the persons merge or disappear in the end). SSGO would find Eriugena’s Trinity lacking in the robust interpersonal quality that modern theology (and SSGO) cherishes. Eriugena is more interested in the metaphysical structure of reality than the interpersonal love within God – SSGO, influenced by personalist thinkers, might critique Eriugena for not celebrating the threeness enough. In essence, SSGO likely views Eriugena as taking a truth (that all multiplicity originates from the One and aims back to the One) and overstating it to the peril of diversity. Therefore, SSGO uses Eriugena as a cautionary tale: yes, God and creation are deeply intertwined (non-dual in a sense), but the distinction is real and must be preserved (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer). SSGO even names one of its principles “Divine Dynamic Actuality” which suggests that God is always fully actual (no dilution in creation) and distinct as the active source – implicitly correcting Eriugena’s more static Neoplatonic emanation-return schema with a more relationally dynamic one (maybe akin to a more mutual relationship rather than all things just dissolving back into God’s simplicity).
• Notable Nuances: Eriugena’s influence in the long run was more on mystics and esoteric strains than on mainstream doctrine. His idea “God is nothing (no-thing) because He transcends being” lives on in apophatic theology. SSGO, by incorporating Marion’s “God without being” and Dionysian ideas via Lossky/Marion, taps into that same nuance: the ultimate simplicity of God defies our categories. For example, if SSGO says God is “beyond our concept of being and relation – yet is Himself the source of all being and relation”, that’s channeling Eriugena’s apophaticism. Another nuance: Eriugena’s cosmic return (all things returning to God) points to apokatastasis (an idea of eventual universal restoration in God). The Catholic Church doesn’t endorse apokatastasis straightforwardly, and SSGO doesn’t either, but SSGO’s optimistic ontology of relational participation might implicitly carry a hope that ultimately all is reconciled in God (through Christ). It must do so carefully, respecting human freedom and the reality of sin/judgment. Eriugena was speculative about end times; SSGO is more focused on fundamentals of God’s nature, so it doesn’t dive into that. Yet the idea that the Trinity is the “end” of all things as well as the beginning (God as alpha and omega) is comfortable in SSGO’s framework. It can say creation was intended to be brought into the communion of the triune love (which aligns with Eastern theology of theosis and something Eriugena would also imagine). Additionally, Eriugena wrote about theophany such that even Scripture and theology are just pointers to an ineffable truth. SSGO’s humility about its own model (that it’s just a rearticulation, not the final word (Divine Givenness AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY – RobertDryer)) echoes this – it’s a finger pointing at the moon, not the moon itself, as Eriugena would insist via negative theology. There’s also an intellectual-historical nuance: Eriugena’s work was a rare example of bold philosophy in the early medieval West, and it was only centuries later that similar bold syntheses (like those of high scholastics) occurred. SSGO, in a much later era, parallels Eriugena’s ambition to unify knowledge (nature and theology) but now with the benefit of a much fuller tradition and magisterium to stay on track. It’s interesting that Dryer’s interest in Eriugena shows an appreciation for the grand unity of truth – something SSGO aspires to, but with the guardrails that Eriugena didn’t have firmly (like the condemnations of pantheism that came after him). Finally, Eriugena’s combination of philosophy, dialectic, and mystical insight prefigures the interdisciplinary approach of SSGO (mixing scriptural, philosophical, patristic inputs). Both try to present a “worldview”. SSGO names itself a worldview of the triune God (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer). Eriugena’s Division of Nature was exactly a worldview, mapping all reality in relation to God. Thus, SSGO can be seen as kindred in scope to Eriugena – a cosmic scope – but far more careful to keep orthodoxy intact. In conclusion, Eriugena’s influence on SSGO is inspirational yet cautionary. SSGO takes the integrative vision (God and creation intimately related) and the extreme apophatic emphasis on God’s unity, but it ensures that it “upholds a clear demarcation” between Creator and creature (A Christian Non-Dualism: A Trinitarian Relational Ontology Illustrated Through the Spider-Man Analogy – RobertDryer) and affirms the Trinity as an eternal relational reality, not a provisional emanation. By doing so, SSGO benefits from Eriugena’s breadth while avoiding his blurry edges, striving for a balanced ontology that is both unified and differentiated – exactly what is needed to articulate divine simplicity and Trinitarian relationality together.

Conclusion: The Self-Standing Givenness Ontology synthesizes insights from a diverse chorus of voices. Benovsky and Marion contribute the philosophical language of primitives and givenness to articulate how the one God can exist in relational diversity. Rahner, Ratzinger, and Balthasar infuse it with a theological and personalist clarity that the triune relations are the very life of the simple God – ensuring SSGO is rooted in biblical faith and love. The dogma of Lateran IV provides the immutable core – one simple essence in three persons – which SSGO ever aims to expound faithfully. Przywara’s analogia entis keeps SSGO attuned to the Creator-creature distinction and mystery, even as Scotus’s distinctions offer a rational scaffold to hold unity and plurality together without collapse. Eastern sages like Lossky and Stăniloae bring in the experiential and mystical emphasis on the Trinity as a communion of love, strengthening SSGO’s resolve that simplicity is not opposed to richness of life but is realized as highest relationality. And even Eriugena’s daring non-dual speculations serve as both an inspiration for all-in-one coherence and a reminder to preserve holy boundaries. Each thinker thus supports a facet of SSGO: divine simplicity is upheld (God is one act of being, with no parts or division) and Trinitarian relationality is equally upheld (that one act exists eternally as Father, Son, and Spirit in mutual self-giving). Where one influence might go too far in one direction, another pulls it back, and SSGO attempts to remain “balanced by accurately reflecting their work while critically assessing it.” The result is an ontology that seeks to confess, with the whole tradition, that God’s unity and God’s triune love are not in tension but in beautiful, mysterious harmony – the triune God is absolutely simple, and in that very simplicity of essence He is an intimate communion of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (Lateran Council 1215 – RobertDryer) (Dumitru Stăniloae – RobertDryer). The self-standing Godhead is self-giving love. All the above voices, across centuries, converge on this paradoxical truth, and SSGO humbly offers a fresh tapestry weaving them together for our time. Each thread – whether philosophical, patristic, or doctrinal – strengthens the portrayal of the one God who is Three, and the three who are One, showing that divine simplicity and Trinitarian relationality, far from opposing, require each other in the fullness of Christian theology (Defending Divine Simplicity – RobertDryer).

Karl Rahner’s primary sources to explore:

Rahner’s Theology and the Stage for SSGO

Karl Rahner’s trinitarian theology provides much of the conceptual “stage” upon which Robert Dryer’s Self-Standing Givenness Ontology (SSGO) performs. Rahner’s insistence on God’s self-communication and the unity of the Trinity’s immanent life with its economic revelation establishes a foundation that SSGO builds upon – even if SSGO’s style is more experimental and metaphysically adventurous. Below, we delve into Rahner’s primary insights (drawing from The Trinity, Foundations of Christian Faith, and Theological Investigations) and see how they align with or challenge SSGO. Key quotes from Rahner are highlighted to show both continuity and tension between his framework and Dryer’s ontology.

Rahner’s Rule: Immanent Trinity Equals Economic Trinity

One of Rahner’s most famous contributions is the axiom often called “Rahner’s rule.” In The Trinity Rahner argues that “the ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity” (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). In other words, the God we encounter in salvation history (the Father sending the Son and Spirit) is exactly God as God is in himself. We have no separate, hidden “immanent” God behind the God revealed in Christ. Rahner writes:

“We know anything at all about the ‘immanent’ Trinity only insofar as we experience a trinitarian God in the ‘economy of salvation,’ and the two are identical” (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer).

This principle was groundbreaking because it closed the gap between abstract Trinitarian doctrine and lived Christian experience. It means that God’s self-revelation (economy) truly reflects God’s inner being – a point that SSGO takes seriously. Dryer’s SSGO likewise assumes that God’s relational being revealed through Father, Son, and Spirit in history corresponds to God’s eternal reality. In fact, SSGO’s whole project of reconciling Trinity with divine simplicity leans on the idea that what God does in time (self-giving love in each divine Person) expresses what God is eternally.

Rahner’s rule sets the stage for SSGO by affirming that any ontology of the Trinity must be rooted in God’s self-gift in salvation. Dryer echoes this by asking how “God is fully present and active in our world through Jesus and the Holy Spirit—showing real differences between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—while still believing that God’s essence is completely one and simple” (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer). Rahner’s answer is that the Trinity’s economic self-disclosure is the immanent reality of the one God. SSGO builds on this, treating God’s self-givenness in each Person as an “explanatory primitive” for reality (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer). In short, Rahner provides the methodological confidence that exploring the Trinity’s self-communication is not just speculative – it’s grounded in how God truly is.

Implication: Rahner’s rule supports SSGO’s approach by ensuring that relational ontology is not a human projection onto God, but drawn from God’s own revelation. SSGO’s experimental metaphysics stays tethered to orthodox insight: “God communicates Himself to humanity (‘economic’ Trinity) as He really is in the divine life (‘immanent’ Trinity)” (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). Rahner thus gives SSGO license to be bold in philosophizing about the Trinity – so long as it never loses sight of the fact that the Triune God in salvation is the real God.

God’s Self-Communication and Self-Givenness

Another Rahnerian theme foundational for SSGO is God’s self-communication in love. Rahner famously equated grace with “God’s self-communication” – God giving Himself, not just something, to us () (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). In Rahner’s vision, the very purpose of creation and salvation is that God pours out his own life and love into the world. He writes in one essay:

“God wishes to communicate himself, to pour forth the love which he himself is. That is the first and the last of his real plans… Everything else exists so that this one thing might be: the eternal miracle of infinite Love.” (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia)

In other words, God is a self-giving God, and human fulfillment is to receive that self-gift (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). This idea clearly resonates with Dryer’s “Self-Standing Givenness” principle. SSGO explicitly builds on the notion of givenness, even drawing inspiration from philosopher Jean-Luc Marion’s concept of the “given.” Dryer describes each divine Person as defined by an eternal act of self-givenness – “each Divine Person is a distinct, irreducible relational identity who fully and uniquely possesses the one indivisible divine essence through an eternal act of self-givenness” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer). That language of self-givenness is very much in the spirit of Rahner’s theology of grace.

Rahner set the stage by articulating that the Triune God’s inner life is one of self-donation – the Father giving himself in begetting the Son, the Father and Son giving themselves in spirating the Spirit, and ultimately God giving Himself to us in incarnation and grace. SSGO takes this and runs with it, making “self-givenness” the central explanatory feature of reality. In a way, SSGO radicalizes Rahner’s insight, proposing a “dynamic relational ontology” where all of reality is “fundamentally rooted in relationality,” anchored in God’s eternal act of self-gift (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer).

Key point: Rahner’s portrayal of God as absolute self-giving Love provides theological cover for SSGO’s focus on givenness. Dryer can claim that SSGO’s seemingly novel metaphysic is actually a development of Rahner’s core intuition: that “God’s gift of himself” underlies both the economy of grace and the very structure of God’s triune being (The Theology of Karl Rahner Quotes by Steven Buller – Goodreads). Every bold line in SSGO about the “relational foundation” of reality (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer) echoes Rahner’s conviction that “God…creates man in such a way that he can receive this Love which is God himself… the unexpected, unexacted gift” (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). Rahner’s theology thus supports SSGO’s emphasis on divine self-gift as not only biblical but metaphysically primary.

Immanent Trinity and Personhood: Rahner’s Relational Ontology

To avoid an abstract or compartmentalized Trinity, Rahner (like many 20th-century Catholic theologians) re-emphasized a classic insight: the trinitarian Persons are relations. In scholastic terms, the Persons are “subsistent relations” – the Father is Father only in relation to the Son, etc. Rahner translated this for modern theology by suggesting we speak of the divine Persons as distinct manners of subsisting of the one God, rather than “persons” in the modern sense of independent centers of consciousness. He wrote that “the Father, Son, and Spirit are the one God each in a different manner of subsisting…” (“Is Karl Rahner a Modalist?” – Trinities). In other words, each Person is the one God, fully, but in a unique relational mode of existence.

Rahner found this phrasing “better, simpler, and more in harmony with the traditional language” than talk of separate “persons,” which could mislead people into thinking of three gods (). Importantly, “to ‘subsist distinctly’…includes the added note of ‘being-thus-and-not-otherwise.’ Moreover, ‘distinctly’ implies the existence of ‘another’ and thus…essential relatedness” (). In short, each divine Person is the one simple God, distinguished only by their relationship to the others. This Rahnerian explanation safeguarded both unity (one divine substance) and plurality (real relational distinctions).

SSGO stands directly on this foundation. Dryer’s ontology uses very similar logic, just with updated vocabulary. Instead of “distinct manner of subsisting,” SSGO speaks of “self-standing relational modes” (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer) or each Person as an irreducible “relational identity” who fully is the one essence (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer). The content is equivalent: Father, Son, and Spirit are not three substances or parts, but one reality lived in three relational ways. Rahner’s influence is evident when SSGO insists “each Person fully expresses the one divine essence uniquely, without…creating division within God’s simplicity” (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer). That is practically a paraphrase of Rahner (and orthodox trinitarian doctrine): the whole God is in each Person, and each Person is the whole God, distinguished by origin or relation, not by having a lesser share of deity (The Trinity—Yesterday, Today and the Future – The Gospel Coalition).

By articulating the concept of person as relational subsistence, Rahner gave theologians permission to move beyond both crude tritheism (three independent beings) and crude modalism (one actor wearing three masks). SSGO benefits from this by framing its solution as a relational ontology exactly of the sort Rahner commended. Dryer even titles his glossary “God as Relatio Subsistens,” indicating that God is relationship subsisting – a very Rahnerian (and Thomistic) idea (Theology – RobertDryer) (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer). Thus, Rahner’s work supports SSGO by providing a vocabulary and conceptual schema in which real, subsisting relations within God are central. SSGO’s claim to “harmonize divine simplicity and the Trinity” through intrinsic relationality (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer)is the kind of project Rahner would recognize as following the trajectory of his own thought.

Supporting Quotes from Rahner:

• “The Father, Son, and Spirit are the one God each in a different manner of subsisting…” (“Is Karl Rahner a Modalist?” – Trinities) – (Rahner emphasizing one God in three distinct subsistent relations, not three separate individuals).
• Rahner preferred “distinct manner of subsisting” because “‘distinctly’ implies the existence of ‘another’…suggests the essential relatedness” of the persons (). This highlights that relationship (Father to Son, etc.) constitutes the persons – a principle SSGO wholeheartedly adopts.
• Rahner was adamant that such language still affirms each Person is fully God: “God could not communicate Himself to humanity as threefold…unless He were threefold in reality” (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia). This guardrail – that the threeness is real, not just an act – undergirds SSGO’s rejection of any modalist reading of “relational modes.” Dryer likewise stresses “One God, Relational Trinity, No Modalism” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer), echoing Rahner’s balance of unity and true triplicity.

Rahner’s Influence vs. SSGO’s Innovations

Given the above, it’s clear Rahner’s framework strongly supports SSGO’s general approach. Rahner set the terms for modern Trinitarian theology in a way that Dryer builds upon:

• Immanent = Economic: SSGO’s trust that our experience of God’s self-giving reveals God’s own being is directly taken from Rahner’s rule (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer). Without Rahner, one might fear that focusing on “givenness” or relationality in God is too speculative – but Rahner assures us it’s grounded in revelation.
• God as Self-Gift: Rahner’s vision of grace as God giving Himself (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia) provides the theological grounding for SSGO’s notion of “self-standing givenness.” Both frameworks see God’s inner life and outward action as an overflow of love. Rahner’s quote about the “eternal miracle of infinite Love” (Self-communication – Theopolis Institute) could practically serve as a motto for SSGO’s worldview of universal givenness.
• Persons as Relations (Unity-in-Distinction): Rahner’s reinterpretation of “person” as a distinct relational way-of-existing is mirrored in SSGO’s terminology. This gives SSGO a legitimate pedigree – it is not inventing a new doctrine, but retooling Rahner’s (and the tradition’s) insight with fresh philosophical language. When SSGO claims each Person “fully possesses the one divine essence uniquely” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer), it stands firmly on Rahner’s shoulders, who showed how to say that without contradicting divine oneness.

However, Rahner’s framework might also resist or caution against some specific moves SSGO makes. Some potential tensions include:

• Philosophical Experimentation vs. Pastoral Language: Rahner was careful about theological language remaining meaningful for faith. He acknowledged that calling the persons “distinct manners of subsisting” was a largely technical description, not a replacement for calling Father, Son, and Spirit by name. As one commentator noted, “no one can invoke, adore and glorify a distinct manner of subsisting” (). In other words, we pray to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – real personal subjects – not to abstract “relations.” Rahner would likely support SSGO’s theoretical nuance but warn against making it so abstruse that it loses the personal, devotional character of the Trinity. SSGO’s terminology (e.g. “metaphysical primitives” or “self-standing relational modes”) leans heavily academic. Rahner might resist if such language overshadowed the fact that the three Persons are someone to encounter, not just ontological principles. His framework demands that any new terms ultimately serve to illuminate the faith of the Church, not confuse it.
• Avoiding Modalism and Tritheism: Rahner trod a fine line to avoid modalism (too much unity) on one hand and tritheism (too much separation) on the other. SSGO aims to do the same, but its innovative terms must be handled carefully. For example, Dryer speaks of the “self-sufficiency and non-dependency of the divine Persons” (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer). Rahner might raise an eyebrow here: if misunderstood, saying each Person is “self-standing” and non-dependent could imply three independent divine agents (tritheism). Traditional theology (which Rahner upheld) teaches that the Son eternally depends on the Father as his principle (begotten of the Father), and the Spirit on their spiration – the divine Persons exist in relation, not in isolation. SSGO likely means “non-dependent on anything outside the Godhead,” not denying the mutual relations of origin. But Rahner would insist on clarity: the Father is not Father without the Son; their very identities are relational. SSGO indeed emphasizes relationality, yet Rahner’s stress on the essential unity of consciousness in God would caution any language that sounds like three independent centers of will. (Dryer does reject the idea of “three subjectivities” explicitly (), in line with Rahner). Still, Rahner’s framework might resist any metaphysical speculation that isn’t extremely careful to preserve “one God in three Whos” rather than a committee of gods.
• Metaphysical Commitments and Mystery: Rahner was a master of marrying philosophy (especially transcendental Thomism) with theology, but he also respected the limits of our concepts before the mystery of God. SSGO’s use of contemporary philosophy – Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and Jiri Benovsky’s ideas of metaphysical primitives (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer) – goes beyond Rahner’s own tools. Rahner might support the creative engagement of new philosophy, yet he might also question whether some of SSGO’s moves add necessary clarity or if they risk redescribing the Trinity in overly novel terms. For instance, SSGO speaks of “relational horizons” and even explores thought experiments (like “the computation for SSGO” or “modal collapse” scenarios) (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer). Rahner’s approach was more straightforwardly theological: he stuck closely to biblical economy and the core dogmatic formulas, reinterpreting them for modern understanding. If SSGO, in its “meta-metaphysical reconfiguration”, proposed anything that strayed from the deposit of faith, Rahner would object. So far, Dryer stays orthodox, but Rahner’s abiding concern would be: does this new ontology serve to illuminate the Trinity given in Scripture and tradition, or does it indulge in speculation? He would likely appreciate SSGO’s desire to “bring clarity and elegance to the doctrine of God” (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer), which indeed echoes his own aim of renewing Trinitarian theology. Yet he would remind SSGO that ultimately the Trinity is a mystery of love to be adored, not fully mastered by any ontology.

In summary, Rahner’s theology both empowers SSGO and keeps it honest. It provides the essential groundwork – the idea of a self-communicating, relational Trinity whose economic revelation truly discloses God’s inner being – without which SSGO could not even begin. At the same time, Rahner’s framework carries built-in safeguards (against modalism, tritheism, and impractical language) that challenge SSGO to articulate its metaphysics in continuity with Christian experience. Dryer’s SSGO can be seen as a bold “performance” on the stage Rahner set. Rahner’s influence is evident in every act of that performance, even if SSGO riffs in a more experimental key.

Conclusion: Rahner’s Lasting Impact on Dryer’s SSGO

Robert Dryer’s Self-Standing Givenness Ontology owes a profound debt to Karl Rahner. Rahner’s vision of the Trinity – one God who is tri-personal Love, fully revealed in divine self-gift to the world – is the fertile ground from which SSGO’s ideas sprout. We have seen Rahner, in his own words, affirm that the “economic Trinity” (God-for-us) is the “immanent Trinity” (God-in-himself) (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer), and insist that the Triune Persons are nothing but God’s one being in three relational modes (“Is Karl Rahner a Modalist?” – Trinities). These insights directly support Dryer’s synthesis of divine simplicity with relational diversity. SSGO is essentially extending Rahner’s project by using new conceptual tools to address an age-old question: How can God be absolutely one and yet live a triune life of self-giving love? On this, Rahner and SSGO sing in harmony.

Yet, Rahner’s framework also offers a gentle corrective harmony when SSGO’s solo gets too daring. It reminds SSGO to keep its performance grounded in the melody of tradition: the trinitarian language of Father, Son, Spirit, and the lived reality of Christian prayer and worship. Rahner would likely applaud SSGO’s enthusiasm to “reaffirm the indivisibility of God’s essence while enriching our understanding of the dynamic relational life of the Trinity” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) – a goal very much in line with his own legacy. And he would encourage Dryer to let that enrichment always serve the faith of the Church.

In the end, exploring SSGO through Rahner’s primary texts illuminates just how much Rahner set the stage. Even if Dryer’s metaphysical style is more experimental, the script was largely written by Rahner: a God who is self-giving love, a Trinity where immanent mystery and economic manifestation are one reality, and a divine life in which Person = self-relationship in communion. With Rahner’s theology as the backdrop, SSGO’s performance gains depth. The direct voices of Rahner we have quoted – speaking of God’s infinite love poured out, of each Person as an eternal “manner of subsisting,” and of the unity of God’s being in saving action – all show that Dryer’s SSGO is a creative variation on Rahnerian themes. Rahner provides both the score and the critical ear, ensuring that as SSGO improvises philosophically, it stays in tune with the fundamental truth that “God’s self-communication to us” in Christ is the very life of the Triune God (What Is the Economic and Immanent Trinity? | Zondervan Academic) (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia).

Sources:

• Karl Rahner, The Trinity – “Grundaxiom” of immanent/economic Trinity (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia) (Karl Rahner – RobertDryer).
• Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith – God’s self-communication as love (Karl Rahner – Wikipedia) (Self-communication – Theopolis Institute).
• Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations (various volumes) – on Trinity and personhood (e.g. “distinct manner of subsisting”) (“Is Karl Rahner a Modalist?” – Trinities) ().
• Robert M. Dryer, SSGO writings (blog posts on robertdryer.com) – to illustrate SSGO concepts (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) (Comparing SSGO with Thomism – RobertDryer) (God as Relatio Subsistens: A Glossary of Terms – RobertDryer) and their resonance with Rahner.

Marion

I’ll conduct a deep analysis of Jean-Luc Marion’s primary sources, starting with the material linked on Robert Dryer’s website and expanding outward to his major works. I will focus on extracting direct quotes from Marion that engage with themes of divine simplicity, Trinitarian relationality, and givenness, and compare them to SSGO’s framework.

Marion’s phenomenology of givenness presents a unique interaction with SSGO, though it does not align as seamlessly as Rahner’s theology. My analysis will highlight points of consonance where Marion’s ideas support SSGO’s emphasis on self-givenness and where his apophatic tendencies challenge SSGO’s more structured metaphysical commitments. I’ll structure the findings similarly to my Rahner analysis, keeping the primary source material as the heart of the response. I’ll update you as I synthesize the findings.

Jean‑Luc Marion and the Divine in Givenness: Influence on Robert Dryer’s SSGO

Marion on Divine Simplicity and Apophatic Approach

Jean‑Luc Marion’s phenomenology is deeply apophatic, resonating with the divine simplicity tradition (the idea that God is indivisibly one and beyond finite comprehension). Marion argues that classical metaphysical approaches (“metaphysica specialis”) cannot grasp God as He reveals Himself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). Instead of treating God as an object or even a being in the usual sense, Marion insists that genuine phenomena (especially the divine) exceed such horizons (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In his view, anything truly divine “does not fall under the order and measure” of our universal scientific or ontological categories (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). This is consistent with the apophatic insistence that God cannot be dissected into parts or known by human concepts – a key aspect of divine simplicity.

Marion’s “God without Being” motif (from his earlier work) encapsulates this stance: God’s essence cannot be conceptualized as one being among others. He affirms that “the way of approaching God in metaphysics… is doomed to failure in the face of the revelation of God” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In other words, God manifests Himself on His own terms, not through a chain of reasoning about essence or attributes. This apophatic bent reinforces the classical notion that God is simple (utterly one and indivisible) by emphasizing God’s otherness and resisting any attempt to break God down into knowable parts. Marion even suggests that “the phenomenon of givenness refuses to be reduced to ontology, yet it reveals that being itself is inseparable from the act of giving” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). Here Marion implies that God’s being is known only through His giving – a radical reconfiguration that places divine self-donation above any static ontological description.

A vivid example of Marion’s approach to divine simplicity appears through his metaphor of the gift. In The Idol and Distance, he writes: “The gift cannot be received unless it is given, for otherwise it would cease to merit its name. The basin is not filled up by the cascade from above unless it ceaselessly empties itself into the basin below. Only the abandonment of that which fills it permits that the stream to come should fill it without cease.” (The Idol and Distance Quotes by Jean-Luc Marion). This poetic image – of an endlessly overflowing cascade – illustrates God’s inexhaustible self-giving. It suggests that God’s fullness (the cascade) can only be known as an ever-flowing act of giving, never as a contained object. Such an image aligns with divine simplicity by portraying God as a pure act of giving (echoing the Thomistic idea of God as actus purus, pure act, but reinterpreted phenomenologically). Marion’s God is utterly self-giving and therefore cannot be caught as a composite object; we encounter Him only by continual self-emptying reception, consistent with an apophatic stance that God’s inner life infinitely surpasses our grasp.

Marion on Trinitarian Relationality

Marion’s work increasingly highlights that God’s self-revelation is trinitarian in form. In Givenness and Revelation, he proposes that the Christian God reveals Himself as Trinity in both content and method. “In a word, the Trinity offers not only the content of the uncovering, but also its mode of manifestation. Or better: the mode of manifestation … coincides exactly with that which manifests itself.” (Articuli Temporis: St. Augustine and Phenomenology on the Temporal Syntax of God’s Self-Disclosure) In this dense statement, Marion asserts that what God gives (the content of revelation – namely, that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) is inseparable from how God gives Himself (the mode – a triune, relational manifestation). The medium is the message: God’s triune nature is shown through a triune act of giving. As one commentator summarizes, “God reveals Godself in a Trinitarian way as Trinity. Thus, that which gives itself (Trinity) completely accords with the way of its giving.” (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews).

In practical terms, Marion sees the Son as the visible Icon of the invisible Father, and the Holy Spirit as the agent who opens us to receive this revelation (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews). The Son’s self-givenness (for example, in the Incarnation and Crucifixion) is an act of perfect filial obedience and love, entirely referential to the Father – a dynamic of giving-and-receiving that constitutes the relation. Likewise, the Spirit’s presence is the gifting of understanding and love, bringing to completion the revelatory event by connecting the believer back to the Father through the Son. In Marion’s view, the Trinity is a relational dynamism of giving: “the divine act of giving surpasses all possible reception, yet it invites participation in its inexhaustible relational dynamism.” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). Here Marion explicitly links the infinite depth of God’s giving with relational life – an “inexhaustible” interplay of giving and receiving that sounds very much like perichoresis (the mutual indwelling of the divine Persons).

Notably, Marion’s phenomenology describes how each Person of the Trinity might appear in the economy of revelation without compromising God’s unity. Revelation, for Marion, is a saturated phenomenon that bears an excess of intuitive content. He notes that “the phenomenon of revelation not only falls into the category of saturation (paradox in general), but it concentrates the four types of saturated phenomena and is given at once as historical event, idol, flesh, and icon (face)” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In Christ’s revelation we find all forms of excess: a historical event that shatters expectations, an apparent “idol” (in the sense of a visible image) that yet points beyond itself, the flesh of a human life, and the iconic face that lets the infinite Father shine through. This comprehensive saturation “refers us back, in its possibility as such, to the givenness that made its very appearance possible” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) – in other words, the revealed Trinity itself grounds and enables the very phenomenon of revelation. Marion thus portrays the Trinity as both the giver and the gift: the Father gives the Son, the Son gives himself fully back to the Father (and to us), and the Spirit is the giving of love itself – all of which is how God’s unity and glory become manifest. This strongly relational ontology of revelation is implicit in Marion’s thought even when he doesn’t systematize it in Thomistic terms. He is showing that the Persons are “subsistent relations” (to use the classical phrase) by describing how each appears only in giving himself toward the others.

Marion on the Phenomenology of Givenness

At the heart of Marion’s philosophy is the phenomenology of givenness. He reformulates phenomenology’s basic principle to say that to show itself and to give itself are ultimately the same: “The phenomenon shows itself only insofar as it gives itself” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In other words, anything that appears at all appears as a gift – coming from itself, not from our control. Marion elevates givenness to the “last principle” of phenomenology (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer), meaning that the most fundamental condition for anything to be manifest is that it donates itself to a recipient. This move shifts the emphasis from the active constituting subject (in classical Husserlian terms) to the givenness of the phenomenon itself. The result is a decentering of the subject: “Givenness produces the phenomenon absolutely reduced to what shows itself inasmuch as it gives itself; it reduces the ‘subject’ to what receives itself without remainder from what it receives – the given.” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). Here Marion asserts that the ego or subject is no longer the master of experience, but “receives itself” entirely from the given phenomenon. We are renamed “the gifted” (l’adonné) – defined by our reception of what shows itself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer).

This radical vision has theological consequences. If all phenomena at their purest arrive as gifts, then how much more would God’s self-disclosure be a gift par excellence. Marion indeed describes divine revelation as the ultimate saturated phenomenon that gives itself endlessly. Because it exceeds our finite capacity, we experience revelation as overwhelming yet inviting – it calls us to respond without ever being exhausted. Marion states, for instance, that “the gift depends only on itself to give itself… in short, it does not depend on [the giver’s or receiver’s] efficiency” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). A true gift, especially the divine gift, is sovereign in its giving; it isn’t caused by us nor limited by our ability. By defining phenomena in terms of givenness, Marion is effectively saying that God’s self-givenness is the paradigm of all experience – everything that appears genuinely (not as a construct of our own making) bears a trace of the gratuitous. Moreover, Marion’s notion that “being itself is inseparable from the act of giving” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) suggests that what something is (even God’s own being) coincides with the act of donation. This is a profound insight: existence and gift are entwined, which in theology resonates with the idea that God’s essence is self-giving love.

Marion also emphasizes the necessity of a response to the gift. The one who receives (the “gifted”) is called by the gift and must decide how to respond. He notes that when confronted with a saturated phenomenon like revelation, the gifted receives “a call and an undeniable call” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) – a summons that comes from the gift itself (for example, the revelatory call of Christ asking, “Who do you say that I am?”). The proper stance is a total surrender to what gives itself: “He is completely achieved as soon as he surrenders unconditionally to what gives itself – and first of all to the saturated phenomenon that calls him.” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). In Marion’s framework, to know God is not to capture Him in a concept, but to yield to His self-giving and to be transformed by it. This underscores a key feature of Marion’s phenomenology of givenness: it is inherently open-ended and relational, involving a giver, a gift, and a receiver caught up in an event of donation. The Trinity perfectly exemplifies this structure, as each Person can be seen as eternally giver, gift, and receiver in love. Marion stops short of explicitly identifying his phenomenological structures with the inner life of the Trinity, but the analogies are potent and not lost on theologians who read him.

Consonance between Marion and Dryer’s SSGO

Robert Dryer’s Self-Standing Givenness Ontology (SSGO) is a theological framework built to reconcile God’s oneness (simplicity) with His threeness (Trinity) by using the concept of divine self-givenness as the foundational principle. Marion’s insights provide rich soil in which SSGO’s ideas take root, and there are many points of resonance between them:

• Divine Self-Givenness as Primary Reality: SSGO posits that each Divine Person “fully and uniquely possesses the one indivisible divine essence through an eternal act of self-givenness.” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) In other words, God’s being is understood as self-donating. This aligns closely with Marion’s claim that being and givenness are inseparable (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). Marion’s statement that God should be known only in the mode of His giving supports the idea that God’s self-gift is the most fundamental “fact” of God. Both Marion and Dryer are effectively saying that what God is (one God) and who God is (Father, Son, Spirit) can only be understood in terms of an eternal giving of the divine essence.
• Trinitarian Relationality: Marion’s description of the Trinity in revelatory terms – the Son as icon of the Father, the Spirit as the bond of giving – complements Dryer’s vision of the Trinity as subsistent relations constituted by self-gift. SSGO draws on the classical idea of relatio subsistens (that the Persons are relations) and gives it a dynamic twist: the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct “irreducible relational identities” by virtue of how each gives and receives the one divine life (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer). Marion’s insistence that the Trinity’s content = mode of manifestation (Articuli Temporis: St. Augustine and Phenomenology on the Temporal Syntax of God’s Self-Disclosure) reinforces this: the Father is Father precisely in giving the divine being to the Son; the Son is Son in receiving and reciprocating it; the Spirit is Spirit in the mutual sharing of that gift. Marion’s line that “the divine act of giving surpasses all possible reception, yet it invites participation in its inexhaustible relational dynamism” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) could almost serve as a motto for SSGO. Both underscore an eternal circulation of love: an infinite giving-and-receiving that not only doesn’t divide God, but is the very life of the one God.
• Avoidance of Modalism and Partialism: SSGO aims to avoid the extremes of seeing the Persons as mere roles/modes or as separate parts of God. Marion’s phenomenology, by focusing on acts (of showing/giving) rather than static things, provides a conceptual space where the Persons can be fully themselves in relation without being separate substances. For example, Dryer’s claim that each Person fully possesses the divine essence through self-givenness (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) is illuminated by Marion’s idea that a gift, to truly be a gift, depends on nothing but itself to give itself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). The Father’s giving of the entire divine essence to the Son is not a 33% partition; it is a self-donation that loses nothing in the giving – much as Marion notes the gift “does not depend” on any external causality and loses nothing by being given. The plenitude of each Person in SSGO (each one is fully God) resonates with Marion’s notion of saturated givenness – an excess that is fully present in each manifestation. Marion’s portrayal of revelation as saturated in multiple ways (event, flesh, icon, etc.) (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) mirrors how SSGO would say each Person is a full manifestation of the one divine being under a distinct relational aspect.
• Dynamic Reciprocity: Both Marion and Dryer emphasize a dynamic movement in God, rather than a static, self-contained substance. Marion speaks of the “mark of the passage, trajectory, or movement” inherent in a phenomenon’s self-showing (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer), and he describes the Trinity as manifesting through a counter-experience of giving and receiving (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews). SSGO similarly depicts the Godhead as “a dynamic relational ontology” (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) – essentially, God is an act of communion. This dynamic view owes much to the logic of love and gift that Marion articulates so well. It is consonant with Eastern Christian insights (e.g. Cappadocian and Palamite theology) that Dryer integrates, but Marion’s phenomenology provides a philosophical articulation: true unity is not static simplicity but ecstatic generosity. In sum, Marion’s work buttresses SSGO’s central claim that God’s unity and Trinity are reconciled in the logic of self-giving love.

Divergences and Tensions between Marion and SSGO

Despite these deep resonances, Marion’s approach and Dryer’s SSGO are not identical in purpose or method. Some key divergences and potential tensions include:

• Phenomenology vs. Ontology: Marion is doing phenomenology, not constructing an ontology. His aim is to describe how God gives Himself in experience (especially in revelation), without presuming to explain the inner workings of God’s being. Dryer, by contrast, explicitly builds an ontology – a systematic explanatory model – grounded in self-givenness. Marion cautions that “the phenomenon of givenness refuses to be reduced to ontology” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). This suggests a subtle resistance: Marion might worry that SSGO’s move to turn givenness into a “first principle” of an explanatory system could inadvertently betray the excess of the gift. By pinning everything on a concept of “self-standing givenness,” one risks domesticating what for Marion must remain somewhat mysterious and unsystematizable. Marion’s apophatic streak means he prefers to let the paradox of a giving God stand, whereas SSGO attempts to resolve paradox (between simplicity and Trinity) by means of a neat ontological framework. In short, Marion describes mystery; Dryer tries to explain it. Marion might see a danger of conceptual idolatry if one thinks even a relational ontology fully “captures” God, whereas for him the distance between God and our concepts always remains infinite.
• Role of Apophasis: Relatedly, Marion’s apophatic theology sometimes entails a deliberate refusal to answer certain metaphysical questions. For example, he does not spell out in scholastic terms how “each person is God.” He would likely say that because God’s self-gift in Christ shows the Trinity without resolving all logical puzzles, we must live with a degree of holy ignorance. SSGO, however, is motivated by a desire to show logically how the Trinity and simplicity can coexist without conflict (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer) (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer). It introduces technical notions (like “relational horizon” or “self-standing” act) to satisfy metaphysical coherence. Marion might resist this as a return to the very metaphysical thinking he bracketed. He famously writes, “The way of approaching God in metaphysica specialis is doomed to failure….” (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer), and instead insists on a counter-intentionality (God’s initiative) that undercuts our metaphysical control (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews). SSGO’s explanatory mode runs somewhat against Marion’s more apophatic phenomenology where one remains receptive and doesn’t close the circle of understanding too tightly. There is a difference in temperament: Marion is content to say God gives Himself — that is who God is, whereas Dryer wants to push further and say how this can be so in an ontologically consistent way. Marion might caution that any “ontology of God” (even one centered on givenness) must be held lightly, lest it pretend to exhaust the divine mystery.
• Use of Philosophical Language: Dryer’s SSGO, while innovative, still operates in the arena of systematic theology and uses terms from classical ontology (essence, relations, persons, etc.) but redefines them. Marion, influenced by thinkers like Heidegger and Derrida, often avoids or reinterprets such terminology. For instance, Marion does not use “simplicity” as a scholastic term in his major works on givenness; instead he demonstrates it by removing all conditional horizons for phenomenon, allowing the “unconditioned” (which for theology would be God) to appear as itself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). SSGO, however, explicitly speaks of indivisible essence and subsisting relations (Self-Standing Givenness – RobertDryer), engaging with Thomist and patristic categories. There’s a potential gap here: Marion’s insights have to be somewhat translated to speak to traditional ontology. Dryer attempts this translation, but in doing so he systematizes Marion’s fluid insights. For example, Marion’s notion that “that which gives itself (Trinity) accords with the way of its giving” (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews) becomes in SSGO a fixed principle that each Person just is the giving/receiving of the divine essence. While consistent, the latter is more assertive and cataphatic (positive in statement) than Marion might be comfortable with. Marion’s work supports Dryer’s content, but Marion might not endorse the confident ontological tone with which SSGO speaks about God’s inner life.
• Explanatory Primitive vs. Gift Event: SSGO labels divine self-givenness as an explanatory primitive – the starting point that cannot itself be explained by deeper principles. Marion would agree that God’s agape is beyond explanation, but his approach is to emphasize encountering the gift, not explaining it. In a sense, Marion would support SSGO’s emphasis that nothing more basic underlies God’s self-gift; however, calling it a “primitive” within a theory is a move Marion doesn’t make. For him, givenness isn’t a theorem to prove other things; it’s the horizon of manifestation itself. The nuance is that Marion uses givenness methodologically to let God be God (which indeed safeguards God’s freedom and simplicity), whereas SSGO uses givenness as a foundational principle to structure a whole metaphysical understanding. Marion might worry that the latter could unintentionally constrain the very phenomenon it seeks to honor. For example, Marion describes revelation as an unpredictable, unforeseeable event – “an inaugural, absolute, and new possibility, origin without origin” that has no cause except itself (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer). This underscores that God’s self-givenness is anarchic (without external principle). Dryer’s ontology would wholeheartedly agree – God’s self-giving love is the uncaused cause – yet once it is placed as the foundation of a system, one might lose sight of its wild, unmanageable character. Marion’s language of overflowing gift and unpredictable event serves as a reminder that even a self-givenness ontology must not become too neat or closed. The gift always retains an element of surprise beyond the grasp of our concepts.

Conclusion: Marion’s Supportive Inspiration with a Critical Edge

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological writings offer profound insights that both inspire and critically temper Robert Dryer’s Self-Standing Givenness Ontology. On one hand, Marion provides the very grammar of self-gift that SSGO elevates: his direct quotes about the gift that “gives itself” and the subject who “receives itself” from the given (Jean-Luc Marion – RobertDryer) lend philosophical weight to the idea that God’s own being might be an eternal giving-of-self. Marion’s exploration of the Trinity as manifesting itself in its mode of giving (Articuli Temporis: St. Augustine and Phenomenology on the Temporal Syntax of God’s Self-Disclosure) gives theological depth to Dryer’s claim that the triune Persons are constituted by relational self-donation. In this sense, Marion’s work strongly supports the content of SSGO – it provides a phenomenological backbone for speaking of God as an act of love, an event of givenness, rather than a static immutable substance in isolation. Dryer’s synthesis can be seen as a creative systematic application of Marion’s core ideas to classical doctrinal problems: indeed, Marion’s thought helps show that affirming God’s simplicity need not conflict with affirming the Trinity, if both are re-thought through the lens of love’s self-gift.

On the other hand, Marion’s apophatic discipline and his refusal to reduce gift to concept act as a caution. His approach resists any attempt to turn God’s self-givenness into a mere formula. SSGO rides on the conviction that speaking of God in terms of self-giving relationality is not only fruitful but necessary for doctrinal coherence. Marion would agree it is fruitful – he himself speaks of God only in terms of donation and revelation – but he might question the presumption of coherence. For Marion, the mystery of God’s giving remains, irreducible to human logic (even a relational logic). He would likely applaud SSGO’s emphasis that “each Person is a distinct who identical with the one essence” (a rephrasing of classical Trinitarian doctrine) through an act of self-givenness, as a welcome move away from sterile metaphysics to a living, loving God. Yet he would also remind us that even this formulation must ultimately point beyond itself to the actual encounter with the giving God. Marion’s influence on Dryer is evident in every aspect of SSGO’s vision of a self-giving Trinity; at the same time, Marion’s work gently insists that God’s self-givenness is an ever-new event, not fully capturable by our ontologies – it is something we receive with awe more than we neatly understand.

In summary, Marion provides the conceptual treasure that Dryer’s SSGO mines: the idea of God as He who gives Himself. Marion’s own words – “that which gives itself (Trinity) completely accords with the way of its giving” (Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Revelation – Phenomenological Reviews) – could almost serve as a thesis statement for SSGO. The consonance is real and profound. But Marion also injects a healthy dose of apophatic humility. His phenomenology supports SSGO’s emphasis on divine self-givenness as the ultimate “primitive” as long as we recall that this primitive is not a static axiom but the living God who ever exceeds our grasp. Dryer’s SSGO, enriched by Marion’s insights, stands as a bold attempt to let God’s own self-giving light shine on the age-old theological puzzle of Trinity in unity. Marion would no doubt encourage this endeavor, even as he bids us to always let the gift of the divine simpleness (simplicity) and the triune excess of love continually astonish us beyond our concepts.

Overall, Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. In that portion, I discussed how Marion views being and givenness as inseparable—that is, the divine essence is not an object to be grasped but is revealed through its own self‑donation. For example, I noted Marion’s idea that:

“that which gives itself (Trinity) completely accords with the way of its giving,”

and explained that for Marion, the divine essence manifests itself as a self‑given gift—a gift that never loses any of its fullness in the act of giving. This implies that God’s being is essentially self‑donating, echoing the idea that the divine is experienced only in the event of its own self‑communication.

Benovsky

I’ll conduct a deep analysis of Jiri Benovsky’s primary sources, beginning with the material linked on Robert Dryer’s website and expanding outward to his major works on metaphysics, particularly on primitives and compresence.

The analysis will focus on:

• Defining where SSGO can appropriately appropriate Benovsky’s ideas on primitives and compresence for its relational ontology.
• Identifying where SSGO might exceed or misappropriate Benovsky’s metaphysics, and delineating clear limits of consonance.
• Evaluating how Benovsky’s rejection of certain ontological commitments (e.g., realism about fundamental structures) might challenge SSGO, while also recognizing where SSGO’s moderate realism and theological commitments (such as Eriugena’s idea of divine unknowability) allow for productive interaction.

This will provide a well-nuanced understanding of how Benovsky can and cannot be integrated into SSGO. I’ll update you once I synthesize the findings.

Jiri Benovsky’s Metaphysics: Primitives, Compresence, and Realism in Dialogue with SSGO

Primitives as Metaphysical “Problem-Solvers”

Jiri Benovsky emphasizes that metaphysical theories rely on primitives – fundamental, unanalyzed concepts or entities – which serve as solutions to core metaphysical problems. He calls such primitives “problem-solvers” because they are introduced specifically to solve theoretical problems that the theory alone cannot handle. For example, any ontological theory will contain “heavily loaded primitives” without which it “could not even start to answer the questions we asked and to do the job we want it to do” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In other words, primitives are the foundational building blocks that allow a metaphysical theory to explain things like how objects exist, persist, and have properties in common.

Benovsky illustrates this idea with different theories of properties. Each theory uses a distinct primitive to explain why two objects share an attribute (the problem of attribute agreement). For instance:

• Trope theory uses the primitive relation of exact resemblance between tropes (individual property-instances) to explain common features.
• Universals theory uses the primitive of instantiation of the same universal in multiple objects.
• Nominalist theory might simply take resemblance itself as a brute fact between objects.

Each of these primitives is a “problem-solver” introduced to account for the same phenomenon (shared properties) in a different way (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Benovsky’s point is that such primitives carry the explanatory load of the theory: “almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their primitives” (Jiri Benovsky). The choice of primitives shapes what the theory can explain and how it explains it.

Importantly, these primitives are not derived from deeper principles within the theory – they are taken as basic. Benovsky argues that metaphysicians typically postulate a primitive precisely because some question cannot be answered without it. As he puts it, “the metaphysician…needs [a primitive] to perform some important theoretical job because she cannot make her theory work otherwise” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In short, primitives are introduced functionally – defined by the role they play in the theory.

SSGO perspective: SSGO, with its relational ontology, can resonate with Benovsky’s notion of primitives as indispensable problem-solvers. In developing its own metaphysical framework, SSGO can identify which fundamental relations or entities it must assume (perhaps divine nature, or key relational principles) to solve core problems (like explaining the connection between God and creation, or the unity and diversity of being). Adopting Benovsky’s insight encourages SSGO to be explicit about its own primitives – for example, treating certain foundational relations (like Creator–creature, or being-in-relationship) as primitives that undergird the ontology. This ensures clarity about what SSGO takes as basic and why those primitives are needed. It also aligns with a humble recognition that some aspects of reality (especially in a theological context) must be accepted as fundamental mysteries or starting points (for instance, the divine act of creation ex nihilo might function as a “primitive” in a theological metaphysics). However, SSGO must also be cautious, as we will see, not to use primitives in ways that distort their intended scope or import assumptions alien to Benovsky’s meaning.

Compresence as a Primitive Relation of Unity

One of Benovsky’s key examples of a primitive is the relation of compresence in the bundle theory of substance. Bundle theorists hold that an object is nothing more than a bundle of properties (qualities, tropes, etc.) tied together. To explain what unites various properties into one object (and what makes that object a particular individual), bundle theory invokes compresence as a fundamental relation. Benovsky describes compresence as a “special polyadic property” that “takes properties ‘in’ and returns objects ‘out’”, playing “the functional role of particularizing particulars” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In plainer terms, compresence is a primitive connective tissue: it binds properties together so that they co-occur (“co-present”) in one individual.

Benovsky emphasizes that compresence in bundle theory performs the same unifying job that a substratum or bare particular performs in a rival theory (the substratum theory). It is a “‘unifying device’ whose primary (functional) role in the theory is to take properties to make up objects” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Rather than positing a mysterious substratum entity to “hold” properties, the bundle theorist uses a primitive relation. This relation does not add any new qualitative feature to the object; it merely ties the object’s qualities together. In fact, Benovsky points out that “this primitive relation of compresence does not contribute to the qualitative nature of objects”, which means you can vary or replace the compresence relation without changing any of the object’s observable properties (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). This feature is crucial because it allows compresence to solve the classic metaphysical puzzle of indiscernible duplicates: how can two objects have all the same properties and yet be distinct individuals? Since compresence is non-qualitative, two identical spheres could differ only by having distinct instances of the compresence relation holding their properties together. “The two spheres are then numerically different in virtue of the numerical difference between the relations of compresence that tie together their properties”, Benovsky explains (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In other words, each sphere has its own compresence instance, which makes them two objects instead of one, even though every qualitative aspect is the same.

By calling compresence a primitive problem-solver, Benovsky highlights that it is simply postulated to do this job of unification and individuation. “The relation of compresence is then not only a primitive problem-solver when it comes to the problem of particularity of particulars, but it can very well also primitively solve the problem of qualitatively indiscernible but numerically distinct objects” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). The bundle theorist, in effect, says: we have an unexplained explainer (compresence) that accounts for why an object’s properties hang together and why two bundles can be distinct even if their contents are identical. There is no deeper explanation of compresence within the theory; it is taken as a given feature of reality for the purposes of that ontology.

SSGO perspective: For SSGO’s relational ontology, Benovsky’s analysis of compresence underscores the power of a relational primitive in explaining unity. SSGO might not literally adopt “compresence” as described, but it can appropriate the principle behind it: that relations themselves can be ontologically fundamental and can serve to constitute objects or unities. For example, SSGO could propose that the relationships among created beings (or between created beings and the divine) are not secondary to those beings but are part of what makes each being what it is – somewhat akin to a compresence-like primitive that ties the network of reality together. If SSGO holds that to be is to be in relation (a core intuition in many relational ontologies), then it aligns with the bundle theory idea that an entity is essentially a bundle of relations/properties unified by relationality. SSGO can thus adopt Benovsky’s view that a unifying relation can be primitive and does the heavy lifting of individuation and cohesion.

However, SSGO should be mindful not to misinterpret compresence beyond its intended scope. Benovsky’s compresence is a metaphysical device within a specific theory of objects; it is not a mystical or theological concept but a functional one. SSGO might be tempted, for instance, to liken compresence to a theological idea like the presence of God in all things or the binding power of divine love. While such analogies can be creatively suggestive, they would exceed Benovsky’s intent. In Benovsky’s usage, compresence is a neutral structural relation, not imbued with sacred significance. Thus, SSGO can appropriate the structural insight (that a relation can be ontologically basic and unifying) but should avoid reading additional spiritual meaning into Benovsky’s term that isn’t there. The consonance lies in viewing relation as fundamental, but SSGO must not conflate a metaphysical primitive with a theological principle without careful nuance.

Equivalence of Theories and the Question of Realism

Benovsky’s exploration of primitives leads him to a provocative claim: many apparently competing metaphysical theories might be equivalent in what they explain, differing only in the primitives they deploy. If two theories solve the same problems in “very much the same way” – i.e. their primitives fulfill identical functions – then those theories may be different only in terminology or conceptual dressing, not in substance (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In the bundle vs. substratum case, for example, compresence and substratum both serve as a unifying, individuating principle. If there is no functional difference between these primitives (aside from one being labeled a relation and the other an entity), then Benovsky argues the theories are equivalent for all practical purposes. They “reveal themselves in the end to be no more than terminological variants” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

Benovsky acknowledges a potential objection: one might insist that a compresence relation and a substratum are different kinds of entity, and thus the theories are not truly the same. This is the Content View – the idea that what a primitive is (its ontological category) matters, not just what it does. According to the Content View, “compresence is a relation and a substratum is not, so they just are not the same thing no matter how similar their functions may be” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Therefore, the two theories would not be fully metaphysically equivalent; they would only be theoretically equivalent (able to save the same phenomena) while still positing different fundamental furniture of the world (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

Benovsky’s own stance is that the Functional View of primitives is superior to the Content View (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). He argues that primitives are introduced with a job description – we define them by what they must accomplish in the theory. If two primitives accomplish all the same tasks (solve the same problems in the same manner), then any supposed difference in their “nature” is philosophically idle. Indeed, any real difference in nature would eventually manifest as a difference in what they can or cannot do (a functional difference) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In the substratum vs. compresence case, consider the often-cited difference that a substratum might exist independently (without properties) whereas compresence cannot exist without relating properties (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Benovsky notes that if this scenario were possible, it would actually be a functional difference (substratum can do something – exist alone – that compresence cannot) and thus a genuine point of divergence between the theories (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). However, in his analysis, he finds “there actually is no difference with respect to the two primitive problem-solvers at hand” in terms of such independence (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In typical circumstances, objects always have properties, so the “bare” substratum scenario is not a compelling practical difference. Thus, he concludes that nothing of significance distinguishes the two in their theoretical role, and treating them as mere notational variants is justified. In general, he expects that “any difference between primitives will typically always be a functional one” (if any), given how primitives are defined by the roles they play (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

This leads to a metametaphysical position: debates between many metaphysical theories might not be about truth so much as choice of language or perspective. If theories are equivalent in all observable or testable respects (since metaphysics has no direct empirical test, “observable” here means in terms of explanatory scope and coherence), then there may be no objective fact of the matter as to which theory is correct. Benovsky explicitly states that in such cases “it is epistemically under-determined which one we should prefer since they do the same job in very much the same way” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). We lack a decisive rational or empirical criterion to pick one fundamental structure over the other.

So how do we choose, if at all? Benovsky suggests that the decision may come down to extra-rational criteria like aesthetics. In his view, “it seems very hard to find independent, objective grounds to choose one structure over the other”, and thus “the reasons to select one theory over its competitors are mainly grounded in aesthetic considerations, and in the evaluation of aesthetic properties metaphysical theories possess.” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In other words, metaphysicians might appropriately consider a theory’s elegance, simplicity, or conceptual beauty when deciding which framework to favor, since empirical data or pure logic do not dictate the choice. (Benovsky explores this idea more in a separate work, indicating he sees metaphysical theory choice as analogous to, say, theory choice in physics where simplicity and elegance can matter, albeit without empirical tests in metaphysics.) He stops short of claiming that aesthetics alone should decide, but he clearly leans toward a form of theoretical pluralism or pragmatism: sometimes, multiple frameworks can be equally valid, and our preference might be subjective or pragmatic.

This stance amounts to a rejection of strong metaphysical realism about one unique fundamental structure of the world. Benovsky is not saying nothing is real; rather, he is suggesting that our descriptions of the fundamental structure (e.g. “world as bundles” vs “world as substances+substrata”) are human theoretical constructions where no single construction can be known to exclusively map reality. In some cases, “the answer is framework-relative, in a Carnapian way” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) – echoing Rudolf Carnap’s view that ontological questions can be internal to a chosen linguistic framework and not absolute questions with a single true answer. Other times, one framework might truly be more elegant or explanatory than another, but discovering that is a gradual, holistic process (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). In summary, Benovsky champions a humble metaphysics that recognizes when a dispute is purely verbal or terminological and admits that metaphysical truth may not always be one-cathedral-of-reality-fits-all.

Adopting Benovsky’s Insights in SSGO

Benovsky’s ideas, especially on primitives and compresence, offer rich insights that SSGO can appropriately adopt to strengthen its relational ontology. Some key points of appropriation include:

• Emphasizing Primitives in Ontology Design: SSGO can follow Benovsky’s lead by identifying its own primitives – the fundamental concepts or relations it must assume. For instance, SSGO might take “relation” itself as primitive, or concepts like being-as-communion or divine creative act as foundational problem-solvers in its system. Benovsky reminds us that clearly stating these primitives and their theoretical role is crucial. SSGO can thus be explicit about what baseline assumptions it makes (e.g. the irreducible dependence of all beings on God could be a primitive relation in a theological ontology) and what metaphysical “problems” those primitives solve (such as grounding the existence and unity of the cosmos in God). Adopting this strategy ensures SSGO’s framework is transparent and self-aware in its first principles, just as Benovsky’s analysis encourages.
• Using Relations as Fundamental Unifiers: Benovsky’s discussion of compresence validates the idea that relations can be as fundamental as substances. SSGO’s relational ontology likely already holds that relationships are as real as the relata. By drawing on Benovsky, SSGO can bolster the view that a relational tie (like compresence) can be the ontological glue for entities. For example, SSGO might posit that the relationship between God and creation is a primitive that holds everything in being (analogous to compresence holding properties in an object). Or within creation, perhaps the interrelations (ecological, communal, etc.) are not secondary but part of what things are. Benovsky’s work on compresence provides a philosophical precedent for treating a relation as a first-class ontological citizen. SSGO can appropriately adopt this by framing certain key relations (such as love, logos, or participation in divine being) as primitive relations that constitute created reality’s coherence.
• Openness to Multiple Descriptive Frameworks: SSGO can also learn from Benovsky’s pluralistic tendency. In synthesizing science, philosophy, and theology, SSGO might encounter multiple ways to describe reality (e.g. scientific vs theological ontologies). Benovsky’s insight that different theories can be equivalent in explanatory power suggests that SSGO can hold multiple models in tension without forcing a simplistic choice. For instance, a more substance-based language of “essences” and a more relational language of “networks” might both have roles in SSGO’s overarching ontology. Recognizing, with Benovsky, that sometimes “it is epistemically under-determined” which model is correct (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) encourages SSGO to be charitable and integrative, rather than dogmatic, about different metaphysical vocabularies. This could foster a more ecumenical ontology that dialogues with various philosophical traditions, knowing that ultimate reality might be approachable through different conceptual prisms.
• Metaphysical Humility and Aesthetic Criteria: In line with Benovsky’s view, SSGO can adopt a stance of metaphysical humility. Given SSGO’s theological commitment (where God’s mystery exceeds full understanding), it already has reason to be humble about claiming any one human model is the final truth. Benovsky’s reasoning provides a philosophical grounding for this: if even purely philosophical theories can be underdetermined and decided by aesthetic preferences, how much more should SSGO be cautious in declaring one ontological schema as the absolute truth about God and reality. SSGO can thus appropriately adopt an approach of evaluating theories by their fruits – coherence, beauty, depth – rather than assuming one must be exclusively right. This doesn’t mean anything goes; rather, it means SSGO chooses frameworks that are beautifully fitting and fruitful for integrating faith and reason, aware that this choice has a certain aesthetic or pragmatic aspect to it (much as Benovsky suggests about theory choice (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc)).

In adopting these points, SSGO would be drawing consonantly on Benovsky’s primary insights: that primitives and relations are central, and that multiple fundamental perspectives can coexist. This strengthens SSGO’s relational ontology by giving it a clearer self-understanding of its foundations and a philosophical justification for its inclusive and moderate realist approach.

Avoiding Misappropriation of Benovsky’s Ideas

While Benovsky’s thought is fertile ground for SSGO, there are also clear areas where SSGO must refrain from overreaching or misusing his ideas. To ensure a careful appropriation, SSGO should avoid the following missteps:

• Overextending Anti-Realism: Benovsky leans toward a form of anti-realism (or at least anti-uniqueness) regarding fundamental structures – suggesting no single theory has a monopoly on truth. SSGO, however, operates within a moderately realist framework, affirming that there is a real creation and a real God independent of our theories. It would be a misappropriation to take Benovsky’s underdetermination thesis to imply that any ontological claim is as good as any other for SSGO. In theology, not all frameworks are equal – e.g. a worldview without any notion of God is not on par with one that includes God’s reality, from SSGO’s perspective. So, while SSGO can embrace pluralism in philosophical descriptions, it should not adopt a radical anti-realism that undermines core theological truths. SSGO must maintain that there is an objective truth (grounded in the divine), even if our conceptualizations of it are manifold and imperfect.
• Ignoring Content Differences that Theology Demands: Benovsky minimizes content differences between primitives when only their function matters. SSGO should be cautious in applying this wholesale. In metaphysics of secular objects, maybe a relation vs. substratum difference can be glossed over, but in theological ontology, content might carry indispensable meaning. For example, calling the fundamental unifier of reality “the Logos (Word) of God” versus a neutral “compresence relation” is not just a terminological tweak – it embeds a whole theological content. SSGO cannot treat God’s reality as merely a functional placeholder interchangeable with a secular primitive without losing what is distinctive about theological ontology. In short, some primitives in SSGO (like God’s self-subsistence or the imago Dei in humans) have intrinsic content that must be honored, not evacuated for the sake of theoretical equivalence.
• Misusing “Compresence” outside its context: If SSGO were to directly import the term “compresence” and start using it, there’s a risk of confusion or category error. Benovsky’s compresence is a metaphysical relation tying properties together; it is not about personal presence or spiritual presence. SSGO should avoid saying, for instance, “God is the compresence of all beings,” which would be a poetic but misleading application of the term. Instead, SSGO can find an analogous concept (perhaps “participation” or “perichoresis” in a theological register) that fits its context, while acknowledging the inspiration from Benovsky’s idea of a unifying relation. Misappropriation would occur if SSGO used Benovsky’s terminology or framework in a way that Benovsky would not recognize, effectively stretching his concepts beyond their logical limits.
• Selective Reading for Confirmation: Another subtle pitfall is using Benovsky’s authority only to back positions SSGO already holds, without embracing the full nuance of his thought. For example, SSGO might appreciate Benovsky’s affirmation of relationality (compresence) and ignore his insistence on evaluating primitives by their success in solving problems. If SSGO declared certain relational primitives but then did not critically assess whether those really solve its theoretical problems, it would be missing Benovsky’s methodological rigor. In other words, misappropriation can happen by cherry-picking ideas (like “relations are fundamental”) while discarding the balancing ideas (like “we must justify our primitives by their problem-solving efficacy”). SSGO should strive to take on Benovsky’s holistic approach – including the self-critical elements – rather than just the convenient parts.

In summary, SSGO must maintain its theological integrity and realist commitments even as it dialogues with Benovsky. His ideas should illuminate and refine SSGO’s ontology, not overturn it. The limit is reached wherever an appropriation would force SSGO to contradict its core tenets (e.g. the reality of God, the meaningfulness of doctrinal content, or the ability to speak truthfully albeit analogically about fundamental reality). By being mindful of these limits, SSGO can use Benovsky’s contributions constructively without distorting either Benovsky’s intent or SSGO’s own mission.

Consonance and Divergence: Benovsky’s Metaphysics and SSGO’s Ontology

It’s important to delineate the clear limits of consonance between Benovsky’s metaphysical views and SSGO’s relational ontology – that is, to identify where their ideas harmonize and where they inevitably diverge due to different commitments:

Areas of Consonance:

• Primacy of Relations: Both Benovsky and SSGO elevate relations to a fundamental status. Benovsky shows through compresence (and similar primitives) that relations can be the building blocks of reality, not merely secondary attributes. SSGO, rooted in a relational vision of being, finds strong support here. There is a deep consonance in the view that an entity’s identity and existence might be constituted by its relationships. For SSGO, which might say “to be is to be in relation,” Benovsky provides a philosophical case-study (the bundle theory’s compresence) illustrating precisely that principle in action.
• Pluralism and Humility: Both frameworks also share a spirit of epistemic humility. Benovsky’s meta-ontology accepts that multiple theories can describe reality’s structure without a single one proving absolutely supreme; analogously, SSGO – especially informed by apophatic theology – accepts that no human concept can fully capture the divine or the totality of being. This yields a consonant attitude of openness: Benovsky’s openness to different but equivalent metaphysical descriptions resonates with SSGO’s openness to diverse philosophical and theological languages to articulate the truth (so long as they cohere with core beliefs). Neither approach is dogmatically attached to one rigid schema – Benovsky for reasons of underdetermination, SSGO for reasons of divine transcendence – and this common humility can be a basis for dialogue.
• Focus on Fundamentals (“What is more fundamental than what”): A striking point of agreement is the importance of fundamental structure. Benovsky writes that “what is at stake in metaphysics is to find out… what is more fundamental than what – to find out what are the best primitives” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Jiri Benovsky). SSGO likewise is interested in fundamental ontology – for example, understanding God as the ground of being, or how created beings relate to that ultimate ground. Both are exercises in discerning hierarchy or dependency in reality. While their content will differ (Benovsky’s inquiry stays within a philosophical scope, SSGO’s extends to the divine), the form of inquiry – seeking the most basic explanatory elements – is consonant. This means SSGO can use Benovsky’s framework as a methodological ally in probing fundamental questions, even if SSGO’s answers invoke theology.

Areas of Divergence:

• Metaphysical Realism vs. Framework-Relativity: The most prominent divergence is over metaphysical realism. SSGO, as a moderate realist, believes there is a mind-independent order established by God – a real creation with a determinate (even if complex) nature, and a God whose being is real (even if incomprehensible in fullness). Benovsky, by contrast, suggests that what we take to be the “fundamental structure” could be relative to our theoretical choices or perspectives (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). He does not claim multiple realities, but he does imply that our knowledge of the one reality doesn’t force a single blueprint. SSGO will diverge here: some fundamental realities in theology are non-negotiable (e.g. “God created the world” is not just one optional framework among others for SSGO – it’s a truth claim). Thus, SSGO cannot go as far as Benovsky in relaxing realism about fundamental ontology. SSGO’s moderate realism holds that while we might articulate being in various conceptual ways, there is a truth of the matter grounded in God’s act. This difference means SSGO will use Benovsky’s pluralism with caution, applying it to secondary theoretical models but not to abandon belief in an ultimate intelligible order willed by God.
• Role of Theological Authority: Another limit of consonance is the role of revelation and theological tradition. Benovsky operates purely within philosophical reasoning, treating all primitives as on equal footing, evaluated by reason and perhaps aesthetic judgment. SSGO’s ontology, however, is theologically informed – which means certain commitments come from faith sources (Scripture, tradition, etc.), not just free variation of metaphysical posits. For example, the existence of a triune God, or the idea that creation is fundamentally good, are truths SSGO is likely built upon. These act almost like “primitives” revealed rather than chosen for theoretical neatness. Benovsky’s method doesn’t account for revealed truth because it isn’t its domain. Therefore, while SSGO can dialogue with Benovsky’s method, it ultimately has a different criterion of theory choice: fidelity to theological truth, not only aesthetic or functional virtues. This divergence is not a conflict so much as an extra dimension SSGO has that Benovsky’s system brackets out.
• Different Aims: Relatedly, the end goals differ. Benovsky wants to make sense of how to choose between or reconcile ontologies like bundle vs substratum, etc., largely to advance philosophical understanding and coherence. SSGO’s aim is broader – to synthesize insights from metaphysics with spiritual understanding to articulate a worldview oriented towards wisdom or salvation (perhaps, given Rahner and Marion influences, to articulate the relationship between God and world in an existentially meaningful way). Thus, certain questions important to SSGO (e.g. personal meaning, divine-human relationship) lie outside Benovsky’s scope. Conversely, some fine-grained ontological debates Benovsky engages (like trope nominalism vs universals realism) might be less central for SSGO’s purposes. This means there’s a limit to how directly Benovsky’s discussions translate into SSGO’s project. SSGO will consonantly take underlying principles (like relationality, the use of primitives) but will diverge in focus when it comes to spiritual or existential dimensions that Benovsky does not address.

By understanding these areas of consonance and divergence, SSGO can affirm the compatibility of Benovsky’s core metaphysical insights with its relational ontology up to the point where fundamental theological commitments assert themselves. Beyond that point, SSGO parts ways with Benovsky’s more relativistic stance, guided by its own sources of truth. This delineation prevents confusion between philosophical flexibility and theological fidelity.

Realism, Unknowability, and the Challenge of Fundamental Structures

Benovsky’s rejection of a single knowable fundamental structure poses a direct challenge to any system (like SSGO) that affirms an objective ontological order. If taken at face value, Benovsky’s view might suggest that even the most basic categories SSGO employs (God, creation, being, relation) could be seen as just one choice of conceptual scheme – useful perhaps, but not the way reality must be described. For SSGO, which is invested in the idea that its ontology is not arbitrary but responsive to how things truly are, this could be destabilizing. How can SSGO claim to offer a truthful ontology if, as Benovsky argues, independent grounds to choose one fundamental structure over another are lacking (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc)?

The first part of the answer lies in SSGO’s stance of moderate realism. Unlike a naive realism that insists its framework is the only correct depiction of reality, a moderate realism accepts that human knowledge of reality, especially of the ultimate, is partial and conditioned. SSGO can acknowledge, in line with Benovsky, that our concepts are limited tools. It need not claim that, say, calling God “Being itself” versus “Beyond being” is a dispute with a clear-cut resolution in human terms – both might be groping at an unspeakable truth. This humility resonates with Benovsky’s insight that some questions are underdetermined by reason alone.

However, moderate realism also means SSGO believes there is a reality that our concepts aim toward. Where Benovsky might lean toward ontological anti-realism (the idea that there isn’t a determinate structured reality independent of our theory, or at least we can’t know it decisively), SSGO would counter that it has reason to believe in a determinate fundamental reality – grounded in the existence and nature of God – even if our descriptions of it are manifold. SSGO’s confidence here doesn’t come from metaphysical argument alone, but from its theological framework which provides another source of insight or belief about the nature of reality.

John Scotus Eriugena’s notion of divine unknowability is a key theological principle that actually gives SSGO a way to accommodate Benovsky’s challenge. Eriugena taught that God is transcendent and “superessential,” ultimately unknowable in His essence to any finite mind. In Eriugena’s memorable phrasing, God is nothing (no-thing) because He transcends all things that are – indicating that God doesn’t fit into our categories of being at all. This apophatic (negative) theology implies that any ontological framework we construct will fall short of capturing God as God is in himself. We are, at best, describing how God relates to creation or how creation reflects God, not pinning down God’s own inner reality. Thus, unknowability of the divine sets an upper limit to SSGO’s realist ambitions: SSGO does not presume to lay bare the structure of God’s being or the ultimate mystery of why there is something rather than nothing. In this respect, SSGO readily agrees with Benovsky that our fundamental frameworks are human perspectives on an ultimate reality we cannot fully grasp.

Where SSGO can go further than Benovsky (because of theology) is in asserting that reality itself has a fundamental structure, even if we know it only indirectly. SSGO can say: “We concede that we cannot fully know or prove the one true metaphysical structure. But we believe, through revelation and faith, that reality is grounded in God (who is Trinity, love, etc.), and therefore any adequate ontology must reflect, however imperfectly, that truth.” This is a kind of anchored pluralism. It accepts Benovsky’s plurality of conceptual schemes on the epistemic level – multiple maps can represent the same terrain – but it also holds that there is a real terrain (God’s creation as it truly is) which places constraints on the maps. For example, an ontology denying any ultimate meaning or purpose in reality would be, for SSGO, not just aesthetically less pleasing but actually in conflict with the truth revealed in Christ (to give a concrete theological stance). So while Benovsky might say a trope-based ontology vs. a universals-based ontology could both be true in different vocabularies, SSGO would add: an ontology that includes God vs. one that doesn’t are not just equivalent options – one of them is fundamentally incomplete or misguided from the standpoint of reality-as-created.

In practice, SSGO can still dialogue deeply with Benovsky’s challenge by adopting his rigorous scrutiny of why we favor one primitive or structure over another. SSGO should ask itself: “Am I choosing this way of describing reality just because of tradition or habit, or because it truly solves a problem and resonates with the entirety of truth (including theological truth)?” Benovsky’s insistence on justification beyond mere intuition is healthy for SSGO – it prevents lazy metaphysics. At the same time, SSGO can respond to Benovsky by pointing out that it has an expanded notion of justification: not purely logical or empirical, but also experiential and revelatory. The “data” for SSGO’s theory choice include religious experience, scripture, and doctrinal heritage. These are not recognized in Benovsky’s analysis (nor should they be, given his scope), but they provide what SSGO sees as legitimate grounds to prefer one fundamental story of reality over another.

To put it another way, Benovsky challenges SSGO to acknowledge the lack of empirical/objective metaphysical proof, and SSGO meets that challenge by leaning into its theological epistemology. Yes, reason alone underdetermines ontology – but faith seeking understanding can tip the scales. This doesn’t mean arbitrarily dogmatic assertions; it means that within the space of underdetermination, SSGO has principled grounds (via theology) to move in a certain direction. And intriguingly, those theological grounds themselves encourage humility: because God is unknowable in Godself, SSGO’s assertions remain tentative and analogical. This aligns with Benovsky’s advocacy of not overstating what metaphysics can achieve.

In conclusion, Benovsky’s quasi-anti-realist stance pushes SSGO to clarify why it holds a moderately realist ontology. The answer lies in the synthesis of philosophical openness and theological conviction. SSGO can genuinely agree with Benovsky that many structural descriptions are possible and that human reason alone may not single out the winner. Simultaneously, SSGO – guided by something beyond Benovsky’s purview – maintains that its ontology approximates the real structure ordained by God, albeit in a way always open to refinement and never claiming exhaustive knowledge of the divine. This tension becomes a fruitful one: Benovsky keeps SSGO honest and self-critical, while SSGO extends the conversation by introducing how divine unknowability and revelation play a role in determining metaphysical “best primitives” in a way that is not arbitrary but rooted in a trust that reality’s ultimate author has given us clues (however veiled) about the true order of things.

Conclusion

Through this analysis of Jiri Benovsky’s primary texts, we have drawn out key quotes and ideas on primitives, compresence, and metaphysical realism and set them in conversation with the aims of SSGO’s relational ontology. Benovsky provides a nuanced picture of how metaphysical theories are built on primitive elements – the “problem-solvers” that account for phenomena like unity and diversity – and he uses the example of compresence as a powerful primitive relation that can do the work traditionally assigned to substances or substrata. We extracted Benovsky’s own words to see how “compresence…returns objects ‘out’” by tying properties together, and how it remains qualitatively inert so as to distinguish identical objects (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

Comparing these insights with SSGO, we found significant areas of appropriation: SSGO can adopt the idea that relations are ontologically fundamental and that specifying clear primitives will strengthen its explanatory power. At the same time, we identified where SSGO must not overstep Benovsky’s intent – for instance, by treating theological truths as if they were as optional as Benovsky’s framework-relative primitives, or by reading spiritual meaning into neutral metaphysical terms. We set limits to the consonance: harmony exists in the shared appreciation for relationality and humility about knowledge, but divergence appears around realism and the role of theology.

Finally, we tackled how Benovsky’s gentle anti-realism about fundamental structures – his view that no single theory can claim definitive victory, often leaving aesthetic judgment to guide choice – challenges SSGO to justify its moderate realism. We saw that SSGO’s secret weapon here is its theological context: drawing on Eriugena’s doctrine of God’s unknowability, SSGO can agree that human reason underdetermines metaphysical truth, yet it holds (by faith and holistic reasoning) that there is a real divine-grounded order which our ontology seeks to approximate. In doing so, SSGO doesn’t refute Benovsky but rather complements him: it accepts his critique of metaphysical hubris while asserting that we are not solely bereft of guidance – we have the dim light of divine mystery to orient our theoretical choices.

In sum, Benovsky’s metaphysics, carefully understood, proves to be both a valuable resource and a cautious corrective for SSGO. By integrating his primary insights on primitives and compresence, SSGO can enrich its relational vision of reality; by heeding the boundaries he sets (and those set by its own theology), SSGO avoids misusing his ideas. The end result is a nuanced engagement where SSGO can say: here is what we have learned from Benovsky, here is how it resonates with our view of a relational cosmos, and here is where we respectfully diverge due to the demands of faith and reason working in tandem. Such an approach ensures that SSGO’s appropriation of Benovsky is neither uncritical borrowing nor arbitrary cherry-picking, but a thoughtful grafting of metaphysical insight onto the living tree of a theological ontology. The dialogue with Benovsky helps SSGO refine its understanding of the fundamental structures it posits, even as SSGO maintains, with appropriate modesty, that those structures reflect a reality that ultimately surpasses our full comprehension – a reality that, in the last analysis, only God fully knows. (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc)