Jiri Benovsky

Jiri Benovsky is a philosopher specializing in metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of mind. He has contributed significantly to discussions on the role of primitives in metaphysical theories. In his work “Primitives,” featured in The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics (2020), Benovsky explores how primitives function as foundational elements that solve specific problems within metaphysical frameworks. He refers to these as “problem-solvers,” highlighting their role in addressing questions such as attribute agreement—how two objects can share the same property. Benovsky notes that different theories may employ distinct primitives to tackle similar issues, leading to debates about the equivalence of these theories. He suggests that while the nature of these primitives may differ, their functional roles can be remarkably similar, prompting meta-metaphysical inquiries into the significance of choosing one theory over another. Jiri Benovsky (University of Fribourg): Publications – PhilPeople

“Primitives.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, edited by Ricki Bliss and J.T.M. Miller, 2020.

Primitives

“Problem-solvers”

Such primitives are what I call problem-solvers. A problem-solver is a primitive that is there to solve a problem. The theories we have seen above all answer the question of attribute agreement (i.e. the question about how two objects can “share the same property”) by appealing to their primitives: the relation of exact resemblance between tropes, the instantiation of the same universal, or the fact that a and b resemble each other. In the same crucial places, all three views introduce a primitive with the same function: primitively answer the question (“In virtue of what are a and b both F?”). Problem solved. With a problem-solver. Problem-solvers are commonplace in metaphysics, and in philosophy in general; without them we would not get very far. Primitive problem-solvers are the pillars that sustain the structures of our theories.

If, then, this is how the substratum theory explains numerical diversity and the particularity of particulars, the bundle theory (with universals) can do the same. According to the bundle theory, there are no substrata, rather there are only properties tied together by a special variably polyadic relation often called “compresence.” Here, compresence, instead of a substratum, plays the functional role of particularizing particulars: it is a “unifying device” (like the substratum, functionally speaking) whose role in the theory is to take properties to make up objects. Concerning the problem with the two indiscernible spheres, the relation of compresence does not contribute to the qualitative nature of objects and so it can very well be a numerically different relation in different objects without spoiling the two objects’ qualitative identity. It can thus account for numerical diversity of the two qualitatively identical spheres–in this way, the two spheres are numerically different in virtue of the numerical difference between the (instances of) relations of compresence that tie together the…

Realize here that not only are primitives like pillars that support the weight of our theories, by doing most of the work, but that they also are “points of contact” between the theories. Keep in mind the three answers above to the problem of attribute agreement (“sharing the same property”): the three theories all contain a primitive problem-solver at a crucial place in the theory that allows them to solve the problem. Their primitives are, of course, clearly different, but they have the same overall function within a given theory, and the role to explain how a and b can share the same property. In a very general sense, all three views do answer the question in the same way–a primitive way.

One can then raise the meta-metaphysical and methodological question: when it comes to the problem of attribute agreement, what difference does it really make to pick one theory rather than another? The current debate in metametaphysics provides a lot of discussion in the neighborhood of this question, even if the discussion typically does not focus on primitives. For instance, Hirsch (2005, 2007, 2008) defends a claim of equivalence between endurantism and perdurantism; in his view, these debates are merely verbal disputes. They seem to say different things but they are in fact making the same claims, merely formulated in different ways. Another example is Bennett (2008) who focuses on theories of composition and argues that there is little reason to embrace one side of the debate rather than the other, even if they are not just terminological variants, for, in her view, it is epistemically under-determined which one we should choose.

To come back to our examples above, in Benovsky (2008), I argue for an equivalence claim between (various versions of) the bundle theory and the substratum theory. In my view, the question that arises is: at the end of the day, if competing theories answer their theoretical challenges by appealing to their primitives, what difference does it make…?

View, then, even if two sides of a debate use problem-solvers that are functionally equivalent, they still have a different nature/content and so they are not metaphysically equivalent even if they are functionally/theoretically equivalent. In our example above, the idea here is that compresence is a relation and a substratum is not a relation, so they are not the same thing, even if their functions are so similar (or even entirely the same).

The functional view seems to behave better than the content view. Consider the idea that the problem-solver used by one theory is a substratum, while the problem-solver of another theory is a relation, and so they have a different nature. What is it that this idea captures? Does it say something about the substratum or the relation of compresence, like for instance the often-cited difference that properties cannot “float free” while a substratum can “stand alone” and support properties? But whatever this alleged difference between the two primitives means, it would be a functional difference–a difference in what a substratum can do, while compresence doesn’t.

So, here again, the functional view seems to be the adequate story. Here, we would have a difference between the two primitives, and so they would not be equivalent, but they would not be equivalent for functional reasons. To repeat: this is no surprise at all–primitives being there to do a job, it’s only natural that they are individuated in terms of their functions.

For this reason, any difference between primitives will always be a functional one–their functions are the very reason for introducing them in the first place. In the content view, we would be forced to say that in addition to their functions primitives have a non-functional content, but this would objectionably mean that there is a difference that makes no difference–a somewhat prejudiced attitude towards one of the primitives and against the other, where one would stick too heavily…

“…are correlated with each other; and what we thought were distinct correlated phenomena run out to be one and the same. Here the apparent correlation is understood as identity.”

(Kim 2006, p. 85)

In this example, the relation between the explanandum and the explanans is simply identity. We have a similar situation in the case of our example concerning attribute-agreement: for instance, we can say that the explanandum is the sharing of the same property, while the explanans is the instantiating of the same immanent universal. In this case, we can say that sharing the same property just is instantiating the same universal, exactly as lightning just is atmospheric electric discharge.

To have another example, according to the substratum theory, numerical diversity of the two spheres in Black’s world just is or consists in their having a numerically different substratum. So, can we say that the relation between a primitive problem-solver and the phenomenon it explains is identity? There are two problems with this view.

First, as Ruben (1990, p. 219) claims, not all identities are explanatory. The identity claim “lightning is lightning” is not explanatory, while the identity claim “lightning is atmospheric electric discharge” is, because in the second case, even if there is only one phenomenon involved, it is conceptualized in two different ways. We see here that explanation is (and identity isn’t) an irreflexive relation.

Second, perhaps even the claim “lightning is atmospheric electric discharge” is not explanatory. This is the skeptical challenge: if the relation between “sharing the same property” and “instantiating the same universal” is identity, how does this explain anything? We encounter this worry in many places; for instance, when discussing the psychoneural identity theory, Kim (2006, pp. 97–98) says:

“Our conclusion, therefore, has to be that both forms of the explanatory argument are open to serious difficulties. Their fundamental weak…”

An “ontological free lunch” in Armstrong’s (1997) sense; the “ontological price” you pay for a and b is just whatever you would pay for b alone. Only in this particular sense can one talk about identity between a and b. This kind of relation is found in many cases of metaphysical theories.

For instance, according to a version of perdurantism, a’s persisting through time just is a’s having temporal parts at different times, where the latter is taken to be a more fundamental phenomenon than the former. Quite often, the terminology that is used in such cases appeals to the locution “in virtue of”: a persists through time in virtue of having temporal parts at different times.

If we took this idea involving the notion of grounding on board, we would then be in a situation where we step on a primitive in our effort of understanding the nature of explanation–indeed, the notion of grounding is typically taken as being primitive itself (as well as other related notions such as the notion of “being nothing over and above,” the notion of an “ontological free lunch,” and similar).

In the case of lightning and the explanation in terms of atmospheric electric discharge, the chain of explanation goes on until the most fundamental level is reached–the most fundamental level being largely dependent here on empirical matters. The situation is different in the case of explanations found in metaphysical theories involving problem-solvers–we are not limited here by empirical matters. Rather, we reach the bottom of our metaphysical inquiry when we arrive at a notion that is unanalysable any further without circularity. The examples we have seen include a substratum, a non-relational instantiation, resemblance, and others. These notions are taken by our theories to be too fundamental to be further explained.

In this sense, what is at stake in metaphysical inquiry is to find out which is the best primitive, and what is more fundamental than what; what explains what and how. Ultimately, it is a matter of deciding which primitive we want to posit to do the job, or which set of primitives we want to adopt, and on which basis. This leads us to further meta-metaphysical considerations about theoretical virtues, parsimony, and how to weigh them in deciding which primitives (and how many) are worth including in our ontology.

References

  • Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Nominalism and Realism. Cambridge University Press.
  • Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
  • Bennett, K. 2008. “Composition, Colocation, and Metametontology.” In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds., Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, pp. 38–76.
  • Benovsky, J. 2008. “The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers?” Philosophical Studies 141:175–190.
  • Black, M. 1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Mind 61:153–164.
  • Bricker, P. 2006. “The Relation Between the General and the Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience.” In Dean Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, pp. 251–287.
  • De Rosset, L. 2010. “Getting Priority Straight.” Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73–97.
  • Hirsch, E. 2005. “Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70:67–97.
  • Hirsch, E. 2007. “Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance.” In John Hawthorne, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman, eds., Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell, pp. 367–381.
  • Hirsch, E. 2008. “Ontology and Alternative Languages.” In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds., Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, pp. 231–258.
  • Kim, J. 2006. Philosophy of Mind. Second Edition. Westview Press.
  • Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism, A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
  • Ruben, D. 1990. Explaining Explanation. Routledge.
  • Schaffer, J. 2009. “On What Grounds What.” In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds., Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press, pp. 347–383.
  • Williams, D. C. 1953. “On the Elements of Being.” Rev. Metaphysics 7:171–192.

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Analysis of Benovsky for Catholic Appropriation

Introduction

Jiri Benovsky’s recent meta-metaphysical work challenges how we understand the basic building blocks of metaphysical theories. In particular, he introduces the idea of “primitives as problem-solvers” – the notion that the unexplained primitives in a theory are deliberately posited to solve specific explanatory problems. This raises provocative questions for Catholic thought, which traditionally upholds a realist metaphysics grounded in objective truth and longstanding theological commitments. Can Benovsky’s approach be appropriated within a Catholic framework, or does it fundamentally conflict with Catholic realism, divine simplicity, and sacramental efficacy? This paper will explore Benovsky’s use of primitives as explanatory tools, assess the limits of applying this approach to Catholic realism, and examine whether his broader meta-metaphysical framework (metaphysical equivalence and theory choice) might constructively inform Catholic philosophical theology. In doing so, we will identify points of tension – especially concerning Catholic commitments to realism, divine simplicity, and the efficacy of the sacraments – and consider if Benovsky’s anti-realist and nominalist leanings offer any clarifications or refinements for Catholic discourse. The discussion is structured under clear themes to provide a balanced evaluation of these issues.

Benovsky’s “Primitives as Problem-Solvers” in Metaphysics

Benovsky uses the term “primitives” to denote the fundamental posits of a metaphysical theory – basic relations or entities that are not explained further within the theory. Crucially, he argues that such primitives function as “problem-solvers.” In other words, they are introduced precisely to handle theoretical challenges or answer otherwise unanswerable questions. For example, in the classic problem of universals (the question of how multiple things can share the same property F), different metaphysical theories introduce different primitives to “solve” it. A realist theory of universals says two objects a and b are both F by virtue of instantiating the same universal – but the instantiation tie itself is taken as a primitive (a basic relation that is not further explained) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). A trope theory, by contrast, claims a and b share F by having exactly similar tropes, and here the exact similarity between tropes is primitive (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). A nominalist theory might say a and b resemble each other in F, taking resemblance as a fundamental fact. In each case, the heavy lifting is done by a primitive element of the theory: “The work is done by the theories’ primitives” as Benovsky puts it (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). These primitives are posited “at the same crucial places” in each theory to yield an answer where otherwise an infinite regress or explanatory gap would occur (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Without such primitives, the theories “could not even start to answer the questions we asked and to do the job we want it to do” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

Benovsky’s analysis highlights that primitives are indispensable, albeit arbitrary, pillars of metaphysical systems. They are arbitrary in the sense that the theorist has some freedom in stipulating them. As he notes (following D. M. Armstrong’s defense of a primitive instantiation relation), a theorist has “the perfect right” to postulate whatever primitive is needed to save the theory (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Far from being ad-hoc weaknesses, primitives are deliberately chosen explanatory tools. Benovsky even generalizes this observation: virtually any metaphysical theory relies on primitives to address its core challenges (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Bundle theory, for instance, needs a primitive relation of “compresence” to tie properties together into one object, whereas substratum theory invokes a primitive “substratum” to individuate particular substances (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). These posits are “problem-solvers” in Benovsky’s terms – they solve specific problems like individuation, persistence, or property-sharing by fiat (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). “In short, a problem-solver is a primitive that is there to solve a problem” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Rather than seeing primitives as embarrassments, Benovsky treats them as the key explanatory devices around which theories are built.

Beyond just describing the role of primitives, Benovsky uses this insight to advance a meta-metaphysical argument. If two competing theories solve the same problem by means of primitives, and if those primitives fulfill the same functional role, then perhaps the supposed dispute between the theories is shallow. Different theories may be “no more than terminological variants” once we recognize that their primitives do equivalent work (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). For example, if one theory uses a primitive relation (like compresence) and another uses a primitive entity (like a substratum) to account for the unity of an object, the question arises: is there any real difference between these approaches, or just a difference in terminology or conceptual scheme? Benovsky distinguishes a Functional View (focusing on what primitives do) from a Content View (focusing on what primitives are) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). The Functional View suggests that as long as primitives play the same role, theories might be deemed equivalent in effect, even if the ontological nature of the primitives differs. In practice, if no observable or explanatory difference stems from choosing one primitive over another, the dispute may be merely verbal or aesthetic. This line of reasoning supports the possibility of metaphysical equivalence between ostensibly rival theories, an idea Benovsky explores through case studies (for instance, arguing that endurantism vs. perdurantism about objects may be a merely linguistic difference, following Eli Hirsch’s insights) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Benovsky does concede that not all debates collapse this way – equivalence claims must be evaluated “locally”, case by case (Jiri Benovsky) (Jiri Benovsky). But importantly, he sets a high bar for a substantive metaphysical disagreement: there must be a functional difference in what the competing primitives can do (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). If two primitives achieve exactly the same explanatory outcomes, insisting on one as “real” and the other as false may reflect a bias toward certain terminologies rather than a discovery about the world (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc).

Benovsky’s meta-metaphysics thus tends toward a form of ontological anti-realism or pluralism. He finds that many first-order metaphysical disputes cannot be definitively resolved by evidence or reason, since each side can introduce a suitable primitive to answer challenges. The upshot is that theory choice in metaphysics may ultimately rely on criteria other than straightforward truth-tracking. In his view, when faced with “non-equivalent but equally good” theories, traditional theoretical virtues (like simplicity, coherence with science, intuitive plausibility, explanatory power, etc.) often fail to uniquely favor one theory (Jiri Benovsky). As a result, Benovsky provocatively suggests that aesthetic criteria might tip the balance: metaphysical theories are evaluated in part by their elegance, symmetry, or beauty (Jiri Benovsky) (Jiri Benovsky). He argues that metaphysical theories “possess aesthetic properties and that these play a crucial role when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice.” (Jiri Benovsky). Embracing such non-traditional criteria, alongside the view that multiple frameworks can be equally legitimate, naturally leads Benovsky to “a form of anti-realism.” By the end of his project, he openly adopts an anti-realist stance about metaphysics (Jiri Benovsky) (Jiri Benovsky): the idea that metaphysical systems are human-constructed models rather than uniquely true descriptions of an mind-independent structure. In summary, Benovsky’s position can be characterized as metaphysically deflationary – primitives are freely posited problem-solvers, rival theories can be often regarded as equivalent or choice-worthy on pragmatic/aesthetic grounds, and ultimate reality does not mandate a single correct metaphysical schema. This is the framework we are asked to consider in light of Catholic thought.

Catholic Realism and the Limits of Benovsky’s Approach

Catholic philosophical and theological thought has historically been committed to a form of realism that stands in tension with Benovsky’s anti-realist leanings. By “Catholic realism,” we refer both to the metaphysical realism inherited from the classical tradition and to the conviction that theological truths correspond to objective reality (God, moral law, sacraments, etc., are not mere human constructs). In Catholic understanding, truth is not merely a product of conceptual scheme or linguistic choice; it is grounded in being. As Pope St. John Paul II affirmed in Fides et Ratio, “truth is completely objective, it is one, and it is the goal towards which our effort to know reality tends.” (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra). This deeply realist outlook holds that things “are as they are, regardless of whether we want them to be or like them to be.” (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra) In Catholic epistemology, our concepts can genuinely (if imperfectly) capture the way things are in themselves (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra) (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra). Even if we acknowledge different “approaches to objective truth” (scientific, philosophical, theological) (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra), the Catholic stance is that these approaches converge toward the same reality.

This commitment is especially evident in Catholic theology’s treatment of universals and natures. The Catholic intellectual tradition, following thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas, embraced moderate realism about universals as opposed to nominalism (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism) (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism). Moderate realism holds that universal concepts correspond to real common natures or “formae” shared by individuals, at least in an analogical or ideal sense (for instance, all humans share a human nature that is real, though it exists in individuals) (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism) (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism). Aquinas formulated this view so influentially that it is sometimes called “Thomistic realism.” In contrast, nominalism – the doctrine that universals are mere names with no reality apart from particular instances (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism) (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism) – was viewed with suspicion in Catholic thought because it can undermine the rational knowability of objective truth (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism) (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism). For example, if goodness or humanity are just labels we impose, then moral truths or the concept of human nature lose any real foundation (Nominalism – Wikipedia). The Catholic Encyclopedia notes that moderate realism “remains the doctrine of all those who have… adopted the neo-Scholastic philosophy” (CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism), underscoring that the Church’s preferred metaphysics posits a real coherence between thought and reality. This realist bent runs counter to any thoroughgoing anti-realism. Benovsky’s suggestion that many metaphysical differences are merely terminological or that theory choice can be made on aesthetic grounds would likely be met with resistance: from a Catholic realist perspective, metaphysical differences often reflect genuine truths or falsehoods about God’s creation. They are not merely about what “works” in a theory, but about what is actually the case.

One limit of appropriating Benovsky’s approach, then, is that Catholic thought cannot accept that metaphysical truths are purely a matter of convention or preference. The Church asserts some metaphysical claims as objectively true, not optional postulates. For instance, the existence of a rational soul in each human, or the reality of angelic spirits, or the real distinction between person and nature in Christ – these are treated as truths grounded in reality, not just useful narrative devices. A Catholic philosopher might agree with Benovsky that we often use theoretical primitives to articulate mysteries (e.g. the notion of person and nature as primitives to explain the Trinity and Incarnation), but would maintain that these correspond to something real (albeit mysterious) about God. The role of human conceptualization is acknowledged (we need analogies, models, etc.), yet the meta-stance is realist: there is a fact of the matter, even if multiple models grasp different aspects of it. Catholic thought allows that our knowledge of divine and metaphysical things is limited and analogical – “our statements (logical truth) have different modalities and degrees” (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra) – but it insists that there is an ontological truth our statements aim at, however approximately (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra) (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra). In short, Catholicism would temper Benovsky’s functionalism about primitives with a demand that those primitives ultimately trace back to real features (or at least real effects of God). A merely instrumental or anti-realist use of primitives sits uneasily with the Catholic mindset, which sees theology as uncovering the intelligible order God imprinted in reality, not inventing useful fictions.

Another general limit is that Catholic thought has authoritative theological commitments that restrict the freedom of “theory choice.” In metaphysics broadly, Benovsky delights in the ability to choose primitives ad libitum to solve problems, and to select one’s favored theory based on virtues like simplicity or elegance. Catholic philosophy certainly also values explanatory power and coherence (the theological task is partially theoretical), but it does not operate in a vacuum of free choice – it works in synergy with revealed truths and dogmas that act as constraints. A Catholic thinker can’t simply decide to replace one primitive with another if doing so contradicts revelation or defined doctrine. For example, if one considered the problem of “why does anything exist?”, a secular metaphysician might introduce a primitive “brute fact” of existence or an abstract entity as a cause, whereas Catholic thought is committed to the existence of a personal Creator (God) as the real answer. That commitment is not negotiable on grounds of theoretical elegance; it’s given by faith and (the Church would argue) supported by reason. Similarly, in the problem of universals, a Catholic philosopher might analyze various theories (realism, conceptualism, nominalism) as Benovsky does, but outright nominalism would be hard to reconcile with Catholic doctrine – because the Church, while not dogmatizing a theory of universals, strongly leans on concepts like nature, form, and essence in its teachings (e.g. the human nature of Christ, the sinful nature of man, etc.). The language of Catholic doctrine presupposes that these abstract terms refer to something more than convenient labels. Thus, there is less latitude for declaring multiple metaphysical schemas equally acceptable if they imply different ontologies that affect doctrinal content. Catholic realism provides a yardstick of truth (grounded in being and revelation) that any theoretical framework must measure up against, limiting the kind of free-wheeling theory equivalence Benovsky entertains.

Metaphysical Equivalence and Theory Choice in Catholic Discourse

Despite the above constraints, we can ask whether Benovsky’s meta-metaphysical ideas – metaphysical equivalence and the criteria of theory choice – might play a constructive role within Catholic discourse. Catholic theology is no stranger to the idea that the same reality can be described in different ways. In fact, within the Church’s intellectual tradition, there have been multiple schools of thought (Thomists, Scotists, Augustinians, etc.) offering divergent metaphysical formulations of the same faith truths. The First Vatican Council (1870) acknowledged this diversity even as it reaffirmed core metaphysical commitments. Vatican I defended the doctrine of divine simplicity in God – that God is not composed of parts, and His attributes are one in His essence – as a non-negotiable truth (Divine Simplicity) (Divine Simplicity). But it did so in a way that “sought to affirm in a general way the classical affirmation of the mysterious transcendence, eternity and immutable identity of the one God, over against competing conceptions”, without adjudicating between various scholastic schools on the precise philosophical account of simplicity (Divine Simplicity) (Divine Simplicity). In other words, the Church insisted on what must be upheld (God’s absolute unity and simplicity) but did not canonize a single philosophical explanation of how this is so. Thomists and Scotists, for example, had slightly different ways of articulating God’s simplicity and the relationship of the divine attributes, yet both approaches were deemed compatible with the faith. This is analogous to Benovsky’s point that there can be “partial metaphysical equivalence”: different theories might be acceptable as long as they adequately fulfill the required explanatory role (in this case, safeguarding God’s transcendence and oneness) (Jiri Benovsky). Catholic thought can appropriate a similar attitude in a limited way – recognizing a kind of equivalence in theological function between different philosophical frameworks that preserve the same core truth. Different conceptual models can be seen as converging on the same mystery. For instance, one might argue that Thomistic analogical language and Palamite essence–energies distinction (an Eastern Christian perspective) are both attempts to honor God’s transcendence, even if they use different primitives. A Catholic meta-philosophy could say these are to some extent equivalent in what they safeguard, if not literally identical theories.

Catholic discourse also has its own version of “theory choice” where multiple explanations compete. In cases where the Church has not given a definitive teaching, Catholic theologians do weigh theories by criteria akin to theoretical virtues. A historical example is the debate over grace and free will between the Molinists and the Bañezian (Thomist) school in the 16th–17th centuries. Both camps agreed on core doctrines (that God’s grace is necessary for any good, that humans have free will, etc.), but had different “primitives” in their explanations – the Molinists posited God’s “middle knowledge” of counterfactuals as a kind of primitive to reconcile grace with freedom, whereas Thomists invoked a mysterious “physical premotion” from God as their primitive explanation for human free acts under grace. The Church eventually decided that both theories could be tolerated, effectively allowing a pluralism of models since each preserved the essential points of doctrine. This resembles a situation of metaphysical underdetermination: the data of revelation underdetermine a single theory, so multiple conceptual schemas remain in play. Here Catholic thinkers did implicitly use theory choice criteria – they debated which view was more coherent with other truths, which was more philosophically elegant, which avoided certain problems. In the end, since neither could be proven superior on purely rational grounds and both stayed within orthodox bounds, the “choice” was left open. This example shows that Catholic intellectual life can accommodate a form of metaphysical pluralism (within limits). It is not that the Church endorses anti-realism, but rather that it recognizes the complexity of certain issues allows for equivalent explanatory approaches in theology. Benovsky’s emphasis on evaluating theories by their problem-solving success and theoretical virtues could reinforce a healthy awareness in Catholic discourse: that some intra-Catholic philosophical disputes are not about faith versus heresy, but about best explanatory fit. His framework might encourage Catholic philosophers to articulate clearly what problem each theological model is solving and to assess models by how well they do so, rather than by loyalty to a school.

Additionally, the idea that aesthetic or narrative qualities can play a role in theory choice might have a surprising resonance in Catholic thought. Catholic theology has always valued the harmony and beauty of truth. While doctrine is not chosen merely for its elegance, the Catholic tradition does see beauty as a property of divine truth (the concept of pulchrum as a transcendental along with bonum and verum). In explaining mysteries, theologians often appeal to the beauty of a doctrine (for instance, the fittingness of the Incarnation or the elegance of Aquinas’s synthesis of faith and reason). One could say that, at times, aesthetic criteria supplement strict logical criteria in theological development – not to determine whether something is true, but to appreciate a particular formulation of truth as especially fitting or illuminating. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity is sometimes defended by pointing to the beautiful symmetry it gives between unity and plurality, or the way it makes “God is love” intelligible (since within the Trinity there is a beloved, a lover, and the love itself). These are aesthetic-appreciative judgments reinforcing the acceptance of a mystery already grounded in revelation. By analogy, if two theological explanations both satisfy the required orthodox constraints, the more beautiful or coherent one might be preferred as giving deeper insight. Benovsky’s contention that aesthetic properties play a crucial role in choosing between otherwise acceptable theories (Jiri Benovsky) (Jiri Benovsky) could thus find a modest application in how Catholic thinkers favor certain articulations of doctrine. It is crucial to note, however, that for a Catholic, aesthetic appeal can never justify contradicting a defined dogma or established truth – it is only a tiebreaker or an added value among permissible options. In Benovsky’s case, aesthetic choice leads him toward anti-realism (Jiri Benovsky), whereas in a Catholic context, aesthetic judgment would be employed within a realist framework to highlight the splendor of truth.

In summary, while Catholic thought cannot adopt wholesale the free-for-all theory substitutability Benovsky might countenance, it can learn from his meta-perspective by: (a) recognizing the functional equivalence of different philosophical traditions that serve the faith, (b) being explicit about the criteria (including coherence and even beauty) by which we judge a theological model’s usefulness, and (c) maintaining humility about the reach of any one conceptual framework. Catholic discourse, at its best, already does some of this – what Benovsky provides is a vocabulary and analytic lens to make these practices more self-aware.

Tensions with Catholic Commitments: Realism, Divine Simplicity, and Sacraments

Despite the potential points of contact above, significant tensions remain between Benovsky’s framework and specific Catholic commitments. It is worth examining these friction points in detail:

  • Metaphysical Realism vs. Anti-Realism: The most fundamental tension is Benovsky’s slide into anti-realism versus the Catholic insistence on realism. Benovsky concludes that many metaphysical theories are human-relative and that theory choice may ultimately be aesthetic, implying no one theory has a uniquely true claim on reality (Jiri Benovsky). Catholic thought cannot endorse a general anti-realism about theological truths. For Catholics, certain metaphysical claims are true in an ontological, mind-independent sense. For example, when the Church says God exists or the soul is immortal, it means these are true irrespective of human theories – they describe reality as it is, “things are as they are” objectively (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra). A Benovskian anti-realism that treats these statements as merely useful parts of a conceptual framework would be seen as undermining the faith. Catholicism holds that God, the angels, moral laws, etc., exist and have a determinate nature whether or not our theories grasp them fully. Therefore, any approach that hints that these entities are just posited to solve problems (like explaining religious experience or moral order) would be firmly rejected. For Catholics, God is not a “primitive” posited to solve the problem of why there is something rather than nothing – God is the real necessary being who genuinely creates and sustains all else. So, while Benovsky’s approach is useful for analyzing human theories, the Church would maintain that reality itself has a given structure (ultimately grounded in God’s eternal Logos) that is not infinitely plastic to our descriptions. The tension here is partly epistemological (how we choose theories) and partly ontological (what we say exists). Catholic realism demands that at least some metaphysical principles (e.g. being vs. non-being, truth, goodness) are not optional, whereas Benovsky’s meta-metaphysics suggests a looseness that verges on relativism. This would call for careful navigation: a Catholic can appreciate the humility in admitting our theories are limited, but cannot go along with the idea that there is no fact of the matter which theory is closer to the truth of things.
  • Divine Simplicity and Theological Ontology: The doctrine of divine simplicity is a test case for these differences. Divine simplicity holds that God is absolutely simple – He has no parts, no composition of matter/form, substance/accident, or even essence/existence distinction; in God, “what He is” and “that He is” are identical, and all attributes (goodness, wisdom, power) are one in His indivisible essence ([PDF] MAKING SENSE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY Jeffrey E. Brower) (March | 2010 | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). This doctrine is a cornerstone of classical theism and was strongly reaffirmed by Vatican I (Divine Simplicity). How does this clash with Benovsky’s ideas? First, the content of divine simplicity is metaphysically heavy – it relies on a particular understanding of ontology (drawn from Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions). One might say it introduces its own “primitives” (e.g. the idea of a being with no metaphysical composition) to solve theological problems like avoiding the implication that God depends on parts or that God’s properties differ from each other. Indeed, divine simplicity is precisely a problem-solver for the issue of how an eternal God can be ultimate and uncaused: by asserting God’s essence is existence and all perfections, it removes any gap between God’s attributes or between God and the act of being (Divine Simplicity). A Benovsky-style analysis might observe that different theological traditions have tackled this with different primitives – Western scholastics with the identity of attributes in God, Eastern theologians with the essence–energies distinction (which in effect treats God’s internal essence as beyond knowing but His energies or operations as accessible). Are these two approaches “equivalent” or is one correct and the other mistaken? From a Catholic perspective, outright denying simplicity is not an option (since it’s dogma), but there might be room for understanding the essence–energies nuance as compatible if viewed correctly. Benovsky’s framework would encourage asking: do both views do the same functional job of preserving God’s transcendence and unity? If yes, perhaps they are just different vocabularies. However, many theologians see a substantive difference there (Catholic theologians generally reject a real distinction between God’s essence and energies as posited in Eastern Orthodox thought, fearing it compromises simplicity). This illustrates a tension: Catholicism’s commitment to a particular metaphysical truth (simplicity) limits the willingness to declare two theories equivalent. Furthermore, simplicity itself, taken as a “primitive” truth about God, must be regarded as real on Catholic terms – it’s not just a convenient posit. A Catholic thinker might worry that calling it a theoretical primitive “to avoid problems” sounds like we invented it, whereas the Church insists God in fact is simple; it’s a feature of the divine reality, not an arbitrary stipulation (Divine Simplicity) (Divine Simplicity). If one applied Benovsky’s anti-realism here, one could say “God’s simplicity or God’s composite nature are just two conceptual models, and we choose simplicity because it’s theoretically smoother (no infinite regress of causes in God, etc.).” That attitude would be anathema to Catholic theology – God’s simplicity is not chosen for its convenience alone, but believed because it is true and revealed (implicitly in the idea of the one God of classical theism). Thus, divine simplicity represents a non-negotiable metaphysical commitment where Catholic thought would not entertain an alternative theory as equally valid. It highlights how Catholicism uses metaphysical reasoning but then fixes a conclusion as doctrinal reality, whereas Benovsky would keep the contest more open-ended.
  • Sacramental Efficacy and Real Presence: Another focal tension is with regard to the efficacy of the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist. Catholic theology famously teaches that in the Eucharist, the bread and wine are truly transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ (a doctrine known as transubstantiation). This doctrine involves robust metaphysical claims: the substance of bread is changed into the substance of Christ’s Body, while the accidents (appearances) of bread remain (Thirteenth Session of the Council of Trent | EWTN). In other sacraments, physical signs (water, oil, spoken words) are said to cause grace ex opere operato – by the very fact of the sacramental action, when properly performed, grace is conferred (Decree Concerning the Sacraments & Decree Concerning Reform | EWTN). These teachings reflect a strong form of realism about spiritual effects: the sacraments objectively do what they signify, they are not merely human symbols. Now, how would Benovsky’s approach view this? One might say the Church introduced the concept of “transubstantial change” as a primitive to solve the theological problem of Christ’s real presence: it answers the question “In virtue of what is Christ present under the appearances of bread and wine?” with a primitive kind of change that defies empirical detection. Indeed, scholastic theologians explicitly recognized transubstantiation as a mystery that cannot be fully explained – it is “a conversion… which we can scarcely express in words, yet… we can conceive and ought most firmly to believe is possible to God.” (Thirteenth Session of the Council of Trent | EWTN). They posited the term “transubstantiation” to name this unique miracle (Thirteenth Session of the Council of Trent | EWTN). For a secular metaphysician, this might appear as adding a sui generis rule (a problem-solver primitive) to avoid the contradiction of saying bread remains bread while becoming Christ. And that is true – it is a theoretical posit, one deeply tied to Aristotelian ontology (substance/accident distinction). However, the Catholic Church holds this is not just a clever theoretical patch; it is what truly happens. The Council of Trent anathematized the view that the Eucharist is only a symbol or that the substance of bread remains (Thirteenth Session of the Council of Trent | EWTN). The tension with nominalism becomes evident: a thorough nominalist who denies that “substance” is a meaningful reality (beyond a collection of properties) would reject transubstantiation as nonsense – if only particulars and their qualities exist, you can’t have an invisible “substance” change while qualities stay the same. In fact, many Protestant Reformers influenced by nominalism did reject the Catholic Eucharistic doctrine, favoring either a mere symbolism or a co-existence of Christ with the bread (consubstantiation) rather than a full change of substance. The Catholic response was uncompromising: “If anyone says that in the sacrament the substance of bread and wine remains… and denies that wonderful and singular change of the whole substance… into the Body and Blood of Christ… let him be anathema.” (Thirteenth Session of the Council of Trent | EWTN). Clearly, Catholicism takes the realist stance that the metaphysical change is actual. Here, applying Benovsky’s meta-method would be extremely contentious. Suggesting that transubstantiation is just one theoretical model to “save” the Real Presence, and perhaps we could equally choose another model (say, a virtual presence or a dynamic symbolism) if it did the job, would contradict Catholic teaching. For Catholics, no alternate theory is equivalent in reality to transubstantiation because alternatives usually deny or water down the reality of the change. The sacramental efficacy is a case where the pragmatic or pluralist approach is foreclosed by doctrine. The Church even has a technical term for sacraments working “ex opere operato”, meaning the sacramental act itself (when validly done) infallibly confers grace by the power of Christ (ex opere operato – Christian Cyclopedia) (Decree Concerning the Sacraments & Decree Concerning Reform | EWTN). This is a strong causal claim about reality, not just a descriptor. It was formulated to solve a theological problem (the objectivity of grace vs. the worthiness of the minister), functioning as a “primitive” principle in sacramental theology; yet it is considered a truth of the faith, not a negotiable axiom. Thus, the tension is that Benovsky’s nominalist or anti-realist leanings, if applied here, would undermine the Catholic understanding of sacraments. The Church cannot treat the sacraments’ efficacy as a mere interpretive framework – it insists the grace conferred is ontologically real (albeit invisible) and that God truly acts through the sacrament.

In light of these tensions, it becomes clear that Catholic commitments set hard limits on where Benovsky’s approach could be followed. When a metaphysical issue intersects with defined doctrine – such as the nature of God or the reality of the Eucharist – the range of acceptable “theory choices” narrows to basically one (or a family of very closely related theories). A Catholic thinker might employ Benovsky’s analysis to better understand the structure of a theological theory (identifying its primitives and what problems they solve), but would stop short of claiming multiple incompatible theories are equally true. The non-negotiable nature of certain truths in Catholicism means that, past a point, one theory is right (orthodox) and the others are wrong (heterodox), not just stylistically different. This absolutism is at odds with Benovsky’s more exploratory, flexibility-minded philosophy. The challenge for any attempted appropriation is to harness Benovsky’s insights without slipping into relativism or denying Catholic dogmas. It requires a delicate balance: using the tools of analysis he provides, but not the conclusions he draws that conflict with Catholic faith.

Clarifications and Potential Benefits for Catholic Philosophy

Given the evident conflicts, one might wonder if Benovsky’s framework can help Catholic philosophical theology at all. Is there anything to be gained from engaging with a meta-metaphysical approach that leans anti-realist and nominalist? I suggest that, despite the tensions, there are a few constructive ways Benovsky’s ideas could clarify or refine Catholic thought, provided they are used judiciously.

1. Greater Self-Awareness of Theoretical Constructs: Catholic theology could benefit from Benovsky’s keen observation that every theory has “primal points” where it leans on unexplained explainers. By identifying the “primitives” in Catholic theological explanations, we achieve more transparency about what aspects of our understanding are ultimately mysterious or taken on faith. For instance, in Christology, Catholics profess that Christ is one person with two natures (human and divine). This doctrine uses terms like “person” and “nature” in a way that functions as an endpoint of analysis – we don’t fully explain how the two natures unite in one person; we just assert they do (the primitive here might be something like the “hypostatic union” as a fundamental mystery). A Benovsky-style lens would point out: hypostatic union is doing the job of maintaining both full divinity and full humanity in Christ – it is a problem-solver for the question of unity-in-duality, and it’s posited as primitive (since attempts to explain it often slide into heresy, e.g. Eutychianism or Nestorianism). Recognizing this doesn’t undercut the doctrine, but helps frame it: it tells us where rational explanation leaves off and sheer divine mystery is affirmed. This kind of clarity can be quite healthy. It reminds Catholic theologians and philosophers which parts of a doctrine are inaccessible to further analysis, preventing futile rationalization beyond what the mystery allows. It can also improve how we teach and communicate doctrines. If we know exactly what issue a concept like transubstantiation resolves (the presence of Christ’s Body and Blood without perceptible change), we can emphasize that role and perhaps head off misunderstandings. In short, Benovsky’s emphasis on primitives as the “pillars that sustain the structure of our theories” (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) can encourage Catholic thinkers to clearly identify the pillars of their theological systems. Those pillars, often being mysteries of faith (Trinity, Incarnation, grace), are then respected as such – one doesn’t try to reduce them further, but one also doesn’t confuse them with conclusions of pure reason. This self-awareness makes for more rigorous and honest theology.

2. Distinguishing Core Doctrine from Theoretical Framework: In Catholic intellectual history, there have been cases where the Church had to distinguish between the essential content of doctrine and the philosophical language used to express it. A famous example is the adoption of Aristotelian metaphysics in articulating the Eucharist (substance and accidents). While the Church dogmatically teaches transubstantiation in those terms, it has also clarified that the idea is to affirm the reality of Christ’s presence and the change at the level of substance, not necessarily to canonize every aspect of Aristotelian physics that goes with “substance.” This means there is some openness to translating that doctrine into different philosophical terms so long as the same truth is preserved. Benovsky’s notion of metaphysical equivalence could help here by offering a way to think about different expressions of the same truth. For example, some contemporary theologians have tried to explain the Real Presence using concepts from personalism or symbolic realism rather than classical substance/accident talk (though remaining careful not to fall into mere symbolism). A Benovsky-influenced perspective might ask: do these different conceptual schemas achieve the same explanatory outcome (Christ’s true presence and the cessation of the bread’s ordinary reality) as the traditional one? If yes, perhaps they are theoretically equivalent to transubstantiation as explanations, even if the terminology and ontology differ. If no, the differences will point to what is non-negotiable (e.g. a purely psychological “presence in meaning” clearly is not equivalent, as it fails to assert an ontological change). Thus, using the criterion of functional equivalence can safeguard the doctrine’s core while allowing potential legitimate development in explanation. This kind of analysis can refine Catholic philosophical theology by preventing equivocation – it ensures that when new theological models are proposed, they are evaluated for whether they truly preserve the deposit of faith or secretly alter it. The Church’s cautious openness to new language (seen for instance in Pope Paul VI’s allowance that we may use the term “transfinalization” or “transignification” of the Eucharist in a limited sense, but only if it is not taken to deny the substantive change) reflects this careful balance. Benovsky’s framework provides a structured way to think about when two theories are “notational variants” and when they are fundamentally different (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc) (Microsoft Word – JiriBenovskyPrimitivenessMetaontologyAndExplanatoryPowerTRACKEDVERSIONMay15.doc). Catholic thinkers could use this to foster legitimate pluralism (where multiple philosophical approaches truly converge on the same truth) and to rule out false pluralism (where differences do matter to the truth). It adds rigor in debating whether, say, Aquinas and Palamas are just using different words or really disagreeing about God, or whether Thomism and Molinism are just two ways to reconcile grace and freedom or hold incompatible notions of God’s knowledge. In essence, it helps separate form from content in doctrinal discourse – a valuable skill in a Church that spans many cultures and philosophical traditions.

3. Emphasizing Theoretical Virtues in Theology: Benovsky draws attention to theory choice criteria, especially the role of aesthetic and pragmatic virtues in assessing metaphysical theories (Jiri Benovsky) (Jiri Benovsky). Catholic philosophy can appropriate a version of this: while fidelity to revelation is the top criterion, among permissible theological theories one can and should discuss which is more parsimonious, more coherent, more explanatorily powerful, etc. In fact, this has been done throughout Church history – for instance, Aquinas’s theory of grace was considered elegant for how it integrated Aristotelian psychology, whereas Molinists found theirs more satisfying in preserving human freedom. A contemporary Catholic example might be the various theories of hell (eternal torment vs. self-exclusion vs. annihilation, etc., noting that the last is outside current orthodoxy for Catholics). Within what the Church allows, one theory might be favored because it aligns better with scriptural imagery or avoids philosophical problems about God’s justice – those are essentially theoretical virtue considerations. A systematic use of such criteria, as Benovsky attempted (he surveyed simplicity, consistency, intuitive fit, etc., in metaphysics (Jiri Benovsky)), could make theological debates more transparent. Instead of talking past each other, proponents of different views can enumerate how their model fares on various virtues (Does it make the mystery clearer or more convoluted? Does it cohere with other doctrines? Is it historically rooted in the tradition or a novum? Etc.). This structured comparison can lead to constructive dialogue rather than anathemas. It may also highlight that sometimes a debate is not about truth vs. falsehood but about pastoral or explanatory preference – analogous to how Benovsky would say two equivalent theories might be chosen based on aesthetic taste. In theology, if two views are doctrinally acceptable, one might still choose the one that speaks more to the faithful or has more spiritual fruit. These are quasi-pragmatic or aesthetic considerations (e.g. the vivid imagery of one model vs. the dry abstraction of another). A concrete instance: to communicate God’s providence, one preacher might prefer the simple model “everything happens for a purpose” (emphasizing God’s plan in a straightforward if deterministic-sounding way), whereas another might prefer a more complex model of God’s permissive will and human freedom. Both are within orthodoxy; the choice might come down to which is pastorally effective or resonates with a person’s experience – effectively, an aesthetic/pragmatic criterion. Acknowledging this can reduce unnecessary polemics and allow a pluralism that serves the Church’s mission of evangelization. Benovsky’s openness to multiple equivalent narratives (as long as each does its job) could encourage the Church to present doctrines under different aspects to reach different audiences, without insisting on a single philosophical exposition in all contexts. The caution, again, is that this is only within the bounds of unchanging truth – but within those bounds, there is room for creativity and adaptation. In that sense, Benovsky’s framework, oddly enough, could inspire greater intellectual charity and flexibility among Catholic thinkers, recognizing that another’s differing metaphysical language might be capturing the same mystery in a complementary way.

4. Humility about Human Knowledge of the Divine: Finally, and perhaps most importantly, engaging with Benovsky’s anti-realist conclusions can remind Catholic philosophers of a key theological principle: the mystery of God transcends all our concepts. Catholic theology already espouses a form of partial agnosticism in its apophatic tradition – we can never fully comprehend God, and all our categories (time, substance, relation, even being) analogically apply to God, who infinitely exceeds them. In this light, one might say that no metaphysical theory we devise can claim exhaustive or absolute truth about God. There is always a gap between the Divine Reality and our mental framework. Benovsky’s skepticism about a single true metaphysics could be taken (in a theistic context) as a secular reflection of that insight: that reality, especially divine reality, is richer than any one system. Catholic thinkers could thus find in his work an occasion to purify their use of metaphysics, guarding against idolatry of any one philosophical system. For example, a Thomist might deeply love Thomistic metaphysics (as many do) and be tempted to equate it wholesale with the Catholic worldview. But the Church does not canonize Aquinas’s philosophy itself – only the truths it serves to express. In history, there have been moments (e.g. 1277 condemnation of certain Aristotelian propositions) where the Church deliberately checked an overconfidence in a philosophical synthesis. Realizing that another metaphysical account (say, an Eastern Christian neo-Platonic approach) can illuminate the faith just as well, humbles the Thomist to see that the faith is not reducible to one school’s conceptual machinery. This doesn’t mean truth is relative; it means our grasp is always limited and multifaceted. Benovsky’s anti-realism could thus be repurposed as an epistemic humility: we are anti-realist about our models of God, not in the sense that God isn’t real, but in the sense that our models are not Reality itself. They are acknowledged as human attempts, valuable but not absolute. This resonates with St. Thomas Aquinas’s own late-life remark that all he wrote was “as straw” compared to the divine truth he glimpsed in mystical experience. In a way, Catholic theology at its height meets Benovsky’s critique not with denial but with a qualified agreement: yes, our metaphysical language is inadequate to the Mystery. Yet, against a full anti-realism, the Church holds that God does disclose real truths about Himself (in Revelation and in the Logos through which creation speaks of the Creator), so we are not left with incommensurable options – we have a guiding thread of truth, even if we can weave different beautiful patterns around it.

Conclusion

Jiri Benovsky’s concept of “primitives as problem-solvers” and his broader meta-metaphysical framework offer a thought-provoking mirror for Catholic philosophical theology. On the one hand, his analysis underscores a point that Catholic thinkers can readily acknowledge: our explanations, whether in metaphysics or theology, inevitably rely on fundamental assumptions or mysteries that we cannot fully explain. Identifying these primitives (such as instantiation in metaphysics or transubstantiation in theology) can be illuminating. It shows that, rather than being completely rationalistic, even Catholic theology proceeds by positing certain truths of faith to resolve paradoxes – and this is not a weakness but a recognition of the limits of reason in the face of divine mystery. In this way, Benovsky’s framework can be appropriated to clarify the structure of Catholic thought, making explicit where faith’s “primitives” lie and how they function to solve theological problems (e.g. How can one God be three? How can eternal grace interact with temporal free will? These are answered by positing the Trinity and a complex notion of providence, respectively, as primitives of a sort).

On the other hand, a direct importation of Benovsky’s anti-realist, nominalist-leaning stance into Catholic thought is neither feasible nor desirable. Catholic realism – the belief in a mind-independent, intelligible order created by God – is foundational. The Church cannot treat core doctrines as just interchangeable models or the choice between them as a matter of taste. There is an authoritative content to the faith that limits theoretical pliability. We saw this with non-negotiable teachings on God’s simplicity, the Real Presence, and other doctrinal facts which, for Catholics, are not merely solutions to intellectual puzzles but truths revealed by God and thus absolutely true in reality. Where Benovsky would encourage seeing many metaphysical debates as terminological or pragmatic, the Catholic perspective insists that some differences (e.g. affirming vs. denying Christ’s Eucharistic presence) are far from trivial – they are about reality and salvation. Therefore, any use of his framework must be done critically, distinguishing where pluralism is acceptable from where it would slide into heresy or relativism.

Ultimately, Benovsky’s meta-metaphysics can serve a constructive, though limited, function in Catholic discourse. It can function as a tool for internal analysis and ecumenical bridge-building: helping to map how different theological traditions tackle the same problems with different primitives and possibly highlighting an underlying equivalence in what is affirmed, thus fostering unity of understanding. It can also act as a reminder that, although Catholicism teaches objective truth, our human grasp of that truth is progressive and culturally mediated – we sometimes need multiple complementary metaphysical perspectives to do justice to the fullness of the mystery (the way both Augustine’s and Aquinas’s insights, though distinct, are part of Catholic tradition). When kept “in service” to the faith rather than made a new master-concept, Benovsky’s ideas about theory choice and aesthetics might even enrich theological method – encouraging Catholics to present the faith in ways that are not only true but also intellectually beautiful and compelling, employing the best of various traditions.

In evaluating these themes, a rigorous and balanced view acknowledges that faith and meta-metaphysics operate at different levels. Faith asserts a truth that sometimes outruns what metaphysical argument alone can secure (e.g. “This is my body” as truth of Eucharist). Metaphysics (and meta-metaphysics) help clarify how we might consistently conceptualize such truths. Benovsky helps by showing that conceptualization can be flexible and imaginative – a lesson useful against any rigid scholasticism. Yet, the Catholic appropriation of this flexibility stops where divinely guaranteed truth begins. In conclusion, Jiri Benovsky’s “primitives as problem-solvers” can be appreciated by Catholic thought as a descriptive insight into how we reason about mysteries, and his meta-metaphysical suggestions can encourage a thoughtful pluralism in non-essential matters. However, the Church’s theological realism and commitment to specific revealed realities provide a firm counterbalance, ensuring that this appropriation remains guided by the principle that truth is one, objective, and ultimately given by God (The science-faith dialogue in the Encyclical Fides et ratio. group Science, Reason and Faith (CRYF). University of Navarra). The fruitful middle ground is one where Catholic philosophers engage with contemporary ideas to sharpen their own thinking, all the while maintaining the transcendent truth that their theories seek to humbly reflect, not replace.

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TL;DR:

A deeply informed Catholic, operating within the text tradition of Catholicism—which synthesizes the Bible, the Catechism, the Doctors of the Church, and the Denzinger text—would appropriate Jiri Benovsky’s concept of primitives as problem-solvers as a methodological tool to clarify the structure of theological reasoning while firmly rejecting his anti-realist conclusions. The thesis statement would be:

While Jiri Benovsky’s framework of primitives as problem-solvers highlights the indispensable role of fundamental explanatory principles in metaphysics, a deeply informed Catholic can appropriate this insight to better articulate the structural logic of theological doctrines—such as divine simplicity, the Trinity, and sacramental efficacy—without conceding to his anti-realist or nominalist conclusions. Rather than treating theological primitives as contingent or interchangeable explanatory conveniences, Catholic realism affirms that these primitives correspond to an objective divine order, ultimately grounded in God’s self-revelation and the ontological reality of creation. Therefore, Benovsky’s approach is useful for analyzing how theological models function, but it must be subordinated to the Catholic commitment that truth is not merely theoretical utility but an ontological given rooted in divine being and revelation. For example, while Jiri Benovsky’s framework of ‘primitives as problem-solvers’ reveals how foundational explanatory elements function in metaphysical theories, a Catholic realist—grounded in the integrated tradition of Scripture, the Catechism, the Doctors of the Church, and the Denzinger text—asserts that such primitives are not mere convenient constructs but reflect objective aspects of divine reality. In this light, Benovsky’s insights can be appropriated to elucidate the structural logic of doctrines like divine simplicity, the Trinity, and sacramental efficacy, without compromising the ontological truth that these theological principles are rooted in God’s self-revelation and the immutable order of creation.